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Summary 
This study is comprised of three interrelated parts of a broad study investigating the 
corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSD) practices of Australian gambling 
companies. The first part of this study investigates the changing trends in the CSD 
practices of two major Australian gambling companies, Crown Limited (Crown) and 
Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Tabcorp), in order to understand what information is 
reported in CSDs, and why. Utilising a complementary perspective that includes 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory, this part of the study 
performs an analysis of the two gambling companies’ annual reports (1995-2009) to 
investigate whether external pressures from the Australian community reflected in three 
major government initiatives leads to a change in the CSD practices of the two major 
gambling companies.  
The results of part one show that the CSDs practices of Crown and Tabcorp appear to be 
directly driven by external pressures, i.e., by the community via government initiatives. 
However, the study results also show that the disclosure category of most apparent 
concern to stakeholders, responsible gambling (RG), had not increased extensively 
compared to other categories of disclosures. The minor and predominantly positive 
disclosures on RG were evident around the time that government initiatives occurred; 
thus the minor increases were deemed to be due to external pressure being exerted on 
gambling companies, which suggests that CSDs are used more for legitimation 
purposes. Part one of the study contributes to the SEA literature, as it is the first known 
study to examine the annual report CSD practices of Australian gambling companies 
with respect to external pressures.  
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The findings of part one directly led to the investigation in part two which examines the 
responsible gambling and harm minimisation (RGHM) annual report disclosures of 
gambling companies to gain an understanding of the extent to which gambling 
companies publicly discharge (or do not discharge) their accountability to stakeholders 
regarding social issues associated with problem gambling. Adopting the ethical 
perspective (embodying a normative position) of stakeholder theory, part two examines 
annual report disclosures by four gambling companies for 7-year period (2005-2011), 
based on a RGHM index which consists of 30 specific issues relating to RGHM, in four 
general categories. The index was developed on the basis of reviewing the eight 
Australian state/territory governments’ documents in relation to RGHM initiatives 
which aimed to minimise the prevalence of problem gambling. The RGHM measures 
embodied in the various state/territory initiatives were considered to be an appropriate 
reflection of wider stakeholder concerns about the social costs of problem gambling.  
An analysis of the 28 annual reports of Crown, Tabcorp, Tatts Groups Limited, and 
SkyCity Entertainment Group Limited, formed the basis for the results of this study. 
The results show a low level of RGHM disclosure which is reflective of a low level of 
corporate accountability being discharged by the gambling companies in relation to 
social issues associated with problem gambling. The findings of part two generally 
support the results of part one – that CSDs, particularly RGHM disclosures, are not used 
to demonstrate accountability to stakeholders. This part of the study contributes to the 
SEA literature in so far as it provides insights into the disclosure practices of gambling 
companies in relation to their RGHM information; this is of most concern to 
stakeholders. The disclosure index sheds light on what information should be disclosed 
by companies.  
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Part three of the study explores corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM and 
problem gambling-related social issues to ascertain any potential difference between the 
views of gambling organisations as projected to the public (through media such as 
annual report disclosures), and the actual views of managers of gambling companies. 
Part three involves a review of public documents (public submissions made by 
gambling companies to the public inquiry into gambling) that allow direct access to 
corporations’ perspectives on RGHM issues and problem gambling-related social 
issues.  
In all, 13 submissions by gambling companies and its associations were analysed. The 
reviews of the gambling companies’ submissions made to the government inquiry 
appear to focus on the importance of profitability and argue against the further 
introduction and/or implementation of RGHM regulatory measures. However, within 
the RGHM disclosures (study results from part two), corporations seemingly proclaim 
themselves to be socially responsible and committed to minimising harm associated 
with problem gambling. This difference between the companies’ public position and 
their actual beliefs on RGHM issues reveals an apparent decoupling between 
corporations’ public and internal views on RGHM issues and raises questions about the 
credibility of, and motivation behind, gambling companies’ voluntarily produced CSDs. 
The findings of part three provide further evidence to support a view that annual reports 
may not provide a true reflection of managements’ beliefs about their social information. 
Consequently, the findings have important implications for Australian federal 
government or state-based regulation relating to gambling: increased regulation 
surrounding RGHM might be necessary to address public accountability in the 
gambling industry and potentially minimise the prevalence of problem gambling.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This broad study examines the corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSD) 
practices of gambling companies operating within Australia and comprises three key 
interrelated parts. The first part of the study investigates the motivation underlying the 
changing trends of CSD practices in the annual reports of gambling companies. At a 
more focused level, the second part of the study investigates the extent of accountability 
being discharged (or not discharged) by gambling companies in relation to responsible 
gambling and harm minimisation (RGHM) annual report disclosures. The third and final 
part of the study explores gambling corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM to 
investigate any potential decoupling between gambling corporations’ public positioning 
and internal views on RGHM issues.  
This study is an attempt to extend our knowledge on a previously unexplored area that 
directs attention towards gambling companies’ CSD practices, in particular RGHM 
information, an area that has lacked attention in social and environmental accounting 
(SEA) literature. The following sections of this chapter present the significance of the 
study, followed by the primary research objectives and related parts of the study, the 
development of the research methods, then an overview of the theoretical perspective of 
the study, the research contributions and an outline of the remaining chapters.  
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1.2 Significance of the study 
The primary motivation behind this study is that the Australian gambling industry, 
while playing a significant role in the Australian economy, negatively impacts on the 
social wellbeing of its population. It is economically important to Australia, since 
gambling revenues comprises 1.5 per cent of the country’s GDP (Australasian Gaming 
Council, 2008; Productivity Commission, 1999), contributes to approximately 10 per 
cent of state/territory tax revenues (Productivity Commission, 2009), and employs 
around 67,000 people directly and an additional 105,000 indirectly in related jobs (e.g. 
in hotels and clubs) (Productivity Commission, 2010). Nevertheless, the gambling 
industry creates serious social costs, particularly those associated with problem 
gambling. In the Australian context, the national definition of problem gambling relates 
to the broad aspects of harm at the social and community level, in addition to individual 
behaviour (Neal et al., 2005, p. i): 
Problem gambling is characterised by difficulties in limiting money and/or time 
spent on gambling, which leads to adverse consequences for the gambler, others, or 
the community. 
Australians have been reported to be among the heaviest gamblers in the world 
(Productivity Commission, 1999). Approximately 0.7 and 1.7 per cent of the adult 
population indulge in problem gambling and moderate-risk gambling respectively 
(Productivity Commission, 2010). In addition to this, for every single problem gambler
1
, 
another 5 to 10 people are affected. In the latest government public inquiry gambling 
                                               
1
 In Australia, people seeking help from counselling agencies for their gambling are labelled ‘problem 
gamblers’. The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) is a set of questions used to determine whether a 
person is a problem gambler. Those scoring 10 or higher on the SOGS can be labelled ‘problem 
gamblers’; those scoring 5 to 9 are often described as ‘at-risk’ (Productivity Commission, 1999). 
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report, ‘Productivity Commission 2010, Gambling, Report No. 50, Canberra’ (hereafter 
referred to as PC2010), the Productivity Commission estimated that problem gambling 
affects up to five million Australians, including friends, family and employers of people 
with a gambling problem (Productivity Commission, 2010). Hence, the social cost of 
gambling to the Australian society will remain significant if a timely and appropriate 
strategy for addressing problem gambling is not implemented within the near future.  
Problem gambling has been recognised by Australian federal and state governments as 
one of the most challenging social issues. The Australian Government promotes 
responsible gambling practices through various harm minimisation measures to tackle 
problem gambling and is taking a range of actions to support problem gamblers and 
their families (FaHCSIA, 2012). For the purpose of this study, the term ‘responsible 
gambling’ is defined as “gambling that takes place in a regulated environment where the 
likelihood of harm is minimal and where people can make informed decisions about 
their gambling activity” (Queensland Treasury, 2002a, p. 3; 2002b, p. 4). ‘Harm 
minimisation’ refers to a policy or program directed towards minimising or decreasing 
the adverse health, social and economic consequences of gambling behaviour for 
individuals, families, communities and society (Fogarty & Young, 2008, p. v). 
Government initiatives to reduce the prevalence of problem gambling is a primary 
concern of gambling companies
2
, as problem gambling is directly linked to the 
gambling activities that they provide. In Australia, there is a belief held by many 
stakeholders that gambling companies should be responsible for protecting their patrons 
from the potential harm of gambling (Delfabbro et al., 2007). They should therefore 
hold formal ‘corporate social responsibility’ objectives that encompass “wide-ranging 
                                               
2
 Gambling companies are those companies that provide any forms of gambling products and/or services 
directly to consumers. 
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social, ethical, environmental and economics obligations to corporate stakeholders 
(including broader communities and future generations) and not just their shareholders” 
(Hancock et al., 2008, p. 60). Corporations should ‘proclaim’ their social responsibility 
credentials and publicly discharge accountability
3
 for social issues to their society 
through the provision of corporate social responsibility information within CSD 
(Cooper & Owen, 2007; Deegan & Gordon, 1996).   
Yet, despite the serious social cost of problem gambling and governments pledging to 
reduce the harm associated with problem gambling, there is still a general lack of 
research that investigates CSD and its associated accountability reporting practices in 
the gambling industry (Jones et al., 2009); specifically lacking is research on what 
information is reported in CSDs and whether external pressure influences/improves 
gambling companies’ CSD and/or accountability reporting practices.   
Prior research indicates that external pressure impacts on the CSD practices of 
corporations (Tilt, 1994; Islam & Deegan, 2009; Cowan & Deegan, 2011). Therefore, 
this study investigates what information is reported via the CSDs of gambling 
companies operating within Australia, and why particular information is reported. In 
doing so, this study provides an understanding of what information is reported within 
the CSDs of gambling companies, and the motivations behind such disclosures. Thus, 
this study also addresses an apparent void in the SEA literature. Moreover, while 
governments have initiated and implemented various RGHM measures to tackle 
problem gambling social issues, investigation into whether or not corporations are 
fulfilling their accountability in relation to RGHM information, has not been undertaken. 
                                               
3
 Accountability is “the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or 
reckoning of those actions for which one is held accountable” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 38). 
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The importance of RGHM disclosure as a mechanism for discharging corporate 
accountability to stakeholders is underpinned by the perception held by many 
stakeholders that gambling companies should be accountable for the social 
consequences of their gambling business activities; they should be held responsible for 
protecting their patrons from the potential harm of gambling (Delfabbro et al., 2007) 
through implementing various RGHM measures. RGHM measures (such as maximum 
bet limit and restricting the daily withdrawal limit from Automated Teller Machines), 
however, might also potentially conflict with corporations’ profit objectives; i.e. RGHM 
measures may potentially decrease or limit increases in corporations’ business 
profitability by, for example, reducing revenues (from problem gamblers) or increasing 
operational costs. Consequently, gambling companies’ voluntarily produced RGHM 
information within annual reports could arguably be viewed with some scepticism, 
given the interdependency between actions taken to address problem gambling and the 
‘market imperative’ to maximise profits and shareholder value. Thus, the study also 
explores corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM and problem gambling-related 
social issues in order to ascertain whether any decoupling
4
 exists between corporations’ 
public position and actual beliefs regarding RGHM issues. If there is a disconnect 
between corporations’ public positioning (reflected in their annual report disclosures) on 
the social costs of problem gambling and their actual beliefs (reflected, for example, in 
their submissions to the New Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling), then 
                                               
4
 According to Deegan (2014, p.391), decoupling occurs when the way an organisation projects itself 
through such media as annual report disclosures is quite different to how the organisation functions 
internally, or where there is a difference between the ‘values’ of an organisation that are  projected to the 
public, and the actual values of the managers in question.  
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questions may be raised about the credibility
5
 of gambling companies’ CSDs, 
specifically RGHM disclosures.   
1.3 Research objectives and the three main research parts 
The three main research objectives of this study are:  
1. To investigate the changing trends of CSD practices of Australian gambling 
companies in order to understand what information is reported, and why.  
2. To investigate the RGHM disclosure practices of gambling companies operating 
within Australia to gain an understanding of the extent to which gambling 
companies publicly discharge (or do not discharge) their accountability to 
stakeholders regarding social issues associated with problem gambling.   
3. To (further) explore corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM and problem 
gambling-related social issues in order to ascertain whether any potential 
decoupling exists between corporations’ public positioning and internal views on 
RGHM issues.  
While interrelated, each research objective is examined and presented in a separate part 
(and chapter) of the thesis. An overview of each part is presented below. 
1.3.1 Part one  
The first research issue and objective (detailed in Chapter 5) is to understand what 
information is provided in the gambling companies’ annual report disclosures and why; 
and whether external pressure exerted on corporations encourages them to change their 
                                               
5
 For the purposes of the study, the term ‘credibility’ refers to the substance of the phenomenon as being 
trustworthy - without material error (free from error and free from bias).    
10 
 
CSD practices. To accomplish this objective, part one of the study investigates the 
changing trends in CSD practices of two major Australian gambling companies – 
Crown Limited (Crown) and Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Tabcorp), over a 15-year 
period (1995-2009). The primary motivation for this part of the study is that in this 
period there was an increase in external pressure (from the community via government 
initiatives) being exerted on the gambling industry and, in particular, gambling 
companies to tackle the social issues and costs associated with problem gambling.  
The results of part one show that Crown and Tabcorp disclose increasingly positive 
information in response to external pressure, such as from the community via 
government initiatives. Supporting prior research such as Islam and Deegan (2008) and 
Tilt (1994), the findings suggest that the CSD practices of gambling companies are 
indeed influenced by external pressure. While not the primary focus of this study, the 
findings suggest that external pressure may affect reporting practices across a range of 
‘sensitive’ industries, e.g., the garments manufacturing industry in Bangladesh (Islam & 
Deegan, 2008) and the Australian minerals industry (Deegan & Blomquist, 2006). 
However, the study results also show that the disclosure category of most concern to 
stakeholders, responsible gambling, has not increased extensively compared to other 
categories such as human resources and community involvement. The minor and 
predominantly positive disclosures on responsible gambling are evident around the time 
that government initiatives occurred; which suggests that CSDs may be used more for 
legitimation purposes rather than for demonstrating accountability to stakeholders. 
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1.3.2 Part two 
The findings of part one led to a more focused investigation carried out in part two – to 
investigate specifically the RGHM disclosure practices of gambling companies 
operating within the Australian gambling industry (Chapter 6). This part of the study 
adopts the ethical perspective (normative perspective of stakeholder theory) that 
corporations have a moral obligation and accountability to disclose information to all 
their stakeholders, not just shareholders. This study involves the development of a 
RGHM disclosure index consisting of 30 specific RGHM issues classified under four 
general categories, namely public awareness, responsible environment, support services, 
and structural machine design. This index is used to assess the extent to which 
gambling corporations publicly discharge (or not discharge) their accountability to 
stakeholders in relation to RGHM disclosures. The annual reports of four major 
gambling companies, namely Crown, Tabcorp, Tatts Group Limited (Tatts) and SkyCity 
Entertainment Group Limited (SkyCity), were examined over 7-year period (2005-
2011).  
The findings of part two show a low level of RGHM disclosures which were considered 
to be reflective of a low level of corporate accountability being discharged by the 
gambling companies to their stakeholders regarding problem gambling issues. The 
results generally support the findings of part one – that CSDs do not demonstrate a 
broader (more ethically-driven) accountability to stakeholders but are used more for 
legitimation purposes. The combination of the results from part one and two suggests 
that there are no substantial attempts by gambling companies to ‘account’ for the actual 
or potential social ‘costs’ associated with their corporation’s activities.  
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1.3.3 Part three 
This part of the study may be viewed as an extension of part 2 in that it seeks to identify 
further evidence, from a different but related source, that might (or might not) indicate a 
de-coupling (disconnection) of gambling companies publicly projected position in 
annual report disclosures on RGHM and their actual RGHM position (beliefs and 
practises). The results of part two raise questions such as are gambling companies’ 
CSDs a ‘true’ reflection of managements’ views about RGHM and problem gambling 
social issues? Are problem gambling social issues really a matter of concern to the 
managers of gambling companies? Or are gambling revenues the focal interest to the 
managers of gambling companies?  
Therefore the objective of part three (detailed in Chapter 7) is to investigate whether 
there is a potential decoupling of gambling organisations public (external) positioning 
(in their annual report disclosures) on issues of RGHM and their internal positioning 
(beliefs and actions) on RGHM issues. To accomplish this objective, in part three of the 
study public documents (public submissions made by gambling companies to the New 
Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling in 2008) were reviewed to investigate 
any potential disconnection between the publicly projected views of corporations versus 
their internal corporate views on RGHM issues. A total of 13 public submissions from 
gambling corporations and industry associations were reviewed to explore the views 
expressed by gambling corporations regarding RGHM and social issues related to 
problem gambling.  
The results of the review of public submissions made by gambling companies provides 
additional evidence that suggests gambling revenues and viability of the industry are the 
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focal interest of the management of gambling companies and supports a view that there 
is a disconnection between gambling corporations public positioning (reflected in their 
disclosures) on the social costs of problem gambling and the corporations’ actual beliefs 
and activities. The results further evidence to support a view that annual reports may not 
provide a ‘true’ reflection of managements’ beliefs about their social and environmental 
information. Part three of the study further suggests that gambling company disclosures 
are not so motivated by the ethical treatment of stakeholders, but more by the desire to 
maintain profits.  
1.4 Research methods: an overview 
Different research methods were adopted for each part of this study. An overview of the 
development of the research methods is provided below:  
1.4.1 Part one 
Part one of this study involved a combination of annual report content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 1980) and a review of government reports issued on the gambling 
industry.  
The annual reports of two major Australian companies, Crown and Tabcorp were 
collected for a period of 15 years (from 1995 to 2009). This period has been chosen to 
provide insight into how the CSD practices have changed over time, and during a period 
where changing pressures were being exerted upon the industry. In this study the three 
interrelated Australian government initiatives (initiatives which are arguably reflective, 
or a manifestation, of community concern) are used as proxies for public concerns about 
the social costs of gambling in the first part of the study. These are: (1) the 
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recommendations of the Productivity Commission in 1999 – Productivity Commission, 
1999, Australia’s Gambling Industries, Report No.10 (hereafter referred to as PC1999)6, 
(2) the establishment of the Ministerial Council on Gambling (MCG)
7
, and (3) the 
MCG-initiated National Framework on Problem Gambling (NFPG). These initiatives 
and related reports outlined recommendations for a range of practices and activities to 
be instituted within the gambling industry and by gambling companies to address the 
issues of problem gambling. Particular recommendations around problem gambling 
were used to categorise content in company annual reports in addition to other broad 
categories which were adopted (with some adaptations) from the instrument used by 
Hackston and Milne (1996) and Deegan et al. (2002). Only Crown and Tabcorp were 
selected for this part of the study for a number of reasons. First, both organisations offer 
wide-ranging forms of gambling products and services, including gaming, wagering and 
lottery products; second, the two organisations control substantial market share (e.g. 
approximately 85 per cent or $4 billion) of total Australian casino industry revenue – 
(IBISWorld, 2012); third, both organisations were listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) since 1994 and annual report were, therefore, available for the 15 year 
period of this study. 
A total of 30 annual reports formed the basis of the results. The content analysis of 
annual reports over a long period of time provided the opportunity to understand if 
external pressures, such as the government initiatives in the PC1999, the MCG and its 
NFPG, led to a change in their CSD practices of the Australian gambling companies.  
                                               
6
 PC1999 was a report that resulted from high levels of community engagement with a wide range of 
participants who raised various concerns with, and expectations of, the gambling industry in terms of its 
social costs, in particular those associated with problem gamblers. 
7
 MCG is a national body that aimed to minimise the negative social impacts of problem gambling 
through exchanging information among states/territory to facilitate the development of suitable regulatory 
approaches such as the implementation of its NFPG 2004-2008. 
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1.4.2 Part two 
In part two of the study, a RGHM disclosure index consisting of 30 specific RGHM 
issues under four general categories was developed. The index was developed on the 
basis of reviewing eight Australian state/territory governments’ publicly issued 
documents in relation to their recommended RGHM initiatives. Such initiatives were in 
response to concerns with problem gambling raised within PC1999 and were based on 
the findings and recommendations within PC1999. Based on this reasoning, this study 
presumed that the government initiatives and recommendations of each state/territory 
are arguably reflective of community concerns with, and expectations of, the gambling 
industry, particularly gambling companies and their activities’ that result in problem 
gambling.  
Utilising this disclosure index, a content analysis of annual reports (2005-2011) was 
then performed to investigate the extent of RGHM disclosure practices of four major 
gambling companies, namely Crown, Tabcorp, Tatts, and SkyCity. The selection of 
companies was based on the criterion that the company would be listed on the ASX top 
200 companies by market capitalisation (S&P ASX200) as on 1 June 2012. This period 
was chosen to provide insights into what and how the disclosure of RGHM information 
has changed over time during a period where there were growing demands from 
stakeholders for gambling organisations to provide a greater account for their actions 
regarding the social issues associated with problem gambling. 
A total of 28 annual reports formed the basis of the results. The content analysis of 
annual reports over time provided an opportunity to gain an understanding of the extent 
of accountability being discharged (or do not discharged) by gambling companies to its 
stakeholders regarding problem gambling social issues.  
16 
 
1.4.3 Part three 
As this part of the study sought to investigate whether any potential decoupling exists 
between corporations’ public and ‘real’ views, part three of the study reviews 
submissions made by the four gambling companies identified in part two of the study to 
the New Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling in 2008.  
Only Tabcorp and Tatts made submissions to the inquiry. However, the industry bodies, 
the Australasian Casino Association (ACA) and the Australasian Gaming Council 
(AGC) (which represent their members including Crown and SkyCity), made 
submissions on behalf of their members. Given this, the submissions from the ACA and 
the AGC were also reviewed to consider their members’ overall broad views on RGHM 
and problem gambling issues.  
Document analysis was adopted as a systematic procedure to review public submissions 
and was considered to be a direct way to access corporations’ perspectives of RGHM 
and problem gambling-related social issues. Rather than quantifying the content of the 
submissions (for example, in terms of words around a particular category), the analysis 
involved reading documents to identify passages of text oriented around any particular 
themes which could provide meaningful categories to further interpret and classify the 
data. 
In all, 13 submissions (submissions submitted by Tabcorp, Tatts, the ACA, and the 
AGC) were analysed to explore corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM and 
problem gambling issues in order to ascertain whether there is any potential decoupling 
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exists between their public positioning on issues of RGHM and their internal 
positioning (view) on the same issues. 
1.5 Theoretical perspectives of the study 
Three interconnected theories – legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional 
theory – were used to examine the CSD practices of gambling companies operating 
within Australia. These theories have been used by many SEA researchers to discuss 
and understand the CSD practices of organisations. 
Legitimacy theory explains how an organisation attempts to maintain its ‘social 
contract’ or ‘license to operate’ in order to be seen as complying with the expectations 
of the community in which it operates (Deegan, 2002). The managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory provides a more refined resolution by referring to particular groups 
within the community and suggesting that an organisation will respond to the concerns 
and expectations of powerful stakeholders (Ullmann, 1985). In view of a belief held by 
many stakeholders that gambling companies are implicitly accountable for the social 
consequences of their operations, to not only their shareholders but also their corporate 
stakeholders (Hancock et al., 2008), in part two of this study, the ethical perspective 
(embodying the normative position) of stakeholder theory is adopted to investigate the 
extent to which gambling companies discharge (or not discharge) their accountability to 
stakeholders regarding social issues associated with problem gambling. Institutional 
theory explains how organisations embrace operating policies that are similar in form to 
those embraced by powerful stakeholders and strongly emphasises that organisations 
can incorporate institutionalised norms and rules to gain stability and enhance corporate 
survival prospects (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
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This study treats these three theories (legitimacy, stakeholders and institutional) as 
largely overlapping, as there are many similarities between them that provide consistent 
but slightly different insights into the factors that motivate managerial behaviour (Gray 
et al., 1995; O’Donovan, 2002). As stated by Chen and Roberts (2010), these theories 
share a common interest – to explain how organisations ensure their survival and 
growth and “although these theories are different in their levels of perspective, 
specificity, and resolution, their objectives are much the same” (Chen & Roberts, 2010, 
p. 661). Thus, a consideration of the three theories is deemed to provide a fuller 
explanation of CSD decisions.  
A detailed discussion of each of these theories will be provided in Chapter 4.  
1.6 Research contributions 
Whilst the three parts of this study together contribute to an understanding of the CSDs 
and associated reporting practices of gambling companies and their motivations, there 
are several further significant contributions of each part of this study.  
Part one of the study is the first known study to explore how shifting levels of 
community pressure can influence the CSD practices of major Australian gambling 
companies. While there is a great deal of research that examines CSD practices in 
various industries such as the garment industry (see for example Belal & Owen, 2007; 
Islam & Deegan, 2008), there is relatively limited research that examines the changing 
trends of CSD practices within the gambling industry. Part one is also particularly 
significant in terms of its research method insofar as it utilises the Australian federal 
government inquiries and related report recommendations as a proxies for community 
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concerns and expectations that lead to changes in gambling companies’ CSD practices 
and to inform the development of categories for the analysis of annual reports. The first 
and arguably the most significant initiative, PC1999, was formed through various 
national surveys, round table discussions and public hearings, and thus covered a large 
sample of the Australian community.  
The significance of part two is that this is the first known research to examine the level 
of disclosure in relation to RGHM information; it also provided evidence of low levels 
of RGHM disclosures, which is reflective of low levels of accountability being 
discharged by the gambling companies regarding the social issues and costs of problem 
gambling. This is also the first known study to develop a disclosure index from state 
and territory governments’ RGHM strategies. There is a general lack of gambling-
related research available in SEA literature, as the existing research related to gambling 
focuses on problem-gambling social issues linked to sociology and from a social science 
perspective (for example, see Wheeler et al., 2008; Mintel, 2006b; Blaszczynski et al., 
2004; Dickerson, 2004; McMillen, 2009; Law, 2005).  
Part three contributes to the SEA literature as it provides further empirical evidence to 
support the view that gambling companies’ CSDs within annual reports do not provide a 
‘true’ reflection of managements’ views about RGHM and problem gambling social 
issues. This raises questions about whether further government regulation and/or 
legislation should be introduced if a real change in gambling organisations’ 
accountability and operations is to eventuate.  
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1.7 Structure of the study 
The remaining chapters of this thesis are presented as follows. 
Chapter 2 addresses the focus area of the study: Australia’s gambling industry, one of 
the most profitable and expanding industries worldwide, but also one of the most 
scrutinised industries, costly from a social perspective. In particular, some major issues 
of concern within the gambling industry will be highlighted, including a brief 
consideration of community pressures reflected in three major government initiatives. 
The discussion in this chapter will primarily lead to a detailed outline of the 
investigation which forms the first part of the study (Chapter 5) – to investigate the 
changing trends of CSD practices of two major Australian gambling companies in order 
to understand what information is reported in CSDs and why. This chapter will also 
provide a brief overview of the three interrelated research issues addressed in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7 respectively.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of prior research in SEA. Based on a review of prior 
literature, this chapter identifies a lack of into the economically and socially significant 
industry of gambling. This chapter specifically shows that there is a general lack of 
available longitudinal research that examines CSD practices of gambling companies, 
how external pressure may influence these practices, as well as the public demand for 
corporate accountability in relation to RGHM disclosures.  
While the literature review begins in Chapter 3, it continues into Chapter 4 with a 
discussion of the theories underpinning this study. The primary purpose of Chapter 4 is 
to provide a general overview of some of the theoretical perspectives that have 
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commonly been used by researchers working in the area of SEA. This chapter also 
provides justification for the adoption of the complementary perspectives of three 
interrelated theories – legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional theories (particularly for 
part one of the study) – to provide a better understanding of the CSD practices of 
gambling companies. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the three interrelated parts of the research and include some 
background to each part of the broader study, the application of theories, the research 
methods (including acquisition of the requisite data, measurement techniques and 
analytic techniques), results, interpretations, discussions and conclusions. The primary 
research, as the first part of the broader study (detailed in Chapter 5) focuses on 
investigating the changing trends of CSD practices of two major Australian gambling 
companies (Crown and Tabcorp). Based on the results derived from Chapter 5, Chapter 
6 focuses on the RGHM disclosure practices of four major gambling companies 
operating within Australia: Crown, Tabcorp, Tatts and SkyCity. Based on the results 
provided in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 reviews the public inquiry submissions made by 
gambling companies (and the industry associations) to explore corporations’ views and 
perceptions of RGHM and problem gambling-related issues, to ascertain whether there 
is any decoupling between corporations’ public and internal positioning on RGHM 
issues (refer to Table 1.1 for a brief summary of the study). 
Chapter 8 provides a conclusion to the study by revisiting the research issues, as well as 
providing future implications of this study. The key contributions and limitations of the 
study are also briefly discussed. 
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Table 1.1: A brief summary of the study 
Research 
parts 
Research 
objectives 
Research methods Research findings Research implications 
Part 1  
(Chapter 5) 
To 
investigate 
the changing 
trends of 
CSD 
practices of 
Australian 
gambling 
companies. 
To understand 
what information is 
reported in the 
CSDs of gambling 
companies 
operating within 
Australia, and why.  
Content analysis: 
Two major gambling companies’ 
CSDs within annual reports from 
1995 to 2009. 
 
The study results show that gambling 
companies make increasingly positive 
disclosures in response to external 
pressures, such as community via 
government initiatives. 
 
The disclosure category of most concern 
to stakeholders, responsible gambling, has 
not increased extensively compared to 
other categories such as human resources 
and community involvement. 
The minor and predominantly positive disclosures on the responsible gambling 
category are evident around the time that government initiatives occurred; the minor 
increases were due to external pressure exerted on gambling companies. This 
suggests that CSDs are more for legitimation purposes rather than for demonstrating 
accountability.  
 
The study results alert regulators about the possible need to regulate social 
disclosures made by organisation operating in the gambling industry. This led to the 
investigation in part two – to investigate RGHM disclosure practices – to gain an 
understanding of the extent to which gambling companies publicly discharge (or do 
not discharge) their accountability to stakeholders regarding problem gambling 
issues.  
Part 2 
(Chapter 6) 
To 
investigate 
RGHM 
disclosure 
practices of 
gambling 
companies. 
To gain an 
understanding of 
the extent to which 
gambling 
companies publicly 
discharge (or do 
not discharge) their 
accountability to 
stakeholders 
regarding problem 
gambling social 
issues.  
Content Analysis: 
Four major gambling companies’ 
RGHM disclosures within annual 
reports from 2005 to 2011 are 
investigated using the RGHM 
disclosure index developed in part 
two of this broader study. 
The study results show a low level of 
RGHM disclosures by the four gambling 
companies based on the RGHM 
disclosure index.  
 
The low level of RGHM disclosures is 
reflective of a low level of accountability 
being discharged by the gambling 
companies with respect to the social 
issues and costs of problem gambling. 
The low level of RGHM disclosures provide further evidence to support the 
findings of part one: that CSDs are not used to demonstrate a broader (more 
ethically-driven) accountability to stakeholders but are more for legitimation 
purposes. The findings from part one and two suggest that is no substantial attempt 
from gambling companies to ‘account’ for the actual or potential social costs 
associated with corporate gambling activities. The study results suggest there is a 
need for legislation to be introduced in order to enhance the accountability of 
companies operating within the gambling industry.   
 
In view of RGHM measures are potentially in conflict with corporations’ profit 
objectives, the study explores corporations’ views of RGHM and problem 
gambling-related social issues to ascertain whether there is any potential decoupling 
exists between corporations’ public and internal positioning on RGHM issues.   
Part 3 
(Chapter 7) 
To explore 
corporations’ 
views and 
perceptions 
of RGHM 
and problem 
gambling 
social issues. 
To ascertain 
whether there is 
any potential 
decoupling exists 
between 
corporations’ 
public and internal 
position on RGHM 
issues.   
Public Documents Review: 
Document analysis was adopted to 
review the 13 public submissions 
made by gambling companies and 
the industry associations to the New 
Productivity Commission Inquiry 
into Gambling in 2008 to examine 
corporations’ views and perceptions 
of RGHM and problem gambling 
social issues. 
 
    
The review of the submissions reveal that 
corporate submissions focus on the 
importance of business profitability and 
are against the further introduction and/or 
implementation of RGHM measures. 
There is lack of corporations’ concerns 
and cares regarding problem gambling 
social issues, which is what they projected 
to the public via their RGHM disclosures.  
 
 
The discrepancy between corporations’ public and internal positioning on RGHM 
issues means that RGHM annual report disclosures do not provide a ‘true 
reflection’ of managements’ views and perceptions regarding RGHM and problem 
gambling social issues. Corporations appear fixated on profits and related issues, 
which makes it difficult to accept that they will voluntarily embrace accountability 
in relation to problem gambling issues. Thus voluntarily produces CSD, especially 
RGHM disclosures, of gambling companies, lack credibility.  
 
The study results provide further evidence to support the findings of parts 1 and 2, 
and increased justification for the regulation of CSDs in order to create real changes 
regarding accountability within the gambling industry.   
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Chapter Two 
The Australian Gambling Industry                                        
and its Social Impacts 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the focus of this study: 
the Australian gambling industry – one of the major industries in Australia and the 
corporate social and environmental disclosures (CSD) of major companies in the 
industry. In the first section, the motivation for selecting this industry is presented 
together with a review of the development of the industry over time. A consideration of 
the social impacts associated with the gambling industry is then presented with a 
particular emphasis on the issues and costs of problem gambling. This is followed by a 
review of major government initiatives and investigations (Productivity Commission, 
1999, Australia’s Gambling Industries, Report No.10 [PC1999], the Ministerial Council 
on Gambling [MCG] and its’ National Framework on Problem Gambling [NFPG], 
Productivity Commission 2010, Gambling, Report No. 50, Canberra [PC2010]) into the 
gambling industry which reflects the government’s response to growing community 
concerns with the social costs of gambling. The final section outlines the three key and 
interrelated parts of this study which examine whether external pressures from the 
community, via government initiatives (PC1999 and the MCG’s NFPG), influence the 
CSD and its associated accountability reporting practices of gambling companies.  
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2.2 The motivations behind considering the Australian 
gambling industry 
The Australian gambling industry was selected as the focus for this study for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, the Australian gambling industry is a major industry in Australia that 
has evolved to be one of significant national economic importance. The industry 
contributes 1.5 per cent of the country’s GDP (Australasian Gaming Council, 2008; 
Productivity Commission, 1999), contributes tax revenues of at least AUD$4.7 billion 
annually – which represents approximately 10 per cent of state/territory taxation 
revenue (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008) – and employs around 67,000 people 
directly and an additional 105,000 indirectly in related jobs (such as those employed in 
hotels and clubs) (Productivity Commission, 2010).   
Secondly, the gambling industry in Australia has been the subject of intense community 
scrutiny, particularly in terms of problem gambling and its associated adverse social 
impacts. The industry contributes substantial economic benefits to Australia in terms of 
taxes, employment, associated tourism and the like, but also causes many adverse social 
outcomes associated with problem gambling, including crime, suicide, depression, 
relationship breakdowns, job loss and bankruptcy (McMillen & Wright, 2008; Bridges 
& Williamson, 2004; Productivity Commission, 1999; Blaszczynski & Farrell, 1998). 
According to the PC1999, these social costs of gambling were high, and approximated 
to be somewhere between $1.8 billion and $5.6 billion (Productivity Commission, 2009, 
p. xxii). Likewise, the Australian Government estimates that the social cost of problem 
gambling to Australian communities are at least $4.7 billion a year (Australian 
Government Problem Gambling, 2012). Research into gambling social-related issues 
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have been undertaken, especially from the sociological and social science perspectives, 
and include investigations of pathological gambling, identifying ‘problem gambling’, 
problem gambling social impacts, problem gambling behaviours, internet gambling, 
socio-economic effects of gambling, and various issues associated with young gamblers 
(Neal et al., 2005; Abler et al., 2009; Allcock et al., 2002; Battersby et al., 2008; Binde, 
2009; Broda et al., 2008; Dickerson & O’Connor, 2006; Dickerson et al., 1990; Lesieur 
& Klein, 1987). However, there is a general lack of accounting research investigating 
the CSD and its associated accountability reporting practices of gambling companies. 
Therefore, the Australian gambling industry is a significant industry in which to 
investigate the extent of, and motivations for CSD practices of gambling companies. In 
particular, CSD about the impact (both positive and negative) of gambling and 
organisational actions undertaken, such as responsible gambling and harm minimisation 
(RGHM) measures, to alleviate social costs associated with problem gambling.  
Lastly, many political issues have been raised recently in the Australian Federal 
Parliament with regard to gambling-related social issues and harm minimisation 
measures. The Australian Government initiated and implemented various approaches 
and efforts to tackle problem gambling associated social issues confronting the 
Australian community; these included but were not limited to the recent gambling 
reform legislation passed by the Federal Parliament on 29 November 2012 (National 
Gambling Reform Act 2012), the National Gambling Reform (Related Matters) Act (No. 
1) 2012, and the National Gambling Reform (Related Matters) Act (No. 2) 2012 
(FaHCSIA, 2012, National Gambling Reform Acts).
8
 Accordingly, it is of interest to 
                                               
8
 However, on 25 March 2014 the Australian Parliament passed amendments to the National Gambling 
Reform Act 2012, and repealed the National Gambling Reform (Related Matters) Act (No. 1) 2012 and the 
National Gambling Reform (Related Matters) Act (No. 2) 2012. The Acts are replaced by the Gambling 
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examine what approaches are taken by the gambling industry, particularly gambling 
companies, in response to the government initiative to tackle problem gambling 
associated social issues. Correspondingly, social reporting or CSD practices of 
gambling companies is worth investigating in order to understand the focus areas of the 
organisations’ CSD and whether potential external pressures such as government 
initiatives influence the CSD practices of gambling companies. It is also worth 
investigating RGHM disclosure practices to gain an understanding of the extent to 
which gambling companies publicly discharge (or do not discharge) their accountability 
to stakeholders for problem gambling social issues, in view of problem gambling can 
have significant stakeholder impact, both financially and socially. It will be significance 
to explore corporations’ views of RGHM and problem gambling-related social issues in 
order to ascertain whether any potential decoupling exists between corporations’ public 
positioning on issues of RGHM (the views of gambling organisation as projected to the 
public), and their internal views on the same issues (the actual values of the managers of 
gambling organisation). If there is any potential disconnection between these views of 
gambling organisations this would also lead us to question the credibility of gambling 
companies’ CSD, specifically RGHM disclosures. This interest is the motivation behind 
this study that could has implications for the possible regulation of corporate disclosures 
of companies operating within the Australian gambling industry. The study also 
attempts to fill the gap by adding to the existing body of knowledge about the nature of 
CSD practices of gambling companies. These points provide motivation to investigate 
the gambling industry in the Australian context.    
                                                                                                                                         
Measures Act 2012 which took effect on receiving Royal Assent on 31 March 2014. ([cited 15 April 
2014], available from http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/communities-and-vulnerable-
people/programs-services/gambling. 
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2.2.1 The Australian gambling industry 
The Australian gambling industry is a mature industry that has undergone many changes 
since the 1800s up until the 2000s, such as the growth of the gambling and liberalisation 
of the industry, changing community pressure, government public inquiries, 
state/territory governments’ gambling policy reforms, and the recent National Gambling 
Reform Act 2012. In particular, the late 1990s saw an important change in this industry 
with the first government public inquiry into gambling industries in 1998 and its report, 
PC1999, which was seen as a watershed for the Australian gambling industry.  
Gambling has been defined as ‘an entertainment based on staking money on uncertain 
events driven by chance, with the potential to win more than staked, but with the 
ultimate certainty that gamblers as a group will lose over time’ (Productivity 
Commission, 2010, p. 1.4). Gambling was introduced into Australia by European 
settlers in the 1800s (McMillen & Eadington, 1986). Since the first official wager on a 
horse race held in 1810, Australia’s gambling industry has grown to a total of 13 casinos 
(with at least one casino in each state/territory), almost 200,000 electronic gaming 
machines (EGMs)
9
 in operation (including EGMs in casinos, hotels, and clubs), and 
ubiquitous lottery products (Productivity Commission, 2009). While there are many 
different forms of gambling in Australia, the principal forms are gaming and wagering. 
Gaming comprises all legal forms of gambling other than wagering and includes 
lotteries, gaming machines, casino table games and keno; wagering is betting on the 
outcome of any uncertain event with the major forms being racing and sports betting 
(Productivity Commission, 1999). Consequently, the ‘gambling industry’ is defined as 
                                               
9
 Electronic gaming machines (EGMs) are also referred to as gaming machines, poker machines, pokies 
or slot machines (Productivity Commission, 1999). 
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an industry inclusive of organisations that provide any of these principal forms of 
gambling services. Such organisations include casinos, clubs, hotels, Totalisator Agency 
Boards (TABs), sports betting enterprises and lottery organisations (Productivity 
Commission, 1999). 
From the development of card games such as cribbage and pitch and toss (an early form 
of two-up) to the current profitable business industry, gambling consumption 
expenditure
10
 has grown from AUD$1.3 billion in the early 1970s to over AUD$11 
billion in 1997-98 (Productivity Commission, 1999), and continued to increase to 
AUD$19 billion in 2008-09 (Productivity Commission, 2010). The most significant 
growth in gambling recorded has been since the early 1990s. The spectacular growth of 
gambling throughout the 1990s is linked with the liberalisation of gambling, particularly 
gaming machines or EGMs in Australia (Productivity Commission, 2010). The 
legalisation of gaming machines in hotels and clubs has created the largest area of 
growth in the gambling industry. Expenditure on gaming machines increased from 
AUD$1 billion in 1972-73 (during these periods only New South Wales had gaming 
machines and only in clubs) to AUD$6 billion in 1997-98 (Productivity Commission, 
1999). Figure 2.1 shows the rapid growth in gambling expenditure from the mid-1980s 
to the current mature industry.      
The growth of the gambling industry has had significant economic benefits for Australia; 
the industry employs more than 170,000 people both directly and indirectly. According 
to Crown Limited (Annual Report 2010), its two gambling businesses, Crown Casino 
and Burwood Resort Casino, are the largest single-site private sector employers in the 
                                               
10
 Expenditure is the net amount lost by gamblers (the amount staked by gamblers, minus their winnings). 
This is the same as the gross profit of the gambling operator (Productivity Commission, 1999). 
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state of Victoria and Western Australia respectively. The Australasian Gaming 
Council
11
 has estimated that there are around 15,000 businesses providing gambling 
services in Australia, with numerous allied industries such as tourism, leisure, retail and 
other entertainment. The economic benefits of gambling, however, come with 
substantial social costs to communities, particularly in relation to problem gambling.  
Figure 2.1: A ‘maturing’ industry 
 
Data Source: Productivity Commission, Gambling 2010   
2.3 Problem gambling and its associated social impacts 
Problem gambling is concerned with broad aspects of harm at social and community 
levels in addition to individual behaviour (Neal et al., 2005). With the serious impacts 
of problem gambling, the Australian gambling industry has been scrutinised by 
                                               
11
 The Australian Gaming Council (AGC) is a national body established by the gambling industry in June 
2000. It claims to support a sustainable gambling industry that provides entertainment and economic 
benefits while promoting gambling education and responsible gambling measures. AGC’s members come 
from all sectors of the industry - wagering, licensed operators, clubs, hotels and casinos. In November 
2007, the Australian Gaming Council changed its name to the Australasian Gaming Council to encompass 
New Zealand memberships (Australasian Gaming Council, 2010, About us/ membership section). 
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communities and social non-governmental organisations (NGOs), particularly in the late 
1990s; they highlight the social issues associated with problem gambling that affect so 
many Australians. These social-related problem gambling issues are discussed in this 
study because problem gambling continues to appear as one of the serious social issues 
confronting the Australian community (Productivity Commission, 2010). Corporate 
ethical issues in gambling businesses are significant since their gambling products and 
services are potentially harmful to its users (Jones et al., 2009). Supporting this view, 
the United Kingdom Responsibility in Gambling Trust (RiGT) independent Trustee, 
David Grayson, observes that ‘gambling is one of those sectors where responsibility for 
the misuse of its products and services, is critical. Alcohol and confectionary are in a 
similar position’ (Grayson, 2006).     
The liberalisation of gambling and the spread of gambling within the Australian society 
have resulted in various social outcomes associated with problem gambling. Problem 
gambling is not a static phenomenon but lies on a continuum that has different degrees 
of severity or harm – some people have moderate problems and others have severe 
problems. It is estimated that there are up to 160,000 Australians who have a serious 
problem with gambling, and 360,000 people who are at risk of developing a problem 
(Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 11). Problem gambling is related to heightened 
anxiety, depression, and in extreme cases suicide (Jackson, 2009; Suurvali et al., 2010; 
Pulford et al., 2009; Shaffer & Korn, 2004; Productivity Commission, 1999). Many 
studies find a connection between problem gambling and mood disorders such as 
depression. The risk of depression in problem gambling groups was identified as 71.4 
per cent (using a general psychological test), and 35.7 per cent of problem gamblers 
have a severe mental disorder (Thomas & Jackson, 2008). It is also found that between 
31 
 
half and three quarters of problem gamblers in the past year reported that they suffered 
from depression (Thomas & Jackson, 2008; Ibáñez et al., 2001). Research suggests that 
between 40 and 60 per cent of problem gamblers have been found to have anxiety 
disorders (Kessler et al., 2008; Petry et al., 2005), and that they are at least 18 times 
more likely to suffer from a severe mental disorder than non-problem gamblers 
(Thomas & Jackson, 2008). As Shaffer and Korn (2004, p. 198) suggest:  
Although it has unique elements, pathological gambling has many signs and 
symptoms shared with other disorders (e.g. anxiety, depression, impulsivity), 
consequently, disordered gambling is best thought of as a syndrome.  
While the Adelaide Central Mission (1998, p. 15) noted:  
In the extreme case, the depression that arises out of the despair, hopelessness, 
shame and guilt of the consequences of gambling can be so overpowering for 
some that the only recourse is suicide. Among the people seen at Adelaide Central 
Mission, over the last six months we are aware of at least 6 suicides. The number 
of people who talk about suicide as an option to their circumstance is approaching 
1 in 3 .... From our experience we are aware that in some cases that the deaths are 
not always recorded as suicide. There is often an alternative recording of the 
cause of death to protect the family or because the death is not readily identified 
as a suicide by the investigating officer e.g. car accidents. 
Problem gambling has potentially devastating impacts on the finances, personal lives 
and relationships of the affected gamblers, and also on those close to them. In 2007, a 
Tasmanian survey found that in a much more general perspective on harm, nearly one in 
five gamblers report that gambling has had an adverse effect on their lives (SACES, 
2008b). Many problem gamblers seeking help indicate that their gambling problem has 
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a devastating impact on their relationship with partners, families and friends, such as 
becoming distanced from their families, losing contact with their immediate family 
altogether, and losing their partners due to lies, deceit and arguments over money (New 
Focus, 2005). These financial burdens lead to an increased risk of family breakdown 
and problem children, and also problem gamblers are six times more likely to be 
divorced than non-problem gamblers (Thomas et al., 2008). Research suggests that 
children of problem gamblers are two to four times more likely to develop gambling 
problems than their peers (Black et al., 2006; Abbott, 2001). They are also likely to 
have low academic achievements, low economic wellbeing, suffer from homelessness, 
mental and physical health problems, problems forming social relationships, poor 
emotional regulation and poor control (Dowling et al., 2007; Williams, 2002; 
Darbyshire et al., 2001). 
Problem gambling affects not only problem gamblers themselves but also their family, 
friends and, to a lesser extent, work colleagues and others in the general community. 
The Productivity Commissions estimates that for each problem gambler, another 5 to 10 
people are affected, and problem gambling affects up to five million Australians 
(Productivity Commission, 2010). In 2007, a Tasmanian survey found that 50 per cent 
of people said they personally knew someone who was experiencing serious problems 
with gambling (SACES, 2008b, p. 65). The survey also found that three quarters of 
Australian adults thought that gambling did more harm than good for the community 
(Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 11). A number of studies conclude that some 
problem gamblers tend to commit income-generating crimes such as theft, fraud and 
robbery in order to finance their gambling activities (Wheeler et al., 2011; South 
Australia Centre for Economic Studies, 2005; Jackson et al., 1997; Blaszczynski & 
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McConaghy, 1994a). Research indicates that defendants found guilty were explicitly 
linked to gambling (Crofts, 2002), and that gambling was the second most common 
motivation for committing fraud (Sakurai & Smith, 2003). In South Australia, since 
poker machines were introduced into the state in 1994, the number of people seeking 
counselling following from a gambling-related crime has risen from one every two 
weeks to one a day (Australian Crime Commission, 2003). A survey conducted by the 
Productivity Commission found that approximately 10 per cent of people with gambling 
problems had committed a crime because of their gambling addiction and about 60 per 
cent of those in counselling had been involved in illegal activities to finance their 
gambling (Productivity Commission, 1999).  
Problem gambling and its associated adverse social impacts are of grave concern to 
various stakeholders including communities. Responding to growing community 
concerns about problem gambling and its associated adverse social impacts, particularly 
in the late 1990s, led to the Australian Government conducting its first public inquiry 
into gambling industries in 1998 and its resulting report, PC1999, in 1999. The key 
recommendation of the PC1999 resulted in the establishment of the Ministerial Council 
on Gambling (MCG) in 2000, followed by the implementation of the MCG’s National 
Framework on Problem Gambling (NFPG) 2004-2008. A decade after the first inquiry, 
the Australian Government conducted its second public inquiry into gambling industries 
in 2008 and its report, PC2010, was released in 2010. The report subsequently resulted 
in the introduction of the National Gambling Reform Act 2012, which aimed at reducing 
harm associated with gaming machines. We now consider government initiatives raised 
to address some of the social issues associated with problem gambling. 
34 
 
2.4 Community pressure via government initiatives 
The significant and widely-reported social costs associated with problem gambling 
ultimately led to mounting community pressure on the Australian Government to take 
actions to minimise the prevalence of problem gambling and to provide a responsible 
gambling environment. A number of significant government initiatives were introduced 
and implemented as a result of community pressure.  
2.4.1  The Productivity Commission’s inquiry report 1999 
In the late 1990s, the issue of problem gambling and its adverse social impacts on many 
Australians and their families shifted community concerns to the social costs of 
gambling rather than its economic benefits (Productivity Commission, 1999). Public 
concern about the adverse social impacts of gambling was the impetus for the 
Australian Government’s first independent national inquiry into the gambling industry 
in 1998.  
In August 1998, the Federal Treasurer of Australia requested that the Productivity 
Commission generate a report on the economic and social impacts of gambling, and the 
effects of the different regulatory structures that surrounded gambling and the related 
industries. Although the inquiry’s terms of reference did not suggest any formal policy 
recommendations, it provided a range of policy-relevant findings to assist government 
decision-making concerned with gambling industries, in particular problem gambling 
issues (Productivity Commission, 1999). 
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The inquiry obtained the views from many diverse groups and attracted considerable 
public attention, resulting in a total of 290
12
 submissions, including approximately 29 
per cent from welfare and community organisations, 21 per cent from individuals, 18 
per cent from government agencies (including local governments), 19 per cent from 
gambling providers, and 13 per cent confidential submissions from gamblers and their 
families members relating their personal experiences (Productivity Commission, 1999).  
The Productivity Commission inquiry involved extensive nation-wide research with 
those closely interested in, affected by, or that provided or used gambling products. 
Research included six formal roundtable discussions and three national surveys: a 
‘National Gambling Survey’ (the survey investigated gambling preferences, spending, 
attitudes and impacts); a ‘Survey of Clients of Counselling Agencies’ (the survey 
produced a profile of problem gamblers); and a ‘Survey of Counselling Services’ (the 
survey explored funding, caseloads, methods of approach and outcomes) (Productivity 
Commission, 1999). Public hearings were conducted in all capital cities for interested 
parties to discuss their submissions with the Commissioners during November and 
December 1998, followed by a final round of public hearings that were held in major 
cities after the release of a draft report in July 1999. The final report, PC1999, was 
released in December 1999 with the government announcing its support of the 
recommendations in PC1999.  
PC1999 and its recommendations resulted from high levels of community engagement 
with a wide range of participants who raised various concerns with, and expectations of, 
the gambling industry in terms of its social costs, in particular, those associated with 
                                               
12
The 290 public submissions are accessible at the Productivity Commission webpage: 
www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/gambling/docs.submissions. 
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problem gambling. Therefore, this study uses PC1999 and its recommendations in 
particular, as a proxy for community concerns (refer to Table 2.1). As it will be 
explained in this study (Chapter 5), the publication of the PC1999 brought many 
negative issues associated with the gambling industry into public focus and there would 
be an expectation that this scrutiny would evoke some form of disclosure response from 
affected organisations – that is, from the gambling organisations, which will be 
explained in Chapter 5.  
Within PC1999, the Productivity Commission provided various recommendations about 
harm minimisation measures such as ‘gambling advertising to incorporate a risk 
warning about the product (using an appropriate slogan)’ (Productivity Commission, 
1999, p. 16.39) and ‘cheques should not be cashed in gambling venues’ (Productivity 
Commission, 1999, p. 16.62) where the Commission considers such approach provides 
gamblers with convenient, instantaneous and repeated access to potentially large sums 
of money at a gambling venue. However, the key recommendation of PC1999 was the 
establishment of the MCG.  
2.4.2  The Ministerial Council on Gambling (MCG) and its National 
Framework on Problem Gambling (NFPG) 2004-2008 
Following the release of PC1999, the Australian government adopted the key 
recommendation of PC1999 and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
formally established the MCG in April 2000. The Prime Minister of the time, John 
Howard, committed the Commonwealth Government to a leadership role, and the 
establishment of the MCG aimed to achieve a national approach to the challenges of 
problem gambling (Gambling Research Australia, 2010, About us section). The 
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objective of the MCG was to minimise the negative social impacts of problem gambling 
by exchanging information on responsible gambling strategies and discussing common 
issues to facilitate the development of suitable regulatory approaches. The MCG’s 
membership consisted of ministers responsible for gambling in each state/territory. In 
developing a national approach to tackling problem gambling, the MCG considered 
various issues, including particularly the PC1999 recommendations pertaining to 
‘interactive gambling’ 13 , responsible gambling approaches, and key priorities for 
research programs.   
In 2003, the MCG developed a NFPG 2004-2008, with a priority on ‘public awareness, 
education and training’, the establishment of a ‘responsible gambling environment’, 
‘intervention, counselling and support services’, and ‘national research and data 
collection’ (FaHCSIA, 2010, Our responsibilities section). Responsible gambling 
approaches and harm minimisation measures within the NFPG were built based on the 
recommendations within PC1999, such as ‘ensuring gamblers have access to 
consumers’ information about the nature of gambling products (i.e. chances of winning 
major prizes)’ and ‘ensuring the gambling industry personnel receive appropriate 
training in the responsible conduct of gambling’ (FaHCSIA, 2010, Our responsibilities 
section). Within Table 2.1, the researcher has attempted to align the recommendations 
of PC1999 (column 1) with the priority areas subsequently established for the NFPG 
(column 2). In the last two MCG meetings in 2008 and 2009, the emphasis was on the 
development of a national work program to tackle problem gambling. The program was 
to build on a number of principles in the NFPG 2004-2008 that addressed risks 
                                               
13
 According to the Interactive Gambling Act 2001, interactive gambling is betting in the ordinary manner, 
but through the use of a service provided over the internet, broadcasting or datacasting services, or any 
other content services (for details please refer to the Interactive Gambling Act 2001).  
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associated with gambling, including: ‘harm minimisation measures’, ‘responsibility for 
minimising harm associated with problem gambling’; ‘collaborative partnerships in 
implementing harm minimisation measures’, and ‘research and evaluation of harm 
minimisation’ (Gambling Research Australian, 2010, About us section). 
Table 2.1: The PC 1999’s recommendations and the focus of NFPG 2004-2008 
PC 1999’s Recommendations NFPG 2004-2008 
1. Basic consumer information  
Improving consumer protection through enhancing 
informational strategies intended to ensure consumers 
can make choices with informed consent and to reduce 
the risk of people becoming problem gamblers. These 
include: 
 The availability of better information about the 
price of playing games or betting and the odds of 
winning; 
 Information about how games work to be made 
available to patrons of gambling venues so as to 
improve people’s understanding of the nature and 
risks of the game;  
 Information on the risk of problem gambling be 
made available at gambling venues in ways that are 
as visible as signs promoting gambling;  
 Information be available about the extent to which 
gambling-related revenue is earmarked for 
problem-gambling, harm minimisation, and 
community awareness campaigns, and for the 
funding of problem-gambling related research.  
 
1. Public awareness, education and training  
Promote a greater understanding of the nature of 
gambling products, the potential for harm, and the 
availability of help and support. Goal to: 
 Build community awareness of problem 
gambling issues and services; 
 Ensure that education and awareness campaigns 
are cognisant of various populations within the 
community; 
 Ensure gamblers have access to consumer 
information about the nature of gambling 
products, for example the chances of winning 
major prizes; 
 Raise awareness of health and social welfare 
professionals about the benefits of early 
identification of problem gambling; 
 Ensure that relevant gambling industry 
personnel receive appropriate training in the 
responsible conduct of gambling; 
 Ensure the availability of treatment and support 
services and venue based services, such as 
exclusions, are well published and promoted. 
 
2. Responsible environment 
Create an environment for controlling and improving 
the gambling environment so as to reduce the harm to 
problem gamblers, and to minimise the development of 
problem gambling behaviour. Initiatives could be 
developed ‘in house’ or in collaboration with 
gambling-related associations and regulatory 
authorities. Initiatives could include 
 Consumers being provided with a written periodic 
record of their spending for tracking their 
expenditure on gambling;  
 Identification and active help by venue staff to 
withdraw gambling services from identified 
problem gamblers;  
 To mandate signage which indicates that any 
patron may self-exclude, and accompanying 
pamphlets that explain how self-exclusion works 
 Tighter controls on gambling advertising, where it 
is felt that the information provided by a gambling 
supplier would have the effect of reinforcing 
inherently false beliefs about the odds of winning 
2. Responsible gambling environments 
To minimise the likelihood of recreational gamblers 
developing problem gambling behaviours. Aim to: 
 Consider any impacts on the community when 
assessing major expansions of gambling 
opportunities or the introduction of significant 
new gambling opportunities; 
 Further develop and implement Codes of 
Practice and/or regulatory frameworks to 
promote responsible practices by operators, and 
informed decision making by consumers; 
 Encourage availability of appropriate venue 
based interventions for gamblers; 
 Further develop and implement Codes of 
Practice and/or regulatory frameworks that 
ensure advertising and promotions do not 
encourage problem gambling; 
 Develop strategies to enable gamblers to limit 
their expenditure or time spent gambling, for 
example through pre-commitment measures and 
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or about the way gambling technologies work; 
 Controlling hours of opening from 24 hours a day 
each day of the week to say, 6 days a week for 18 
hours a day; 
 Reducing the total quantity of gambling products; 
 Limiting the accessibility of minors to gambling; 
 To provide clocks and natural lighting at gambling 
venues in order for problem gamblers to be alert to 
the passing of time; 
 Prohibition on credit and cheque-cashing within 
gaming areas;  
 Bill acceptors not be included in the design of 
EGMs, with any cash dispensers being located 
outside the gaming area; 
 Introduce pre-commitment strategies to limit 
gamblers’ expenditure,  or time spent on gambling;  
 Limitations on the rate of loss; 
 Enforced breaks imposed upon gamblers; 
 Pay out larger prizes by cheques in order to avoid 
gamblers gambling with prize money; 
 A longer lapse of time between button pushes; 
 Lighting, graphics and sound effects to be modified 
to reduce ‘entertainment’ aspects;  
 Machine design should aim to maximise informed 
consent and player control.   
 
appropriate controls over financial transactions.  
 
3. Counselling/Treatment 
 Problem gambling agencies routinely to carry out 
follow-up assessments of clients;  
 Needs of people of culturally and linguistically 
diverse backgrounds to be acknowledged; 
 To research approaches for determining how best 
to deliver problem gambling help services to 
particular groups in the community for whom 
mainstream approaches may not be suitable; 
 Collection of a National Minimum Data set on 
clients of problem gambling counselling agencies, 
using an identical set of definitions across all 
jurisdictions and an approach that would allow 
repeat clients to be identified as well as clients who 
attend more than one counselling services. 
 Improved training and consistent accreditation 
processes for gambling counsellors Australia-wide. 
 
3. Intervention, counselling and support service 
To enhance problem gambling support and 
treatment services that are effective, accessible and 
culturally appropriate 
 Maintain a problem gambling support and 
treatment system, which is available generally, 
including across regional, rural and remote 
locations; 
 Ensure services are effective for culturally and 
linguistically diverse populations and 
indigenous people; 
 Introduce standardised problem gambling 
assessment tools for used by counsellors and 
community workers; 
 Ensure counsellors and community workers 
have appropriate training; 
 Develop national standards for problem 
gambling treatment and support services. 
 
4. Funding of problem gambling services 
 Funding arrangements for problem gambling 
counselling, support services, research and public 
education programs should include compulsory 
contributions from all organisations that provide 
gambling services. 
 
4. National research and data collection  
To inform the further development of the national 
framework. 
 Implement and further develop the National 
Gambling Research Program which is jointly 
funded by all jurisdictions, to increase 
understanding of the nature and extent of 
problem gambling and effective intervention 
strategies in Australia and provide for a 
clearing-house for gambling research. 
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2.4.3  State/Territory government initiatives 
In addition to the MCG, the state and territory governments also introduced various 
harm minimisation strategies in their respective state/territory with the aim of 
minimising the prevalence of problem gambling upon PC1999. The Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT) Government introduced the Gambling and Racing Control (Code of 
Practice) Regulation 2002 (Code of Practice) that made the application of the Code of 
Practice mandatory for all licensees of a gambling facility. This Code was developed 
based on the findings of PC1999 and to replace a voluntary code that the Productivity 
Commission considered ‘had minimal impact on controlling industry activity’ (The 
ACT Gambling and Racing Commission, 2012, p. 25). In response to problem gambling 
concerns raised within PC1999, the New South Wales (NSW) Government introduced 
the New South Wales’s Gaming Machine Act 2001 (for hotels and clubs) to foster 
responsible gambling. In 2001, as part of the Victoria Government’s broader harm 
minimisation strategy, the Government implemented regional limits (regional caps) on 
gaming machine numbers in order to protect areas considered particularly vulnerable to 
the harm caused by problem gambling. The regional caps policy aims to reduce the 
accessibility of gaming machines in vulnerable areas which was also discussed and 
recommended within PC1999.  
From the above brief overview, responsible gambling approaches and harm 
minimisation measures implemented by state/territory governments were influenced by 
the recommendations within PC1999, such as the Code of Practice developed in ACT 
was based on the findings of PC1999. Such initiatives were based on the findings and 
recommendations within PC1999. Based on this reasoning, this study presumed that the 
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government initiatives of each state/territory are arguably reflective of community 
concerns with, and expectations of, the gambling industry, particularly gambling 
companies, in terms of their activities’ impact on the social costs of problem gambling. 
The RGHM measures embodied in the various state/territory initiatives were considered 
to be an appropriate proxy for wider stakeholder concerns about social costs of problem 
gambling. 
2.4.4  The Productivity Commission’s inquiry report 2010 
After a decade since the government’s first gambling inquiry in 1998, the Australian 
Government announced the conduct of the New Productivity Commission Inquiry into 
Gambling in 2008 with the intention of providing policy recommendations on gambling 
for consideration by all Australian jurisdictions. The new inquiry stemmed from the 
COAG decision on 3 July 2008 that asked the Commonwealth Treasurer to arrange for 
the Productivity Commission to update its 1999 inquiry into problem gambling. Chris 
Bowen, Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, 
stated that ‘The inquiry will help shape government action to tackle problem gambling. 
It will inform policy responses to minimise the prevalence of problem gambling in 
Australia. The Commission will have the scope to provide additional research into the 
impacts of harm minimisation measures and how effective they are in countering 
problem gambling’ (FaHCSIA, 2011, Media release section). Therefore, the 
Commission will concentrate on updating key developments since 1999 and focus on 
policy development, particularly relating to the social impacts of gambling such as 
problem gambling and those ‘at risk’, social costs of gambling, harm minimisation 
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measures introduced to address problem gambling, as well as policy responses to other 
consumer issues associated with gambling.  
Similar to the first inquiry, the second inquiry into gambling industries also attracted 
considerable public attention with a total of 421
14
 submissions received from various 
parties including but not limited to gambling providers, industry associations, 
counselling organisations, religious organisations, government organisations/agencies, 
and individuals. Public hearings were also conducted in various cities before the release 
of the final report, PC2010, in June 2010. The government adopted a similar approach 
to the one a decade ago – that is, the government announced its support for harm 
minimisation strategies recommended in PC2010, particularly the key reform directions 
to minimise harm caused by problem gambling. Consequently, in January 2012, the 
Australian Federal Government announced its plan to tackle problem gambling
15
 and 
adopt harm minimisation approaches as recommended within PC2010; these included: a 
large scale trial of mandatory pre-commitment; introducing a $250 daily withdrawal 
limit from ATMs in gaming venues (excluding casinos) by 1 February 2013; electronic 
warnings and cost of play displays on poker machines by 2016; additional counselling 
support and expanding the reach of Gambling Help Online; strengthening self-exclusion 
arrangements; and improving training for staff in pokies venues. Following this, on 29 
November 2012, the Federal Parliament passed the National Gambling Reform Act 2012, 
aimed at reducing harm associated with gaming machines. 
                                               
14
The 421 public submissions are accessible at the Productivity Commission webpage: 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/gambling-2009/submissions. 
15
 The media release by the Prime Minister of Australia, Julie Gillard, on 21 January 2012 is available at 
http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/tackling-problem-gambling-australia.  
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Since the late 1990s, community concerns about social impacts of gambling have 
heightened, with increased public concerns of problem gambling and its related social 
impacts on society. Increased concerns in problem gambling and its related social 
impacts has arguably led to an increase pressures for the government to act such as the 
conduct of the government first public inquiry into the gambling industry in 1998, 
followed by its report, PC1999, in 1999, and subsequently the establishment of the 
MCG in 2000, and then the MCG’s NFPG 2004-2008. The discussions above suggest 
that community pressure arguably drives government initiatives in the gambling 
industry. Following PC1999, in response to community pressure, governments initiated 
and implemented various RGHM approaches to tackle the harm resulting from problem 
gambling confronting the Australian community. Correspondingly, it is of interest to 
understand what information is reported in CSDs of gambling companies, and potential 
reasons for such disclosures. That is, this study aims to investigate whether external 
pressure such as government initiatives, which are driven by community pressure, 
influences the CSD practices of gambling companies; do gambling companies 
responded to external pressures with regards to problem gambling social issues and 
become more accountable via their reporting in relation to RGHM information. It is also 
essential to ascertain whether any potential decoupling between corporate ‘views’ on 
issues of RGHM as projected to the public, and the managers of gambling 
organisations’ actual perceptions about RGHM and gambling-related issues.  
To address the above questions, the study first examine how the two major Australian 
gambling companies have responded to the government’s first gambling report, PC1999 
and the first national gambling council, the MCG and its NFPG (2004-2008) over 15 
years from 1995 to 2009. This longitudinal research investigates how gambling 
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companies changed their CSD practices before and after some government initiatives in 
the gambling industry, and hence aims to understand what information is reported in 
CSDs, and why. Second, the study adopted the ethical perspective (embodying a 
normative position) and ‘drill-down’ to investigate the extent of accountability in the 
area of RGHM being discharged by gambling companies to stakeholders for problem 
gambling social issues. This part investigates annual report RGHM disclosures by four 
major gambling companies operating within Australian over 7 years from 2005 to 2011. 
Third, the study explores corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM and problem 
gambling-related social issues to ascertain any potential decoupling between corporate 
public positioning on issues of RGHM and corporate actual perceptions on the same 
issues. If there is a decoupling (or disconnection) between corporate public position and 
its actual perceptions about RGHM and gambling-related issues, this would also lead us 
to question the credibility of gambling companies’ CSD, specifically RGHM 
disclosures. This will then provide evidence to support a need for regulations of social 
disclosures of companies operating in the gambling industry in order to create real 
change in the accountability and operations of gambling organisations.  
2.5 An overview of the development of the three research 
issues 
The main goal of this study is to contribute to the literature, theoretically and 
empirically, by offering an investigation on corporation disclosure about a specific 
social issue that literature has neglected so far. While this study consists of three 
interrelated parts, the above discussion leads to the investigation that focus primarily on 
part one of the study. An overview of each research part is provided below:   
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1. Part one, presented in Chapter 5, will investigate the changing trends of CSD 
practices of two major Australian gambling companies: Crown Limited (Crown) 
and Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Tabcorp), over a 15-year period (1995-2009). By 
way of annual report content analysis and government report reading, part one 
will investigate whether external pressure (such as the community via government 
initiatives – PC1999, the establishment of the MCG and its NFPG) influences 
CSD practices of the two Australian gambling companies in order to understand 
what information is reported in the CSDs of gambling companies, and why. The 
findings of part one show that the overall CSDs of the two gambling companies 
show an increasing trend of predominantly positive disclosures across times in 
response to external pressure. However, the extent of disclosure category of most 
concern to stakeholders in the gambling industry, responsible gambling did not 
notably increase, compared with other disclosure categories such as human 
resources and community involvement. The predominantly positive CSDs and the 
failure to provide more disclosures pertaining to responsible gambling would 
seem to be somewhat at odds with the serious social cost of problem gambling. 
The findings also suggest that the CSD practices of gambling companies have 
little to do with demonstrating accountability but more to do with securing 
corporate legitimacy.  
2. Part two will be presented in Chapter 6. While part one examines the overall 
CSDs practices of gambling companies and its motivations, part two adopted the 
ethical perspective (embodying a normative position) and ‘drill-down’ to 
investigate the detail of disclosure practices in terms of RGHM to assess the 
extent of accountability being discharged by gambling companies to stakeholders 
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regarding problem gambling social issues. To do this, a disclosure index 
consisting of 30 specific issues relating to RGHM in four general categories was 
developed. The index was developed based on Australian state/territory 
governments’ RGHM strategies to minimise the prevalence of problem gambling. 
The index is used to investigate RGHM disclosures within annual reports of four 
gambling companies operating within Australia, namely Crown, Tabcorp, Tatts 
Group Limited (Tatts) and SkyCity Entertainment Group Limited (SkyCity), over 
a 7-year period (2005-2011). The findings of part two show that there is a low 
level of RGHM disclosures by gambling companies which is inferred as reflective 
of low level of corporate accountability discharged by gambling companies in 
relation to their RGHM disclosures. The findings enhance the results of part one – 
that is CSDs of gambling companies are not for embracing broader corporate 
accountability to its stakeholders but more for legitimation objective.  
3. Part three will be presented in Chapter 7. Part three may be viewed as an 
extension of part two in that it seeks to identify further evidence, from a different 
but related source, that might (or might not) indicate a de-coupling (disconnection) 
of gambling companies publicly projected position in annual report disclosures on 
RGHM and their actual RGHM position (beliefs and practises). Therefore, the 
objective of part three is to explore corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM 
and problem gambling-related social issues in order to ascertain whether there is 
any potential decoupling between corporations public positioning on issues of 
RGHM and their internal positioning (view) on the same issues. To achieve this 
objective, this part of the study explores corporate views regarding RGHM and 
problem gambling social issues via reviewing public documents (public inquiry 
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submissions made by gambling companies to the New Productivity Commission 
Inquiry into Gambling in 2008) to examine the views expressed by gambling 
corporations regarding RGHM and the social issues related to problem gambling. 
The reviews of the gambling companies’ submissions made to the government 
public gambling inquiry appears to be focused on the importance of gambling 
business profitability and argument against further introduction and/or 
implementation of RGHM measures. There is a lack of representation of 
corporations’ views about concerns and cares for problem gambling-related social 
issues within corporate public submissions. The findings provide more evidence 
to support that CSD do not provide ‘true’ reflection of managements’ performance 
views about their social and environmental information. The findings of part three, 
adds weight to the argument that there is a decoupling (disconnection) between 
gambling companies public positioning (reflected to their disclosures) on the 
social costs of problem gambling and the corporations’ actual beliefs and 
activities. This would also lead us to suggest the lack of credibility of voluntarily 
producing CSDs, specifically RGHM disclosures in the annual reports of 
gambling companies.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a general overview of the Australian gambling 
industry and problem gambling related social impacts, followed by governments’ 
initiatives in the gambling industry in response to public pressure. The discussion of this 
chapter leads to the primary objective of the study (outlined in Chapter 5): to investigate 
the changing trends of CSD practices of two major Australian gambling companies over 
48 
 
15 years, in order to understand whether external pressures from the community via 
government initiatives (PC1999 and the MCG’s NFPG) influence the CSD practices of 
gambling companies; this will provide an understanding of what information is reported 
in the CSDs of gambling companies, and why. Hence, this chapter builds the platform 
for this broader study to investigate the CSD practices of gambling companies operating 
within Australia. To gain an understanding of why gambling companies might adopt 
CSD practices, this study explores extant literature in social and environmental 
accounting (Chapter 3) and theories (Chapter 4), which provide insight into theories that 
are most relevant to this study.  
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Chapter Three 
Social and Environmental Accounting Research 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of social and environmental 
accounting (SEA) research. The initial discussion focuses on the meaning and 
development of SEA and reporting. The chapter then proceeds with a review of prior 
research related to corporate social and environmental reporting or disclosure in general, 
and in the gambling industry in particular. In so doing, this chapter identifies some 
significant gaps in the SEA field in relation to research within the context of the 
gambling industry.  
3.2 What is social and environmental accounting? 
There are many and varied definitions of SEA. In general, SEA is a branch of 
accounting that deals with the social and environmental performance of organisation 
and the reporting of such results to interested (internal and external) stakeholder groups 
(Gray et al., 1996). According to Bebbington and Thomson (2007), SEA is an inclusive 
field of accounting for social and environmental events which arise as a result of, and 
are intimately tied to, the economic actions of organisations. Table 3.1 provides some 
definitions of SEA which have been used by many SEA researchers.  
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Table 3.1: Definitions of social and environmental accounting 
Sources Definitions 
Gray et al.               
(1987, p. 9) 
‘…the process of communicating the social and 
environmental effects of organizations’ economic 
actions to particular interest groups within society 
and to society at large. As such, it involves extending 
the accountability of organizations (particularly 
companies), beyond the traditional role of providing 
a financial account to the owners of capital, in 
particular, shareholders. Such an extension is 
predicated upon the assumption that companies do 
have wider responsibilities than simply to make 
money for their shareholders.’ 
Ramanathan   
(1976, p. 519) 
‘… the process of selecting firm-level social 
variables, measures, and measurement procedures; 
systematically developing information useful for 
evaluating the firm’s social performance; and 
communicating such information to concerned social 
groups, both within and outside the firm.’  
Deegan             
(2003, p. 10) 
‘…a broader term that relates to the provision of 
environmental-performance related information to 
stakeholders both within, and outside, the 
organisation.’  
Mathews and Perera 
(1995, p. 364) 
‘…an extension of disclosure into non-traditional 
areas such as providing information about 
employees, products, community services and the 
prevention and reduction of pollution. However, the 
term ‘social accounting’ is also used to describe a 
comprehensive form of accounting which takes into 
account externalities.’ 
Bennett and James 
(1998, p. 33) 
‘…the generation, analysis and use of financial and 
non-financial information in order to optimise 
corporate, environmental and economic performance, 
achieving a sustainable business.’ 
Gray                    
(2000, p. 250) 
‘…the preparation and publication of an account 
about an organization’s social, environmental, 
employee, community, customer and other 
stakeholder interactions and activities, and where 
possible, the consequence of those interactions and 
activities’. 
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From the definitions of SEA provided above, it is observed that most definitions 
emphasise essential elements such as an association between financial and non-financial 
performance, qualitative and quantitative measurement, and a consideration of wider 
stakeholder groups. Accordingly, similar to traditional financial accounting, SEA is also 
presented for both internal and external users (Yakhou & Dorweiler, 2004; Deegan, 
2003; Schaltegger & Burritt, 2000; Gray, 2000; Ramanathan, 1976). Most definitions 
also indicate that SEA stems from the assumption that organisations have an obligation 
beyond their shareholders to the wider stakeholder groups or community. In addition, 
most definitions consider social and environmental reporting or disclosure as a subset of 
SEA and are part of the SEA process. In summary, SEA and reporting involves 
accounting for and reporting an organisation’s policies, procedures and impacts with 
respect to employees, communities, suppliers, customers and the environment. A 
discussion of social and environmental reporting is provided next.    
3.3 Corporate social and environmental reporting  
Corporate social and environmental reporting is concerned with the disclosure of an 
entity’s social and environmental related information such as community activities, 
environmental impacts, employee welfares, products and safety information and 
consumer interests – information that is of interest to wider stakeholders or community 
groups in addition to shareholders. Thus, disclosure of such information is considered 
part of an organisation’s responsibility to its stakeholders or a response to stakeholder 
interests and concerns (Deegan, 2007; Gray et al., 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; Mathews, 
1995; 1993). Deegan (2007, p. 1265) defines social responsibility reporting as the 
provision of information about the performance of an organisation with regard to its 
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interaction with its physical and social environment. This includes such factors as an 
organisation’s interaction with local community, the level of support for community 
projects, the level of support for developing countries, health and safety records, 
training, employment and education programs, and environmental performance.   
While social and environmental reporting provides useful information for stakeholders 
in relation to the social and environmental effects of organisations’ economic activities, 
this reporting is predominantly a voluntary practice (Deegan, 2002; Mathews, 1995). 
There is no mandatory requirement to report social and environmental information 
under current Australian accounting standards. For example, under the Corporations Act, 
companies are not specifically required to include corporate social and environmental 
performance information in their annual report. Likewise, the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) listing rules made no requirement for companies to account for their 
social and environmental impacts to be a listed entity. Corporate social and 
environmental reporting is not covered in the corporate governance principles of the 
ASX. The only disclosure requirements in Australian corporate law relate to the 
requirement that corporations provide details within the Directors’ Report about their 
compliance with environmental laws (Section 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act) 
(Deegan & Shelly, 2013). Therefore, for the purpose of this study that investigates the 
Australian gambling industry, corporate social and environmental reporting or 
disclosure is deemed to be associated with the voluntary provision of information about 
the social and environmental activities of gambling organisations in relation to the 
broader areas and context of corporate social and environmental reporting practices.  
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3.4 Development of corporate social and environmental 
accounting 
While SEA has commanded growing attention and acceptance, its development can be 
seen as a result of stakeholder pressures as well as academic advocacy. Since the 1970s, 
interest in investigating the role of corporations in society has heightened, with an 
increased public awareness of corporations’ actual and potential impacts on society. 
Increased interest in corporate social and environmental performance has arguably led 
to an increase in the expected responsibility of corporations to provide their social and 
environmental performance information to stakeholders (Tilt, 1994; Patten, 1992; Gray 
et al., 1996). During the 1970s and 1980s, advocates of SEA research (Tinker et al., 
1982) were seen as radical in terms of having the potential to create real change in 
existing accounting structures and practices (Deegan, 2002). They were seen as 
‘explicitly or implicitly criticising the current structure of the discipline: historical 
financial accounting reports for shareholders and creditors’ (Mathews, 1997, p. 488). 
According to Deegan (2001), the practice of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (CSD) was widely promoted in the 1970s but lost prominence in the 1980s 
due to several factors such as lack of enthusiasm for voluntary disclosures by the 
business community itself, variable models and measurements that were lacking 
(Johnson, 2001). However, in the early 1990s, CSD appeared to re-emerge and 
throughout the 1990s, SEA research has increasingly gained prominence and developed 
substantially (Mathews, 1997). Increasing numbers of corporations accept the concept 
of ‘corporate social responsibility (CSR)16 and have developed substantial community 
                                               
16
 For the purpose of this study, CSR is viewed as an umbrella concept which includes corporate 
citizenship, corporate sustainability, corporate social performance, business ethics, and corporate social 
and environmental performance. 
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support programs and thus reporting of such information. According to the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (2000, p. 2-3), CSR is defined as: 
…the ethical behaviour of a company towards society … management acting 
responsibly in its relationships with other stakeholders who have a legitimate 
interest in the business. CSR is the continuing commitment by business to behave 
ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of 
life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and 
society at large. 
Early research on SEA (see for example Guthrie, 1982; Ernst & Ernst, 1978) focussed 
on documenting CSD practices via content analysis to explore the substance of 
disclosures (Owen, 2008). In the early 1990s, attention was devoted to environmental 
reporting from an eco-efficiency perspective, while social reporting did not appear to re-
emerge until the mid to late 1990s. With an increasing number of corporations reporting 
their social and environmental information, researchers started to investigate CSD 
practices and corporate motivations behind CSDs, by employing a number of theories 
including legitimacy theory, political economy theory, stakeholder theory, and 
institutional theory17; these were to explain CSD practices rather than simply describing 
SEA and disclosure practices (Owen, 2008). In the late 1990s, SEA researchers began to 
present a uniform stream of deeply perceptive and well-designed studies (Owen, 2004; 
Deegan & Rankin, 1999) that investigated stakeholder needs and expectations, 
recognitions and perceptions in relation to CSD18. A growing number of recent studies 
such as Milne and Patten (2002), O’Donovan (2002), Deegan et al. (2002), Belal and 
                                               
17
 These theories will be explained in Chapter four – Theoretical Perspectives. 
18
 It is important to understand stakeholder demands and concerns in order to respond to their needs for 
information and expectations of corporate responsibility (Zadek, 2004). 
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Owen (2007), Cooper and Owen (2007), Deegan and Blomquist (2006), Herbohn 
(2005), and O’Dwyer and Owen (2005), have made significant contributions to the SEA 
literature with suggestions for well-designed further research. SEA continues to gain 
attention from researchers as Parker (2005, p. 843) states: 
…a community of social and environmental accounting scholars has truly arrived 
and is producing a wide range of significant research that will hopefully lay the 
foundations for the future policy and practice. 
Parker (2005) also explains that accounting researchers were attracted to investigate 
social and environmental accountability issues following the recognition of their 
importance and the concerns expressed by communities, lobby groups, governments and 
the business community. A number of studies have directly investigated the influence of 
particular stakeholder groups such as the community and non-government organisations 
(NGOs) on CSD practices (Islam & Deegan, 2008; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006). An 
increasing amount of empirical research has examined media attention (as a proxy for 
community concerns) impacts on CSD practices (Brown & Deegan, 1998; O’Donovan, 
1999; Deegan et al., 2002; Islam & Deegan, 2008; Deegan & Islam, 2014) as well as 
changes to CSD practices to avoid further onerous regulations being introduced 
(Mitchell, 1997).   
From the discussion, the increasing engagement of academic researchers suggests that 
SEA and disclosure practices continue to be investigated in attempts to determine the 
rationales underlying such practices. The next section discusses the different areas of 
SEA research that attracted researchers with different interests. 
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3.5  Areas of research in social and environmental accounting 
There are various areas of SEA which have attracted attention from researchers 
including motivations behind disclosures, ethical/accountability issues, cost externalities 
and market reactions. 
Examining organisation motivations behind their CSD practices is one of the significant 
areas of research in SEA. This area of research investigates the motivations behind 
CSDs and seeks to explore ‘why’ organisations provide social and environmental 
information via corporate mediums such as annual reports, sustainability reports and 
web-based disclosures. In an effort to explain ‘why’, researchers often make reference 
to the positivist approach to research, that is an approach of ‘explaining what is’. 
Consequently, the positivist approach is applied in examining corporate motivations 
behind CSDs. Prior research on this area of CSDs demonstrated that the motivation 
behind organisations providing social and environmental information varies and 
includes the creation or maintenance of legitimacy, the desire to meet community 
expectations19 (see for example a series of voluminous studies documented in Deegan, 
2002; Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011), to manage particular (and possibly powerful) 
stakeholder groups (Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Arnold & Hammond, 1994; Arnold, 
1990; Ullmann, 1985), to respond to the influence exerted by pressure groups (Nasi et 
al., 1997; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; O’Donovan, 1997; Bailey et al., 2000; Buhr, 2002; 
Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Elkington, 1994), to influence market or share prices 
(Freedman & Jaggi, 1988), to avoid regulations (Freedman & Stagliano, 1998; Stanny, 
                                               
19
 Owen (2008, p. 247) noted that the aim of maintaining legitimacy, explained within legitimacy theory, 
is ‘to seek to identify and possibly go on to predict, the driving factors behind managerial disclosure 
decisions, which are understood to be motivated by a desire to demonstrate corporate conformity with 
social expectations’. 
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1998; Barth et al., 1997; Mitchell, 1997; Ness & Mirza, 1991), to discharge 
accountability (Gray et al., 1996a, 1997; Lehman, 1999, 2001; Adams, 2002; Cooper & 
Owen, 2007), or to comply with regulations  (Dias-Sardinha & Reijnders, 2001; Rivera-
Camino, 2001; Adams, 2002; Hart & Ahuja, 1996; Ghobadian et al., 1998). 
Parker (2005) supports SEA researchers who embrace stakeholder power and 
community expectations as factors in explaining motivations behind CSD practices. 
According to Parker (2005), such factors appear to present realistic explanations for 
CSDs compared to researchers who utilise market data for explanations. This area of 
research in SEA has increasingly attracted attention and interest of researchers, and 
demonstrates a significant opportunity for further research. Nevertheless, there is a 
general lack of research that investigates the motivations behind CSD practices in the 
gambling industry (Jones et al., 2009), in particular in the Australian context.   
Another major area of research in SEA related to accountability issues – that is, 
investigating what organisations should do to be ethical and accountable to the wider 
stakeholder groups. This area of research is ‘describing what should be’ and can 
therefore be classified as a normative approach to research. According to Owen (2008), 
early SEA research focuses on prescriptive work is collectively with the normative 
attempts to improve CSD practices. Normative research such as Hackston and Milne 
(1996), Gray et al. (1995a), and Ernst and Ernst (1978) contribute useful suggestions in 
relation to the measurement and classification of CSDs. According to Deegan (2002), 
based on the normative concept, corporations’ CSD decisions should be based on their 
beliefs about what managers are considered to be accountable for, and what people need 
to know about an organisation’s social and environmental performance, rather than as a 
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responsive reaction tool to perceived legitimacy threats. CSD decisions are therefore 
viewed as ethical decisions to discharge the accountability of organisations. Hence, it 
can be said that this area of research is motivated by democratic concerns about the 
rights to information, and that organisational behaviour might be controlled by society. 
This area of research includes authors such as Gray et al. (1997), Cooper and Owen 
(2007), Cooper et al. (2003), Adams (2002), Lehman (2001, 1999 and 1995), Gray et al. 
(1996), and Medawar (1976). 
Further to the above, another area which has also attracted considerable attention from 
SEA researchers is about how to cost externalities. With an increasing amount of 
academic and applied research being conducted such as Deegan (2008), Burritt (2004), 
Schaltegger and Burritt (2000), and Bartolomeo et al. (1999), research addressing the 
internalisation of external costs is increasingly gaining importance within research 
(Owen, 2008). This area of research also includes accounting for energy (see Loew, 
2003; Bennett & James, 1997; Birkin, 1996), full cost accounting20 (Deegan, 2005; 
Bebbington et al., 2001; Schaltegger & Burritt, 2000), activity-based costing to 
incorporate accounting for environmental costs (Deegan, 2003; Bartolomeo et al., 2000; 
Haveman & Foecke, 2000), and life-cycle costing (Parker, 2000; Bennett & James, 
2000; Kreuze & Newell, 1994). 
As mentioned earlier, some researchers are studying share-price reactions to CSD 
practices. This is another area of research in SEA that views CSDs as a decision 
motivated by self-interest; an economic interest approach which is one of the positivist 
                                               
20
 According to Schaltegger and Burritt (2000), full cost accounting is the method used to trace and 
allocate all direct and indirect costs to a product, product line, process, service or activity for the purposes 
of inventory valuation, product pricing decisions and profitability analysis.  
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approaches. This approach explains that economic interest of managers and 
shareholders sought to conceptualise the relationship between disclosure and share price. 
However, this area of research possesses some major limitations (Owen, 2008; Parker, 
2005; Deegan, 2002), as the findings of prior studies in this area are somewhat mixed, 
and generally failing the answer to ‘so what’ test (Parker, 2005). Shareholders and 
creditors are invariably neither the drivers nor primary beneficiaries of corporate social 
and environmental accountability practices and related disclosures (Parker, 2005).  
It is notable that different areas of research in SEA contribute to accounting literature in 
different ways, and are all essential in creating further research and contributions to the 
accounting literature, particularly the area of SEA. While many SEA researchers 
contributed knowledge and valuable insights to facilitate the development of SEA 
research, this study attempts to contribute to the first and second strand of research 
within SEA – that is this study seeks to investigate and examine corporate motivations 
behind CSDs as well as adopting a normative approach to investigate corporate 
accountability discharged by gambling organisations to its stakeholders. For the 
purposes of this study, the SEA literature review of the different areas of research 
reveals that the investigation of corporate motivations behind CSDs has increasingly 
gained attention. However, the review also reveals that there is a general lack of 
research that investigates corporate motivations behind CSDs in the gambling industry. 
Gambling companies that provide gambling products and services that are potentially 
harmful to its users (Jones et al., 2009) are viewed to have corporate social 
responsibility to their stakeholders beyond their shareholders (Hancock et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, CSDs of gambling companies, particularly those relating to responsible 
gambling and harm minimisation (RGHM), has not been widely investigated. An 
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overview of the research in the context of corporate motivations behind CSDs in general, 
and the gambling industry in particular, is provided next. 
3.6  Prior research on CSD practices   
This study investigates the Australian gambling industry and CSD in this context is 
therefore associated with the voluntary provision of information about the social and 
environmental activities performances of gambling companies. Consequently, the 
discussion will focus on motivation with regards to voluntary CSDs rather than the 
motivation to comply with any legal requirements to report corporate social and 
environmental performances.  
There is relatively limited research on the CSD practices of organisations operating 
within the gambling industry both globally or locally, or the external pressures being 
exerted on such organisations in relation to their social and environmental performance 
and related accountability practices (see Islam & Mathews, 2009; Belal, 2008; Belal & 
Owen, 2007; de Villiers & van Staden, 2006; Islam & Deegan, 2008).  
Prior research suggests that there are various reasons that potentially drive CSDs. 
According to O’Dwyer (2000), the primary motivation for CSDs comes from the 
business-case rationale where the intention and action are mainly geared towards 
activities linked to business profitability. Kurucz et al. (2008, p. 85) identify four 
reasons for CSDs under the business-case that relates to prioritisation of self-interest, 
these are: ‘reputation and legitimacy’, ‘synergistic value creation’, ‘costs and risk 
reduction’, and ‘competitive advantage’. This supports the view that corporate 
reputation now has an increasingly large impact on shareholder values, and this view is 
supported by John Browne, Director of Reputation Assurance at PwC. According to 
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Browne, ‘successful companies will be those who embed social, environmental and 
ethical risk management into their core business processes and performance measures’ 
and ‘company reputation’ is a corporation’s most valuable asset and is at the heart of 
managing a business in the 21
st
 century (cited in O’Dwyer, 2000, p. 13-14). Thus, the 
maintenance of a corporate image or reputation is of importance for either short or long-
term economic gain. In a study of Spanish companies, Larrinaga-Gonzalez et al. (2001) 
conclude that CSDs are used to promote a favourable environmental image in an 
attempt to gain business advantage – that is, CSDs are used as part of corporate public 
relations for legitimacy purposes.  
In a study by Deegan and Rankin (1996), the authors found that companies tended to 
avoid information which was unfavourable to their corporate image. The study results 
show that the prosecuted companies provided a significantly greater amount of positive 
environmental disclosures compared to the non-prosecuted companies, to project a 
positive corporate image. Similarly, in another study, Jupe (2007) found that among the 
177 CSDs investigated, the proportion of negative news reported was considerably less 
than positive news. The author concludes that CSDs are created to manage stakeholders 
for the benefit of the organisation; this supports that the self-interest related rationale is 
a key driver behind CSDs. CSDs are therefore viewed as a tool for gaining, repairing or 
even maintaining a company’s legitimacy and thus reputation as part of a reputation risk 
management strategy to create and protect shareholder value. 
Another driver behind CSDs is accountability. When management of an entity accepts 
that the entity has accountability (or duty) to provide particular information to its 
stakeholders, CSDs are related to business morals and ethics (Douglas et al., 2004; 
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Reinig & Tilt, 2009). However, such motivation behind CSDs is difficult to prove as 
this involves identifying the values of corporate management, which is hard to 
empirically test (Deegan, 2009). Research on moral or ethical motivation behind CSDs 
is limited, and the motivation is usually indirectly derived. It is likely that there is a 
combination of motivations (Zadek & Raynard, 2004; Unerman et al., 2007) rather than 
the purely moral-based argument for CSDs (Jones, 1999). Many researchers support this 
view, such as Gray et al. (1996), Owen et al. (1997), and Bebbington (1997), and 
suggest that unless CSDs are about accountability and sustainability, they fail in their 
principal purpose – for corporations to meet the expectations of both the community and 
environmental stakeholders equally, rather than to maximise returns to their 
shareholders alone. 
In a study by Islam and Deegan (2008), the authors examined CSD practices of the 
Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Associations (BGMEA) from 1987 
to 2005 to explore the motivation behind BGMEA’s CSDs. The authors found that 
rather than being driven by local pressure or expectations, the CSDs of BGMEA were 
directly driven by the changing expectations of multinational buying companies, which 
in turn directly related to the expectations of the community in which they operated. 
The authors stated that without pressure (such as from companies Nike and H&M), or 
related economic incentives, it appears that organisations in developing countries would 
be slow to embrace social and related accountabilities expected by the global 
community. In another study, Deegan et al. (2002) examined the CSD practices of BHP 
Billiton Limited (BHP) from 1983 to 1997 to ascertain the extent and type of CSDs in 
their annual reports, and their motivations behind such disclosures. The authors found a 
trend in providing greater social and environmental information in the annual report of 
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BHP in recent years of their analysis, which significantly correlated with community 
concern which was the motivation behind these CSDs. Deegan (2001) also lists the 
motivations behind CSDs according to different theoretical perspectives. They are 
identified in Table 3.2 below.    
Table 3.2: Theoretical perspectives of motivations behind CSDs  
Motivations behind CSDs Theoretical perspective 
To influence the perceived 
legitimacy of the organisation. 
According to legitimacy theory, organisations undertake 
legitimation strategies, including disclosing information, 
in an attempt to appear legitimate to the societies in 
which they operate. Legitimacy theory itself relies on the 
notion of a social contract or ‘license to operate’. 
To manage particular stakeholders 
or powerful stakeholder groups; 
To forestall efforts to introduce 
more onerous disclosure regulations 
by regulators and government. 
Managerial branch of stakeholder theory differentiates 
stakeholder groups within society. The power of 
stakeholders depends on stakeholder’s degree of control 
over resources required by the organisation. The more 
powerful the stakeholder is, the more effort taken to 
address their concerns (Ullmann, 1985). 
To increase the wealth of the 
shareholders and the managers of 
the organisation. 
Based on self-interest wealth maximisation, managers 
would decide to make CSDs if such disclosures would 
ultimately increase the wealth of the managers (perhaps 
as a result of increasing the profitability or value of their 
organisation and thus the managers’ remuneration). 
A belief by the managers that the 
entity has an accountability (or a 
duty) to provide particular 
information. 
The ethical branch of stakeholder theory states that 
stakeholders have intrinsic value in and of themselves 
and the organisation therefore has an obligation to 
uphold their right and serve their interests simply 
because they exist (Goodijk, 2003; Kaler, 2003). Thus, 
the disclosure is to discharge corporate accountability to 
their stakeholders. 
 
Prior research that focuses on the United Kingdom (UK) gambling companies found 
that gambling companies operating in the gambling industry disclose a limited amount 
of social and environmental information that is predominantly positive and it was rare to 
find instances of negative disclosure (Jones et al., 2009). To the best of the researcher’s 
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knowledge, there is no research investigating the CSD practices of the gambling 
industry in Australia. In order to understand the key findings of prior research on the 
CSD practices of gambling companies, a brief review of the study of Jones et al. (2009) 
within the UK context of gambling companies is provided below.  
Jones et al. (2009) investigated the CSDs of a number of the UK’s major gambling 
companies. Their study was based on the information obtained from two sets of sources: 
(1) CSDs on the world-wide-web by 16 major UK gambling companies; (2) the review 
of reports from a number of government departments, organisations and associations 
concerned with the regulation and social impacts of gambling. The findings of the study 
indicated that there are substantial variations in the nature and the extent of CSDs in this 
industry. From the 16 gambling companies investigated, only four of them produced 
CSDs, another nine had some limited information about CSR or social responsibility or 
responsible gambling, while the remaining three provided no information on CSR. More 
specifically, their research focused on four categories of CSDs, namely those relating to 
the marketplace, workplace, environment, and the community. The findings also 
revealed that CSDs were varied in nature, content and extent due to the absence of 
legislative guidance or a conceptual framework for the consistent measurement and 
communication of social responsibility performance.  
From the study by Jones et al (2009), the CSDs of gambling companies could be 
considered a smokescreen that helps to mask damaging impacts by providing a selection 
of examples where companies have positive impacts within the economy, society and 
environment; that they are ultimately created for the purpose of corporate legitimation 
and positive corporate image. The authors also discussed the importance of recognising 
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the inevitable tension between an organisation owned by shareholders who traditionally 
seek sound dividend returns, and the expectations of other stakeholders who seek their 
interests and expectations to be satisfied. This study investigated the CSD practices of 
gambling companies over a specific time period without further investigating the 
changing trends of CSDs and the motivations behind for CSDs.     
However, the study by Jones et al. (2009) does appear to be the first known study in 
SEA literature within the context of the gambling industry, and it provides some 
insights which might be consistent with the research aims of this study. In addition, the 
authors also found that CSDs within the UK gambling industry have received relatively 
little attention from academics, and this provides opportunities for other people who are 
considering researching this important area; an area of interest to many stakeholders 
given the significant social, economic, and political impacts of the gambling industry. 
This is similar in the context of Australia, as most of the gambling-social related 
research focuses on sociology, social science and the management perspective 
(Delfabbro, 2008; Hing, 2000; Pratten & Walton, 2009) rather than on the SEA 
perspective.  
A review of literature also suggests there is a general lack of research seeking to 
determine theoretical interpretations or explanations of the motivations behind CSDs, or 
investigating RGHM disclosures by gambling companies related to social accountability 
issues. This is somewhat surprising given that there is a belief held by many 
stakeholders that gambling companies should be accountable for the social 
consequences of their operations to not only their shareholders but also their broader 
stakeholders (including broader communities and future generations) (Hancock et al., 
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2008). The review also demonstrates that there is a great deal of scope for further SEA 
research within the gambling industry which would promote and potentially improve 
social reporting and the related accountability of those conducting business in the 
industry. There is a notable absence of research, for example, that investigates corporate 
disclosures in relation to RGHM information; an area of great concern to a broad range 
of stakeholders (Productivity Commission, 1999).  
The discussion within this chapter provides some valuable insights into the research 
gaps and opportunities in SEA literature. The next section identifies some major 
research gaps which this study will address. 
3.7  Gaps in the literature 
The overall discussion in this chapter leads to a consideration of the following research 
gaps in the SEA literature: 
 a general lack of research that investigates CSD practices in the gambling industry, 
particularly gambling companies, in order to understand what information is 
reported in the CSDs, and why; what drives gambling companies to disclose their 
social and environmental information; are gambling companies similar to other 
companies that respond to external pressure and change their CSD practices 
accordingly? Very limited research on CSD practices of gambling companies 
appears in the SEA field (see Jones et al., 2009 for the UK context).  
 an absence of research that investigates RGHM disclosure practices to gain an 
understanding of the extent to which gambling companies publicly discharge (or do 
not discharge) their accountability to stakeholders for problem gambling social 
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issues. Nevertheless, there is a belief held by many stakeholders that gambling 
companies should be accountable for the social consequences of their operations to 
not only their shareholders but also their corporate stakeholders (Hancock et al., 
2008). RGHM measures and performance are linked to problem gambling social 
issues which are the main issues of stakeholder concern in the gambling industry. 
Hence, RGHM disclosure of gambling companies arguably attracts strong interest 
from stakeholders in order for them to gain an understanding of corporate 
accountability embraced by gambling companies. 
 a general lack of research exploring corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM 
to understand the actual or genuine corporate concerns about RGHM and problem 
gambling issues, and whether corporate social disclosures are a ‘true reflection’ of 
managements’ views and perceptions on issues of RGHM. This is despite the fact 
that RGHM-related social issues and accountability has been the subject of public 
debate in the Australian gambling industry since the late 1990s. Given the potential 
incongruence between actions taken by corporations to address (restrict) problem 
gambling and the ‘market imperative’ to maximise profits and shareholder value, 
the question that develops is whether there is any potential decoupling exists 
between corporations ‘real’ position (actual activities and processes) and their 
public positioning reflected in social disclosures? If there is an apparent decoupling, 
then the difference between the positions of gambling organisations would lead the 
researcher to question the credibility of gambling companies’ CSD, specifically 
RGHM disclosures and to contemplate the idea of greater industry regulation. 
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The above gaps have motivated the conduct of this study and hopefully the research 
findings will lay the foundations for the future initiatives of social reporting in the 
gambling industry. The study also attempts to fill the gaps by adding to the existing 
body of knowledge concerning CSD practices, in particular RGHM information of 
gambling companies operating within Australia.  
3.8  Conclusion 
This chapter sought to describe and summarise SEA research in general. Key terms 
arising from the discussion were defined. The development of SEA and the major areas 
within SEA research were briefly introduced, followed by a discussion on research 
within the context of the motivation behind CSD and then the CSD research in the 
gambling industry. While investigating the research issues identified in this chapter, it is 
essential to embrace the relevant theoretical frameworks underpinning the study. In this 
regard, Chapter 4 presents a detailed discussion of these theories, as they are relevant to 
gaining an understanding of the motivations behind providing CSDs as well as 
accountability within the gambling industry.       
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Chapter Four 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Social and environmental accounting (SEA) researchers provide a variety of theoretical 
perspectives to explain or predict disclosure motivations. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide the theoretical framework within which corporate social and environmental 
disclosure (CSD) practices are examined. Within the SEA research, legitimacy theory, 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory are three theoretical perspectives that have 
been adopted by a number of researchers in recent years. According to Gray et al. 
(1996), legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional theories are all derived from a broader 
theory which has been called political economy theory. The ‘political economy’ itself 
has been defined by Gray et al. (1996, p. 47) as ‘the social, political and economic 
framework within which human life takes place’ and the economic realm may not be 
studied in isolation from the political, social and institutional frameworks in which the 
economy is situated (Gray et al., 1996). These theories offer potential in-depth 
explanations of the motivation behind CSD. While these three complementary theories 
have many similarities and have been widely used in CSD research (Chen & Roberts, 
2010), each theory offers explanations for CSD from a different perspective. As Chen 
and Roberts (2010, p. 652) suggest, from these theories it is ‘possible to reach 
compatible interpretations of business social phenomena and the selection and 
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application of these theories depends upon the focus of study’. A detailed discussion of 
each theory follows. 
4.2  Legitimacy Theory 
Many authors have discussed CSD practices within the theoretical framework of 
legitimacy theory (see for example Hedberg & Von Malmborg, 2003; O’Dwyer, 2003; 
Patten, 2002b; Cowan & Deegan, 2011; Cowan & Gadenne, 2005; Cunningham & 
Gadenne, 2003; Deegan, 2002; Deegan et al., 2002; Milne & Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 
2002; O’Dwyer, 2002; Patten, 2002a; Tilt, 1994). Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 131) 
suggest that legitimacy theory is useful in analysing corporate behaviour: 
…because legitimacy is important to organizations, constraints imposed by social 
norms and values and reactions to such constraints provide a focus for analysing 
organizational behaviors taken with respect to the environment. 
Within the SEA literature, legitimacy theory offers the tools to describe and explain the 
changing levels of CSD practices of an organisation. Numerous SEA researchers 
provide empirical studies to support legitimacy theory in explaining motivations behind 
corporate management reporting their social and environmental information (Deegan, 
2002; Islam & Deegan, 2008; Gray et al., 1996; Mathews, 1993; Deegan et al., 2000; 
O’Donovan, 1999; Walden & Schwartz, 1997). Many of these SEA researchers found 
that corporate annual report disclosures are a tool used by organisations to maintain 
corporate legitimacy. The researchers also suggest that the greater the likelihood of 
adverse shifts in society’s expectations, the greater the need to influence the process 
through CSD. Given that legitimacy theory is able to explain the CSD practices of an 
organisation, it is necessary to understand the concept of legitimacy. 
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4.2.1  The meaning of legitimacy 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
It is important to understand the concept of legitimacy as it is useful in supporting and 
explaining social relations of an organisation. It is also needs to be acknowledged that 
there are two levels of legitimacy – organisation level (organisational legitimacy) and 
societal level (institutional legitimacy). Organisational legitimacy refers to how an 
organisation seeks approval (or avoidance of sanction) from groups in society (Kaplan 
& Ruland, 1991). Definitions of organisational legitimacy are relatively broad and 
associated with the proclamation about legitimation arising from consistency with 
socio-cultural values. Lindblom (1993, p. 2) defines legitimacy as ‘a condition or status 
that exists when an organisation’s value system is congruent with the value system of 
the larger social system of which the organisation is a part’. Nasi et al. (1997, p. 300) 
define organisational legitimacy as:  
…a measure of the attitude of society towards a corporation and its activities, and 
it is a matter of degree ranging from highly legitimate to highly illegitimate. It is 
also important to point out that legitimacy is a social construct based on cultural 
norms for corporate behaviour. 
Institutional legitimacy is described as “the ‘macro-theory’ of legitimation, [which] 
deals with how social-institutional structures as a whole (capitalism, for example, or 
government) have gained acceptance from society at large” (Tilling et al., 2008, p. 2). 
Organisations are institutional ‘beings’ in this sense, because they are the embodiment 
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of capitalism, and themselves ‘creatures of law’, as artificial persons (Tilling & Tilt, 
2010). According to Hybels (1995, p.243), ‘legitimacy itself has no material form. It 
exists only as a symbolic representation of the collective evaluation of an institution’. At 
an institutional legitimacy level, the environment created provides significant 
opportunities for organisations to obtain organisational legitimacy. Hence, the term 
‘legitimacy’ refers to acceptance sanctioned by the community – that is, ‘legitimacy’ is 
a conferred status that is controlled by others and grants rights to organisations to 
operate.  
‘Legitimacy’ is distinguished from the term ‘legitimation’ which relies on an 
organisation’s legitimate actions and process of obtaining this status (Lindblom, 1993). 
Organisations are perceived to be legitimate if they pursue socially acceptable goals in a 
socially acceptable manner; economic efficiency alone is insufficient to obtain or 
maintain this status (Epstein & Votaw, 1978). Legitimacy is not synonymous with 
economic success or legality, because economic success is just one facet of legitimacy 
and legality is theoretically an enforcer, but not a creator, of changes in social values 
(Deegan, 2002; Lindblom, 1993). Accordingly, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) argue that 
legitimacy is like any resource that an organisation must obtain from its environment. 
However, different from many other ‘resources’, legitimacy is a ‘resource’ that an 
organisation is considered to be able to impact or manipulate through various 
disclosure-related strategies (Woodward et al., 1996). Consequently, such legitimation 
strategies are used as the baseline to evaluate whether a legitimacy-seeking organisation 
adheres to its society’s expectations which are not static but evolve over time. Societal 
expectations change because the community becomes more knowledgeable, informed 
and expect all individuals to enjoy a decent life, to have access freedom, to share and 
73 
 
enjoy justice and equality, to have a pollution-free environment and no exploitation of 
minor parties. With changing societal expectations, it is important for organisations to 
continuing retaining their legitimacy in order to survive conditions beyond those of the 
marketplace (Boulding, 1978). The change in social expectations is a continual process, 
thus the amount of ‘legitimacy’ attributed to an organisation may fluctuate over time 
according to community expectations, and the impact of such fluctuations in legitimacy 
is always directly reflected in the organisational stance in one form or another. 
Therefore, this study examines both organisational legitimacy (such as legitimising 
particular gambling companies) and institutional legitimacy (such as legitimising the 
broader gambling industry) – that is whether a particular strategy (such as disclosures) 
or all strategies as a whole (for example capitalist economic structures or democratic 
government) have gained or maintained social acceptance of gambling companies and 
the gambling industry’s ‘social contract’. 
4.2.2  Legitimacy and social contract   
Legitimacy theory relies on the notion of a ‘social contract’ or ‘license to operate’ 
(Deegan, 2002; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Shocker & Sethi, 1974). The ‘social contract’ 
or ‘license to operate’ is considered to represent an implicit agreement between an 
organisation and its society (Shocker & Sethi, 1974), where corporations seek to satisfy 
their stakeholders by behaving in a socially desirable manner (Brown & Deegan, 1998; 
Donaldson, 1982; Shocker & Sethi, 1974). Guthrie and Parker (1990) state that 
legitimacy theory is based on a notion that an organisation operates in society via a 
‘social contract’; for example, the organisation gains approval to perform various 
socially desirable business activities in return for endorsement of its rewards and 
74 
 
ultimate survival. Primarily, the ‘social contract’ is deemed to be an implied contract 
between an organisation and its society, whereby the society grants the organisation 
permission to operate in compliance with societal expectations concerning the conduct 
of the organisation
21
. Mathews (1993, p. 26) provides a broad view of a social contract 
as follows: 
The social contract would exist between corporations (usually limited companies) 
and individual members of society. Society (as a collection of individuals) provides 
corporations with their legal standing and attributes and the authority to own and 
use natural resources and to hire employees. Organisations draw on community 
resources and output of both goods and services and waste products to the general 
environment. The organisation has no inherent rights to these benefits, and in order 
to allow their existence, society would expect the benefits to exceed the costs to 
society. 
The historical development of the ‘social contract’ is long and distinguished, with a 
noteworthy role in the philosophical theories of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1697, 1994), 
John Locke (1632-1704, 1993) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778, 1996). 
According to Rousseau, the idea of the ‘social contract’ was to ensure liberty so that the 
power was exercised by the sovereign (the common power created by the social 
contract). The social contract was viewed as a means to govern via a system that society 
had agreed upon, and therefore individuals, the community and organisations should act 
in accordance with its society’s terms. Hence, an individual or an organisation is 
supposed to comply with the expectations of all citizens or the community as a whole. 
                                               
21
 Donaldson (1982) views social contracts as a theoretical construct that is deemed to represent the 
multitude of explicit and implicit expectations that society has concerning how an organisation should 
conduct its operations in order to be seen as complying with societal expectations.     
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Based on the notion derived from the social contract, where the community is not 
satisfied with the operation of an organisation, it can effectively revoke the 
organisation’s ‘contract’ to continue its operations (Deegan, 2002). Thus, an 
organisation that operates in an unacceptable manner or fails to comply with the social 
contract of its society has negative implications that result in legitimacy gaps. As 
Deegan (2006, p. 277) states: 
Failure to comply with societal expectations (that is, comply with the terms of the 
‘social contract’) may lead to sanctions being imposed by society, for example, in 
the form of legal restrictions imposed on an organisation’s operations, limited 
resources (for example, financial capital and labour) being provided, and/or 
reduced demand for its products (sometimes through organised consumer boycotts). 
4.2.3 Legitimacy gaps, threats to legitimacy and legitimation strategies  
A legitimacy gap is based on a relational perception that accepts a relationship between 
organisations and individuals in society. Accordingly, legitimacy gaps can arise for 
many reasons. Sethi (1977) summarises reason into two main branches: firstly, societal 
expectations may change over time and this change could possibly lead to an 
expectation gap arising even though an organisation may not have altered its practices; 
secondly, a legitimacy gap could also occurs when previously unknown information 
becomes known about an organisation, such as through disclosures in the media or 
government reports. Nasi et al. (1997, p. 301) further state: 
The potential body of information about the corporation that is unavailable to the 
public – the corporation shadow (Bowles, 1991) – stands as a constant potential 
threat to a corporation’s legitimacy. When part of the organisational shadow is 
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revealed, either accidentally or through the activities of an activist group or a 
journalist, a legitimacy gap may be created. 
A widening gap causes an organisation to lose its legitimacy but also poses a ‘threat’ to 
its survival. ‘Threats’ to legitimacy can be viewed as clues to an organisation’s need to 
change some aspects, if not all, of its operations in order to maintain its social contract 
and ensure survival. Therefore, a ‘threat’ to an organisation’s perceived legitimacy is 
predicted to lead to responsive actions by management, who will endeavour to minimise 
the impacts of such threats and thus ensure survival. When an organisation faces 
legitimacy threats, the existence or absence of legitimation strategies employed by 
corporations is a critical variable in determining an organisation’s survival. It is 
important for a corporation to have legitimation strategies to manage ‘threats’ when 
they arise, otherwise the organisation becomes vulnerable. Prior research suggests that 
if an organisation finds itself confronted by a ‘threat’ or in a situation that necessitates 
legitimation strategies, legitimacy theory can offer a powerful explanatory means to 
analyse the particular behaviours of that organisation (Cowan & Gadenne, 2005; 
Cunningham & Gadenne, 2003; Deegan, 2002; Deegan et al., 2002; Wilmshurst & Frost, 
2000; O’Donovan, 1999; Tilt, 1994; Patten, 1992; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Tinker & 
Neimark, 1987; Hogner, 1982).  
Legitimacy theory considers that once organisational legitimacy is threatened, an 
organisation will embark on a process of legitimation aimed at those groups who it 
perceives to be its ‘conferring publics’ (O’Donovan, 2002; 1999). According to 
O’Donovan (2002, p. 349), in order to manage legitimacy effectively, an organisation 
must consider the following factors: 
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 identify its conferring publics; 
 establish what are its conferring publics’ social and environmental values and 
perceptions of the corporation (public pressure variables); 
 decide on the purpose or aim of any potential organisational response to 
legitimacy threats; and, 
 decide what tactics and disclosure options are available and suitable for 
managing legitimacy, related to the purpose of the organisational response. 
Legitimacy theory predicts that when managers perceive that a legitimacy gap exists 
they will implement different legitimation strategies in response to changing societal 
expectations. Organisations’ legitimation strategies differ depending on the legitimacy 
objectives or purpose being sought by the corporation (O’Donovan, 2002; Oliver, 1991; 
Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). For instance, is the corporation attempting to gain or maintain 
or repair legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990) concern of the 
organisations? According to Deegan (2014), there are three phases of legitimation 
strategies; establishing, maintaining and repairing legitimacy. 
Suchman (1995) described gaining legitimacy as winning social acceptance, where 
techniques used are usually proactive (O’Donovan, 2002). Gaining legitimacy is 
normally required when an organisation operating in a new market or producing new 
product to the market which is new to its stakeholders (for example, introduce a new 
product which may have a potential negative impact on the community). Once gaining 
legitimacy, organisations may enter the phase of maintaining legitimacy. The 
maintaining phase is argued to be the one that can be achieved with the least effort 
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compared to the other phases (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; O’Donovan, 2002). 
Maintaining legitimacy requires management to observe and anticipate changes in the 
stakeholder relationship in order to preserve past conferring of social expectations. 
Repairing legitimacy is normally required when the organisation is associated (not 
necessarily directly involved, see Patten, 1994) with an incident which caused a crisis of 
legitimacy (a legitimacy crisis to the organisation or the respective industry as a whole) 
such as loss of human life, or significant damage to the environment. For repairing 
legitimacy, organisations may choose to conform to social values as their first 
preference strategy (O’Donovan, 2002), such as inform stakeholders about recent 
emergent changes in performance and activities to remedy deficiencies (Samkin & 
Schneider, 2009). Different from gaining strategy, repairing tactics are largely reactive 
in nature (Patten, 1994; O’Donovan, 2002), and it is obvious to see when a significant 
crisis to legitimacy exists, the effect of other legitimation tactics (such as gain, maintain) 
will be futile unless it is repaired first, and proactive strategy may need to be 
implemented thereafter. In addition, Deegan (2014) explains that it is also possible that 
organisation legitimation efforts might be abandoned when organisation legitimacy has 
been so badly eroded it may beyond repair (for example, please see Tilling & Tilt, 2010, 
where the study investigates the legitimacy of an Australian producer of tobacco 
products Rothmans Limited). 
From the discussion above, repairing legitimacy appears to be relevant to gambling 
companies operating in the Australian gambling industry, particularly in the late 1990s, 
when the issue of problem gambling and its adverse social impacts on many Australians 
and their families shifted community concerns to the social costs of gambling rather 
than its economic benefits (Productivity Commission, 1999). This was followed by the 
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Australian Government’s first independent national inquiry into the gambling industry 
in 1998, and its report released in 1999.  
When an organisation is threatened, it can adopt various legitimation strategies, 
including public disclosure strategies (Lindblom, 1993; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). 
Lindblom (1993) identifies four strategies that an organisation can implement to obtain 
or maintain legitimacy:  
a) educate and inform its “relevant publics” about (actual) changes in the 
organisation’s performance and activities; 
b) change the perception of the “relevant publics” – but not change its actual 
behaviour; 
c) manipulate perceptions by deflecting attention from the issue of concern to 
other related issues through an appeal; or 
d) change external expectations of its performance. 
Prior studies support the view that CSDs can potentially be used by an organisation to 
implement each of the above strategies (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Milne & Patten, 2002; 
O'Donovan, 2002; O'Dwyer, 2002). A number of empirical studies that sought to 
associate legitimacy theory with CSD policies also found that CSDs via annual reports 
are a reaction to legitimacy threats (see for example Deegan et al., 2002; Deegan et al., 
2000; Patten, 1992; Hogner, 1982). As Patten (1992, p. 475) demonstrates: 
(…) threats to a firm’s legitimacy do entice the firm to include more social 
responsibility information in its annual report. 
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An organisation’s legitimacy itself can also be threatened merely because it fails to 
provide disclosures consistent with what society wants and expects (Deegan, 2006; 
2002; Newson & Deegan, 2002). Supportive of this view, Deegan (2006, p. 281) states 
that: 
Legitimacy itself can be threatened even when an organisation’s performance is 
not deviating from society’s expectations of appropriate performance. This might 
be because the organisation has failed to make disclosures that show it is 
complying with society’s expectations, which in themselves, might be changing 
across time. That is, legitimacy is assumed to be influenced by disclosures of 
information, and not simply by (undisclosed) changes in corporate actions. If 
society’s expectations about performance change, then arguably an organisation 
will need to show that what it is doing is also changing (or perhaps it will need to 
explicitly communicate and justify why its operations have not changed). 
Patten (1991, 1992) notes that organisations may choose to respond to changes in public 
attention through CSDs within annual reports in order to retain or increase perceptions 
of legitimacy. This perspective argues that organisations will disclose social and 
environmental information whenever the organisation is faced with ‘threats’ to its 
legitimacy which linked to its social and environmental issues. 
Relating legitimacy theory to the focus of this study (gambling companies), legitimacy 
theory can be used to provide possible predictions about the impact that society could 
have on the CSD practices of gambling companies. Community concern about problem 
gambling social issues puts increasing pressure on government to implement initiatives 
(such as Productivity Commission, 1999, Australia’s Gambling Industries, Report 
No.10 [PC1999], the Ministerial Council on Gambling [MCG] and its National 
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Framework of Problem Gambling [NFPG], Productivity Commission 2010, Gambling, 
Report No. 50, Canberra’ [PC2010]) to address social issues associated with the 
gambling industry. Legitimacy theory would suggest that, if gambling companies 
perceived public pressures through governments initiatives as ‘threats’ to their 
legitimacy, they will react to such ‘threats’ by adopting various legitimation strategies, 
including disclosure strategies to minimise the impacts of such threats so as to remain 
legitimate with its society. 
4.3  Stakeholder Theory 
According to O’Donovan (2002), many CSD studies moved away from a focus on 
legitimating for ‘society’, towards legitimating for ‘stakeholders’ (or, as they are 
sometimes referred to, the ‘conferring publics’). Stakeholder theory is another theory 
often utilised by researchers to explain motivations behind CSD. Deegan (2014) 
explains that ‘stakeholder theory’ is a broad ‘umbrella term’ for a number of related 
theoretical perspectives that place the ‘stakeholder’ as a key focus of analysis. Deegan 
(2014) notes that stakeholder theories can be subdivided into two broad branches: the 
normative branch and the managerial branch (p. 371 to 382 for more detail). This theory 
holds that organisations are not only accountable to their shareholders, but also to their 
stakeholders. This section first explains the meaning of the term ‘stakeholder’ before 
discussing each branch of the stakeholder theory. 
4.3.1  Definition of a stakeholder  
Freeman and Reed (1983, p. 89) have identified stakeholders as ‘those groups who have 
an interest in the actions of the corporation’. Evan and Freeman (1988, p. 79) have 
82 
 
classified stakeholders as ‘those groups who have a stake in or a claim on the firm’. 
They have specifically outlined suppliers, customers, employees, stockholders, the local 
community and management as the stakeholder groups of an organisation. According to 
Carroll (1993, p. 74), a stakeholder is defined as ‘any individual or group who can affect 
or is affected by the actions, decisions, policies, practices, or goals of the organisation’. 
In summary, stakeholders can be identified by the legitimacy of their claims, which are 
substantiated by a relationship of exchange between themselves and the organisation. 
Hence, stakeholders include shareholders, creditors, managers, local communities, the 
general public, customers, employees, suppliers, governments and not-for-profit 
organisations (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).  
In the early studies, some researchers differentiated stakeholders as primary or 
secondary stakeholders. Clarkson (1995, p. 106) stated that a primary stakeholder ‘is 
one without whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going 
concern’; while he defined secondary stakeholders as ‘those who influence or affect, or 
are influenced or affected by, the organisation, but are not engaged in transactions with 
the organisation and are not essential to its survival’. His definition of stakeholders is 
consistent with Freeman’s (1984) definition – that primary stakeholders are those upon 
which the organisation depends for its survival (such as customers, shareholders, 
governments and employees) and secondary stakeholders are those who have an interest 
in the organisation or its activities, though the organisation may not depend on these 
groups of stakeholders for its survival (such as social groups). Freeman (1984) also 
indicated that although secondary stakeholders such as NGOs might be less significant 
at present, this group of stakeholders could become a powerful group at any time, which 
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will have a direct influence on an organisation’s operations. Therefore, organisations 
should not to ignore secondary stakeholders.   
4.3.2 Normative or ethical branch of stakeholder theory 
The normative branch is also known as the ethical branch of stakeholder theory. The 
normative branch of stakeholder theory prescribes the relationships between an 
organisation and its stakeholders, and agreed upon normative principles of fairness, in 
consideration of all stakeholders; i.e. the interests of one stakeholder (for example, a 
shareholder) should not be pursued at the expense of other stakeholders (Zsolnai, 2006; 
Phillips et al., 2003) such as the community and the public. Reed (1999, p. 453) 
explicitly constructs the relation stating that the stakeholder relationship ‘is best 
characterised as a theory of corporate responsibility or a normative theory of the firm’. 
This explains that normative researchers believe that stakeholder theory is useful as a 
theory or for an organisation’s ethics when it is supplemented by a theory of moral 
responsibility (Van de Ven, 2005). 
According to the normative stakeholder theory, stakeholders have intrinsic value in and 
of themselves and the organisation therefore has an obligation to uphold their rights and 
serve their interests simply because they exist (Goodijk, 2003; Kaler, 2003; Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995). Thus, the obligations of corporations extend beyond their 
responsibilities to their owners to stakeholders groups other than the shareholders and 
beyond those responsibilities imposed by the law or union contracts (Jones, 1980). 
Normative stakeholder theory examines whether managers should meet the demands of 
the stakeholders, other than shareholders, and if so, on what grounds these various 
stakeholders have justifiable claims over the firm (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). This 
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approach presents the moral basis for the stakeholder theory by stating that 
organisations should do (or not to do) the right (wrong) thing (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995). As Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 66) state: 
Within the ethical branch of Stakeholder Theory there is a view that stakeholders 
have intrinsic right (for example, to safe working conditions, fair pay), and these 
rights should not be violated. That is, each group of stakeholders’ merits 
consideration for its own sake and not merely because of its ability to further the 
interest of some other group, such as the shareholders. 
In support of the normative branch of stakeholder theory, Van de Ven (2005) states that 
normative principles set the normative rules about certain subjects, such as the 
‘corporate ought to be governed’ or ‘managers ought to act to...’ to do the following. 
Normative stakeholders are ‘those to whom the organisation has a moral obligation, an 
obligation of stakeholder fairness, over and above that due other social actions simply 
by virtue of them being human’ (Phillips, 2003, p. 31). Hence, from the normative 
perspective, stakeholder theory asserts that managers have a fiduciary duty to manage 
the business for the benefit of all stakeholders (Boatright, 2004), and all stakeholders 
have the right to be treated fairly by an organisation regardless of stakeholder power 
(Deegan, 2009). It is also embraces a view that ‘management must give equal 
consideration to the interests of all stakeholders and, when these interests conflict, 
manage the business so as to attain the optimal balance among them’ (Hasnas, 1998, p. 
32). This suggests that management is obliged to consider the interests of the wider 
stakeholder groups, over the interests of shareholders only (Hasnas, 1998, p.32). Based 
on this perspective, it involves extending the accountability of corporations to all 
stakeholders, and it is therefore inappropriate to classify stakeholder groups as either 
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primary or secondary, since all stakeholders share the equal right to be considered 
regarding an organisation’s social and environmental performance (Deegan, 2009).  
Demonstrating ‘accountability’ can also be linked to the ethical branch of stakeholder 
theory. Accountability is ‘the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a 
financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held accountable’ 
(Gray et al., 1996, p.38). Indeed, O’Dwyer et al. (2005) argue that stakeholders are 
aware of their ‘right to know’ about the impact an organisation has on them, and hold 
expectations concerning the accountability of organisations ‘for their stewardship’ of 
stakeholders’ resources (O’Dwyer et al., 2005, p. 22). Hence, the normative branch of 
stakeholder theory is consistent with the notion of ‘right to information’ (Deegan, 2009), 
and society is to be informed about the extent to which the organisation meets the 
responsibilities imposed upon it (Gray et al., 1991). Gray et al. (1996) suggest that 
‘accountability’ involves responsibilities for undertaking particular actions and thereby, 
providing an account of those actions. Explaining accountability within the context of 
SEA, Gauthier et al. (1997, p. 29) state that:  
Accountability is defined as the obligation imposed on a manager (leader, 
administrator, etc) by the law or a regulation or contract to demonstrate that he or 
she has managed or controlled, in accordance with certain explicit or implicit 
conditions, the resources with which he or she has been entrusted. Accountability, 
therefore, requires disclosure of the information deemed necessary to account for 
the company’s performance with respect to the issues and objectives previously 
established. In the context of environmental accounting, a company must account 
for its overall performance, including its performance with regard to 
environmental issues. 
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The notion of the accountability concept is often used in the SEA literature, 
emphasising the responsibility of organisations to account for their business activities 
(Cooper & Owen, 2007; Parker, 2005; Adams, 2004; Adams & McNicholas, 2007). It is 
considered that corporations are responsible for both achieving economics goals and for 
behaving in a socially responsible manner (Chen, 1975, p. 541). As such, it involves 
extending the accountability of companies to other stakeholders and beyond the 
traditional role of providing a financial account to the owners of capital, in particular, 
shareholders. Social disclosure practices are viewed as a moral discourse to satisfy a 
larger range of accountability relationships, as CSD is a process of communicating the 
social and environmental effects of organisations’ economic actions to particular 
interest groups within society and to society at large (Gray et al., 1987, p. ix). Thus, 
CSD is considered an ‘integral element of the process of communication between the 
company and key stakeholders’ (Zadek, 1998, p. 1427).  
Accordingly, it is argued that the role of CSD is to inform society about the extent to 
which the organisation meets the responsibilities imposed upon, or expected of it (Gray 
et al., 1991). The provision of social responsibility information in corporate annual 
reports is seen as a means by which corporations can ‘[proclaim] their social 
responsibility credentials’ and publicly discharge accountability for social responsibility 
to a wide range of stakeholders (Cooper & Owen, 2007, p. 649; Deegan & Gordon, 
1996). To be accountable, companies’ disclosures need to demonstrate corporate 
acceptance of their ethical, social and environmental responsibilities (Adams, 2004; 
Owen, 2005). Thus, under the accountability concept, CSD is responsibility-driven 
rather than demand or survival-driven. This view considers that companies genuinely 
believe they are accountable to a wider group of stakeholders, and that they recognise 
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and accept their responsibility to them by voluntarily performing and disclosing their 
social and environmental information to other stakeholders. It is this willingness to 
discharge their responsibility to stakeholders that explains their reporting to be 
responsibility-driven rather than demand or survival-driven.  
In the context of a normative view, a number of researchers have sought to identify the 
nature of accountability firms have to the community. Gray et al. (1997) suggest that 
accountability could be expressed in terms of the expectations of the community 
surrounding the actions and activities of the firm (p. 334):  
The nature of the relationships – and the attendant rights to information – are 
contextually determined by the society in which the relationship occurs. 
An accountability perspective widens this view to reflect the relationships based on a 
societal or community view. As Gray et al. (1996, p. 39) state: 
These contracts can be thought of as both legal and non-legal – that is, moral or 
natural contracts, that is some relationships and parts of some relationship are 
governed by law whereas other relationships – and some parts of all relationships 
– are governed by the ruling ethics, values and principles of society. These 
‘contracts’ provide the basis for the rights of the parties in that relationship – 
including rights and responsibilities relating to information flows. 
In the gambling industry, given that there is a belief held by many stakeholders that 
gambling companies should be accountable to ensure a safe gambling environment to 
protect their patrons from the potential harm of gambling (Delfabbro et al., 2007), 
corporations are therefore implicitly accountable for the social consequences of their 
operations to not only their shareholders but also their corporate stakeholders (including 
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broader communities and future generations) (Hancock et al., 2008). The ethical 
perspective of stakeholder theory argues that corporations should ‘account for [their] 
actions or inaction in some form of report provided for its stakeholders’ (Holland & 
Gibbon, 2001, p. 279-280). Thus, consistent with this normative perspective, if 
gambling companies are to be accountable to the community in relation to the social 
impacts of their business activities, they would disclose information about actions they 
might undertake (such as responsible gambling and harm minimisation measures) to 
alleviate problems associated with issues such as problem gambling so as to publicly 
discharge their accountability to stakeholders for the social impact of problem gambling.  
4.3.3  Managerial branch of stakeholder theory 
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory is positive in nature and tends to provide 
explanations or predictions for why managers might behave in particular ways, for 
example, why they might elect to disclose particular information. Stakeholder power 
and the use of information to influence or manipulate stakeholders can be explained by 
the managerial branch of stakeholder theory. 
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory is based on the premise that an 
organisation and its stakeholders are interdependent on one another for resources, and 
managers are responsible for maintaining this exchange relationship for the 
organisation’s survival. In accordance with the managerial branch of stakeholder theory, 
the importance of a stakeholder depends on its influence or degree of control over 
‘resources’ required by the organisation (Ullmann, 1985). Therefore, Mitchell et al. 
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(1997) argue that one of the core attributes of a stakeholder is their power
22
 to influence 
organisations. While many researchers often struggle to define power, Mitchell et al. 
(1997, p. 865) view that ‘power may be very tricky to define, but it is not that difficult 
to recognise’ and suggest that ‘stakeholder power exists where one social actor, A, can 
get another actor, B, to do something that B would not have otherwise done’. They 
further explain that when these are combined with urgency a typology emerges that has 
great utility in explaining managers’ assessments of stakeholder salience23 (Mitchell et 
al., 1997). The positive relationship between stakeholder power and salience as 
proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) has been empirically supported (Agle et al., 1999; 
Gago & Antolin, 2004).  
Consistent with this view, Savage et al. (1991) state that it is important to understand 
each stakeholder’s potential to threaten an organisation. Stakeholder’s relative power 
and its relevance to any particular issue is dependent on their capacity, opportunity and 
willingness to threaten the organisation with an issue with which the organisation must 
deal. As organisation has many stakeholders and various issues to deal with; an 
organisation might not respond to all stakeholders equally or deal with all issues, but 
rather respond more thoroughly to those stakeholders deemed to be ‘powerful’ (Buhr, 
2002). The more powerful the stakeholder is in terms of controlling organisational 
resources, the greater the expectation that this stakeholder’s demands will be addressed. 
                                               
22
 Power is the most common concept utilised by many stakeholder theorists to explain how 
stakeholders influence an organisation (Frooman, 1999).  
23
 Mitchell et al. (1997, p. 854) define salience as ‘the degree to which managers give priority to 
competing claims’. 
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A successful organisation is considered to be one that satisfies the demands of the 
various powerful stakeholder groups
24
.  
Numerous SEA researchers suggest that social and environmental performance and 
disclosure of such information are a means of managing relationships with stakeholders 
(Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Gray et al., 1996; Gray et al., 1995a; Ullmann, 1985). As 
Ullmann (1985, p. 553) states, an organisation ‘will use either social performance or 
social disclosure or both techniques simultaneously to manage its relationship with its 
stakeholders’. In this regard, the managerial branch of stakeholder theory considers that 
an organisation discloses particular types of information (such as social and 
environmental information) in order to gain and retain or maintain the support of 
powerful stakeholder groups (Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Buhr, 2002; Bailey et al., 
2000; O’Donovan, 1997; Gray et al., 1996; Gray et al., 1995a). Thus, the disclosure of 
such information is aimed at conveying detail about an organisation’s social and 
environmental activities to its powerful stakeholders in an effort to affect their actions in 
a manner that is beneficial to the organisation (Deegan et al., 2002; Deegan & 
Blomquist, 2006). In other words, the disclosure of social and environmental 
information can be viewed as an instrument to manage powerful stakeholders. In 
describing stakeholder theory and the role of information controlling and potentially 
manipulating the actions of powerful stakeholders, Gray et al. (1996, p. 45) state: 
Here (under this perspective), the stakeholders are identified by the organisation 
of concern, by reference to the extent to which the organisation believes the 
interplay with each group needs to be managed in order to further the interests of 
                                               
24
 According to Hasnas (1998, p. 32), ‘when viewed as an empirical theory of management designed to 
prescribe a method for improving a business’s performance, the stakeholder theory does not imply that 
business has any social responsibilities’.  
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the organisation. (The interests of the organisation need not be restricted to 
conventional profit-seeking assumption). The more important the stakeholder to 
the organisation, the more effort will be exerted in managing the relationship. 
Information is a major element that can be employed by the organisation to 
manage (or manipulate) the stakeholder in order to gain their support and 
approval, or to distract their opposition and disapproval. 
The managerial branch of stakeholder theory can be used to provide possible predictions 
about the impact that powerful stakeholder groups could have on the CSD practices of 
gambling companies. Hence, with increasing community and public pressure by means 
of government initiatives (such as PC1999, the MCG and its NFPG, and PC2010), if 
managers perceived a need for information for groups deemed to be powerful, then they 
would disclose more information to meet this demand. Consistent with this perspective, 
if managers perceive particular stakeholders (such as the ‘community’, which has power 
to influence government policies that ultimately will affect their gambling businesses’ 
profitability) to be both powerful and demanding information (such as responsible 
gambling practices that the companies have in place to address problem gambling 
issues), then gambling companies would disclose such information to conform to these 
demands. Thus, CSD is deemed to be demand or survival-driven. 
4.4  Institutional Theory 
Another theory which underpins this study is institutional theory. Dillard et al. (2004, p. 
507) explain that institutional theory: 
...concerns the development of the taken for granted assumptions, beliefs and 
values underlying organizational characteristics...[with accounting-based studies] 
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suggesting the importance of social culture and environment on the practice of 
accounting; the use of accounting practices as rationalizations in order to maintain 
appearances of legitimacy; and the possibilities of decoupling these rationalizing 
accounting practices from the actual technical and administrative processes. 
Institutional theory posits that organisational structures and practices are shaped by 
pressure from stakeholders who expect to see particular practices in place (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; 1991). This theory focuses on examining and explaining how 
institutionalised norms and pressures could affect social and environmental policies 
and/practices among organisations. Deegan (2009) argues that organisational practices 
and policies respond to social and institutional pressure in order to conform to 
prevailing societal expectations, to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy. There are two 
main dimensions to the institutional theory: isomorphism and decoupling. Isomorphism 
will be discussed first, followed by decoupling.  
4.4.1 Isomorphism 
Institutional theory focuses on a form of legitimacy where the industry sector’s other 
organisations and structures generate cultural pressure on the organisation to follow or 
assume some kind of status (Suchman, 1995)
25
. Prior research indicates that the 
institutional environment plays an important role in influencing organisations to adopt 
new accounting and reporting practices (Dillard et al., 2004). Institutional theory has 
been used to explain how organisations adopt similar organisational structures and 
particular operating or reporting policies because of pressure from powerful 
stakeholders who expect to see certain practices in place across a particular 
                                               
25
 Suchman (1995) considers this form of legitimacy ‘institutional legitimacy theory’ where legitimacy is 
constructed by the external institutions in the industry sector, and that ‘within this tradition, legitimacy 
and institutionalization are virtually synonymous’ (1995, p. 576). 
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organisational field. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), an organisation is 
affected by the organisational environmental in which it operates, and thus organisations 
must respond to external pressure. They argue that an organisation responds not 
necessarily to increase its efficiency, but to conform to expectations in their 
organisational field. This is consistent with an underlying assumption of institutional 
theory that suggests organisations must be responsive to external demands and 
expectations in order to maintain their legitimacy (Oliver, 1991). DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983, p. 11) version of institutional theory has been termed neo-institutional 
theory and focuses on: 
… the way action is structured and order made possible by shared systems of 
rules that both constrain the inclination and capacity of actors to optimise as well 
as privilege some groups whose interests are secured by prevailing rewards and 
sanctions. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) observed a similar structure among organisations within 
the same field. The authors were attracted by the degree of homogeneity in 
organisational environments and sought to explain some of the institutional forces that 
cause organisations to become similar over time. For example, in the education industry, 
all universities tend to be structured along the same hierarchical lines. Organisations 
seem similar because they adopt similar structures. Organisations within the same 
industry will tend to follow one another and this process happens naturally by itself; 
organisations are ‘more similar without necessarily making them more efficient’ 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147). This phenomenon is recognised as ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Consequently, ‘isomorphism’ refers to a 
homogenisation process that occurs when organisations structurally conform to other 
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organisations in their environment or field. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 149) 
explain: 
The concept that best captures the process of homogenisation is isomorphism. In 
Hawley’s (1968) descriptions, isomorphism is a constraining process that forces 
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environment conditions. 
Institutional isomorphism takes place as organisations adopt structures that are 
perceived as legitimate and therefore socially acceptable, without considering issues of 
relevant efficiency. This isomorphism is deemed to be practical to organisations, and 
adds to their likelihood of survival (Oliver, 1991). It has been proposed that there are 
three primary mechanisms that are responsible for isomorphism – coercive, mimetic and 
normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) – each of which is briefly discussed below. 
4.4.1.1 Coercive isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism, ‘results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organisations by other organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural 
expectations in the society within which organisations function’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, p.150). It emphasises that an organisation’s behaviour changes because standards 
of conduct or elements of structure are externally imposed upon it (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). As Tuttle and Dillard (2007, p. 393) state: 
Change is imposed by an external source such as a powerful constituent (e.g. 
customer, supplier, competitor), government regulation, certification body, 
political powerful referent groups, or a powerful stakeholder. The primary 
motivator is conformance to the demands of powerful constituents and stems from 
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a desire for legitimacy as reflected in the political influences exerted by other 
members of the organisational field. These influences may be formal or informal 
and may include persuasion as well as invitations to collude. If the influencing 
group has sufficient power, change may be mandated.  
Coercive isomorphism, therefore, focuses on companies being coerced by powerful 
stakeholders into adopting particular organisational practices. It can be inferred that 
there exist two classes or levels of coercive isomorphism: one that results from socio-
cultural expectations which simply exist and are taken-for-granted (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977); and the other arising as a function of dependencies or direct pressure for 
compliance or conformance stemming from organisation-to-organisation relations. The 
influence of societal and cultural expectations coerces organisations’ to conform in 
order to gain legitimacy, which in turn enhances the organisation’s survival prospects 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As discussed under legitimacy theory, legitimacy can be 
linked to a ‘social contract’ between organisations and the broader social context which 
drives organisations to adopt socially appropriate practices and goals (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) work on the influence of socio-cultural expectations 
is consistent with the legitimacy theory, which suggests an implicit ‘social contract’ 
between an organisation and the broader community in which it operates. 
Coercive isomorphism also often arises as a function of dependencies among 
organisations. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) emphasise that such pressure is often 
mandated as state or regulatory requirements or as a result of dependencies arising from 
much-needed critical resources. Coercive pressure is exerted upon organisations by 
other more dominant organisations which they find themselves dependent upon. This 
process imposes compliance with legal regulations, standards and requirements by 
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ensuring that an organisation is legally established and operates in conformity with 
relevant laws and regulations. Thus, organisations strive to become isomorphic with the 
policies, mandates and beliefs of the dominant organisations. 
4.4.1.2 Mimetic isomorphism  
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 67), mimetic isomorphism occurs when 
structures within organisations occupying the same field begin to resemble each other 
because of ‘standard responses to uncertainty’. Mimetic isomorphism involves 
organisations seeking to mimic the institutional practices of other organisations in their 
field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
The presence of ‘successful’ organisations is predictive of mimicry within an 
organisational population: they are structural agents of mimicry. This mimetic behaviour 
can occur explicitly via transfer of personnel or through the use of consultants or trade 
associations. Once some organisations adopt new practices, other organisations 
eventually come to view these practices as necessary (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Over time, as more organisations adopt a particular practice, 
social pressures mount for others to do the same. Regarding mimetic isomorphism, 
Tuttle and Dillard (2007, pp. 392-393) argue that: 
Organisational change is voluntary and associated with one entity copying the 
practices of another. Mimetic pressure includes benchmarking and identifying of 
best practices and leading players in the field. Mimetic isomorphism occurs when 
the processes motivated by these pressures become institutionalised so that 
copying continues because of its institutional acceptance rather than its 
competitive necessity. 
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Mimetic isomorphism often occurs for reasons of competitive advantage in terms of 
legitimacy within an environment of uncertainty. Uncertainty can stem from within the 
institution or from the external environment, and imitating the response patterns of a 
more ‘successful’ institution can provide a means for institutional survival. This process 
may occur unintentionally and indirectly, or explicitly, diffused by organisations such as 
industry and trade associations and consulting firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Mimicking other successful and legitimate organisations can enhance and increase 
organisational legitimacy. Therefore, organisations may model themselves on other 
similar, successful organisations by adopting voluntary CSD practices to increase the 
probability of institutional survival. 
4.4.1.3 Normative isomorphism   
The third form of isomorphism is normative isomorphism. Normative pressure is 
exerted by members of the same profession who abide by common standards of 
behaviour as a result of their common educational background and professional 
socialisation. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), normative isomorphic force 
occurs as a result of professional influences on the organisation resulting from 
professional training and education, and influence from involvement with organisations 
such as professional associations outside the firm (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
According to Scott (2001, p. 175), normative isomorphism introduces a prescriptive, 
evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life that is reflective of preferable values 
and social norms. Corporations are expected to fulfill certain social commitments and 
obligations in order to be seen as socially expected and accepted by other actors (March 
& Olsen, 1989). Consequently, these expectations are usually perceived to be an 
98 
 
external pressure to which one must conform. Corporations may become normatively 
isomorphic by way of internalisation and socialisation processes – that is they share a 
common belief system through the diffusion of group-based institutional norms due to 
education, training or exchanges with professional associations (Abercrombie et al., 
1994; Corocan, 2003; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Normative isomorphism is therefore 
a product of the professional roles that the organisational actors play to influence the 
executives’ evaluation of their peers and, conversely, their peers’ evaluative 
expectations influence the executives’ decisions related to social actions. For example, 
the practices of accounting departments in different firms are not determined by the 
management of those firms but rather by the standards and norms of the accounting 
profession. The normative rules provide an orientation and disposition that can override 
variations in tradition and control, which in turn shape organisational behavior (Perrow, 
1974). Thus, organisations might change to follow professional norms in relation to 
organisational practices, including disclosure practices.  
In general, within SEA literature, institutional isomorphism has been applied to explain 
the reasons why organisations often adopt particular CSD practices. Although they 
usefully identify three different forms of isomorphic pressures of influence operating 
among organisations in the same environments, coercive, mimetic and normative 
pressures, all are predicted to have the same effect of increased structural isomorphism. 
Tuttle and Dillard (2007) argue that coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism may 
occur simultaneously as it is possible that two or more forms will be acting at the same 
time and empirically it may be difficult to distinguish the three forms of isomorphic 
pressures (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001).    
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Institutional theory is a widely applied theory in social sciences and organisational 
research. It has also been utilised by a number of accounting researchers to explain 
management accounting techniques (see Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988), the similarity 
within accounting research (see Tuttle & Dillard, 2007), the role of the accounting 
profession (see Fogarty, 1992), and reasons why organisations adopt particular CSD 
practices and a code of conduct (Islam & Deegan, 2008). SEA researchers contend that 
the reason behind organisations adapting their social and environmental performance 
and associated reporting practices may be due to coercive, mimetic or normative 
isomorphism. This study considers the three forms of isomorphism to understand 
managerial motivations behind disclosing or not to disclosing social and environmental 
information. Derived from institutional isomorphism, if gambling companies across the 
industry perceived institutional pressure to adopt and maintain particular practices that 
are thought to provide institutional legitimacy, gambling companies will seek to 
generate a perception that they have embraced the issue of problem gambling and 
responded to responsible gambling initiatives (such as the development of a responsible 
gambling code) as recommended by PC1999 and the MCG in the NFPG. While 
instituting responsible gambling-related activities and programs, gambling organisations 
will choose to disclose (similar) information within their annual reports in order to make 
it known to the stakeholders (such as the community) that they have changed their 
behaviour and are adopting practices consistent with stakeholders’ expectations. As 
Deegan (2006, p. 307) argues: 
A company could be coerced into adapting its existing voluntary corporate 
reporting practices (including the issues upon which they report) to bring them into 
line with the expectations and demands of its powerful stakeholders (while 
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possibly ignoring the expectations of less powerful stakeholders). Because these 
powerful stakeholders might have similar expectations of other organisations as 
well, there will tend to be conformity in the practices being adopted by different 
organisations – institutional practices will tend towards some form of uniformity. 
4.4.2 Decoupling 
The other dimension of institutional theory is decoupling. Deegan (2014) explains that 
if corporations perceived a need for their organisation to be seen to be adopting certain 
institutional practices, corporate managers might institute formal processes to 
implement those practices; however the actual institutional practices can be very 
different from those formally sanctioned and publicly pronounced processes and 
practices. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), decoupling refers to the situation in 
which the formal organisational practice is separate and distinct from actual 
organisational practice. In other words, the practice is not integrated into the 
organisation’s managerial and operational processes, but more for ‘social fit’ of the 
organisation within its environments in order to gain and maintain legitimacy. That is, 
organisational formal structure has much more to do with the projecting of an 
organisational-self than with the actual operations of the organisation (Carruthers, 1995). 
Therefore, the implementation of an institutional practice is symbolic, or decoupled, if it 
is not integrated into the management and organisation processes. As Laine (2009, p. 
1031) states: 
Factual organisational activities may become decoupled from the accounts given 
outside (Carruthers, 1995; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), leading to window dressing 
(Mouritsen & Skaerbaek, 1995). The external appearance may be rationalized and 
used to help the organisation meet the social expectations and to “confer legitimacy 
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upon the organisation” (Carruthers, 1995, p. 315; also Meyer & Rowan, 1977), 
even though the underlying factual organisational reality may remain unchanged.   
Accordingly, the actual organisational practices can be decoupled from the 
institutionalised (apparent) practices (Deegan, 2014). Hence, in relation to corporate 
reporting practices (including social reporting), this decoupling can be linked to some of 
the insights from legitimacy theory that explained CSD can be used to construct an 
organisational image (such being image of social and environmental responsibility) 
which could be very different from the actual organisational social and environmental 
performance (such as maximising of profitability or shareholder value) (Deegan, 2014). 
CSD thus becomes an element of organisational institutionalisation, despite the fact that 
there might be a decoupling (or disconnection) between how the organisation projects 
itself in its public reports and the internal (unseen) operational structures and practices 
within the organisation (Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2007). As Dillard et al. (2004, p. 510) 
state: 
Formal structure has much more to do with the presentation of an organizational-
self than with the actual operations of the organization (Curruthers, 1996). Ideally, 
organizations pursue economic efficiency and attempt to develop alignment 
between organizational hierarchies and activities. However, an organization in a 
highly institutionalized environment may face conflicts and inconsistencies 
between the demands for efficiency and the need to conform to ‘ceremonial rules 
and myths’ of the institutional context (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In essence, 
institutionalized, rationalized elements are incorporated into the organization’s 
formal management systems because they maintain appearances and thus confer 
legitimacy whether or not they directly facilitate economic efficiency. 
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Prior research provides evidence that supports decoupling as an explanation for 
organisations projecting a socially responsible image through CSD when the actual 
managerial imperative is maximisation of profitability or shareholder value (Deegan, 
2014, p. 392; Laine, 2009; Dillard et al., 2004). That is, the aim of CSD may be for 
institutional legitimacy rather than a ‘true reflection’ of management views about their 
social and environmental information. Relating decoupling to the focus of this study 
(gambling companies), decoupling can be used to explain possible difference in the 
views of the organisation management projected in the organisations public disclosures 
and their ‘real’ management imperatives about responsible gambling and problem 
gambling social issues.  
4.5 Justification of the theories adopted for this study 
The review of the theoretical literature indicates that legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory, and institutional theory, assume that an organisation is influenced by, and in turn 
influences, the society in which it operates (Deegan, 2009). These theories have been 
utilised by numerous SEA researchers in seeking to explain CSD practices (Chen & 
Roberts, 2010). Interestingly, these theories have a shared objective in their explanation 
of whether and how an organisation maintains legitimacy in a dynamic society. As 
Deegan (2002, p. 293-294) states: 
Reflecting the overlapping nature of many theories, the notion of legitimacy is 
also central to institutional theory (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Under this 
theory, organisations will change their structure or operations to conform with 
external expectations about what forms or structures are acceptable (legitimate). 
For example, because the majority of other organisations in an industry might 
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have particular governance structures there might be “institutional” pressure on an 
organisation to also have such structures in place. That is, there is expected to be 
some form of movement towards conformance with other “established” 
organisations. Failure to undertake this process leading to congruence, which is 
referred to as “isomorphism” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149), and has direct 
implications for an entity’s survival. 
Chen and Roberts (2010) consider legitimacy theory as an overarching theory reflecting 
broader societal-level views from which the relationships with institutional, resource 
and stakeholder theory can be observed. All three theories see the organisation as part of 
a broader social system in which the organisation influences and impacts, or is 
influenced or impacted by, other parties within that social system. In this study the view 
is taken that a joint consideration of these three interrelated theories provides richer 
insights into what drives CSD practices than would be possible where only one theory 
was considered in isolation. 
While legitimacy theory emphasises the importance of compliance with social 
expectations and generally focuses on the expectations of ‘society’ in general and 
considers the broader perspective (i.e. the average expectations of all stakeholder groups 
in a society) to explain organisational practices; the managerial branch of stakeholder 
theory explicitly refers to issues of stakeholder power and recognises that society is 
composed of different stakeholder groups that have different and even conflicting 
expectations of organisations. Therefore, the perspective provided within legitimacy 
theory is broader than that of stakeholder theory, such that the former tends to consider 
the expectations of society in general. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of overlap 
between the two theories. 
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When institutional theory describes coercive isomorphism, it shares common views 
with stakeholder theory: institutional theory describes an organisation as coerced into a 
particular form or practice by its powerful stakeholder groups, and the managerial 
branch of stakeholder theory explores how stakeholder power can exert pressure on an 
organisation to follow specific practices. They differ however, in the fact that 
institutional theory views an organisation as embedded in an external environmental in 
which the existence of institutions external to the organisation, such as laws, regulations 
and norms, influence its structure and the creation of institutions within the organisation; 
stakeholder theory holds that organisations act in response to resource control power 
wielded by stakeholders.  
SEA researchers such as Gray et al. (1995a) and Deegan (2006) similarly argue that 
joint considerations of different theories originating from the same paradigm will enrich 
understanding of CSD practices. As Gray et al. (1995a, p. 76) state: 
(…) the different theoretical perspectives (legitimacy theory and stakeholder 
theory) need not be seen as competitors for explanation but as a source of 
interpretation of different factors as different levels of resolution. In this sense, 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory enrich, rather than compete for, our 
understandings of corporate social disclosure practices.    
Prior SEA research utilising these theories indicate that organisations operating in 
various industries respond to the expectations of stakeholder groups specifically; more 
generally they respond to the expectations of the broader community in which they 
operate, through the provision of social and environmental information within annual 
reports, and in so doing reveal the legitimation motives underlying such organisations’ 
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disclosures (Islam & Deegan, 2008). While prior research notes that the disclosure 
strategy of organisations is brought on by a crisis of legitimacy, little can be foretold 
about the behaviour of organisations in the gambling industry, where its products and 
service are potentially harmful to its users. In this regard, this study extends the research 
to investigate whether and how the disclosure behaviour of gambling companies in 
Australia responds to the pressures and expectations of broader stakeholder groups – the 
‘community’. 
Hence, this study will determine to what extent legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory 
and institutional theory predict and/or explain corporate disclosures in the context of the 
Australian gambling industry. While the details of these three theories have been 
discussed in this chapter, an outline of their specific application will be provided in 
Chapter 5, 6 and 7 respectively.  
4.6 Conclusion    
This chapter has provided a broad discussion of the three interrelated theories – namely 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory – which all originate from 
the political economy paradigm. The discussion on the justification of the theories 
forms the underlying theoretical foundation for this study, especially for part one of the 
analysis outlined in Chapter 5. Based on theoretical perspectives, an organisation’s 
CSDs can be seen as their reaction and response to general societal, stakeholder and 
institutional pressure, or as discharging its accountability. The specific application of 
these theories will be further summarised in Chapter 5, 6 and 7 respectively. Having 
developed the relevant theoretical perspectives, the following three chapters will 
provide details of the three interrelated parts of this study. 
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Chapter Five 
The changing trends of corporate social and 
environmental disclosure within the Australian 
gambling industry 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter represents part one of the broader study that aims to investigate the 
changing trends of corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSD) practices of 
gambling companies in order to understand what information is reported in CSDs, and 
potential reasons for why it is reported. In doing so, this chapter provides an 
understanding of the nature of the CSD practices of Australian gambling organisations, 
and the extent to which gambling organisations publicly disclose social and 
environmental information, together with any information about actions they might 
undertake to alleviate the impact of social problems associated with problem gambling. 
The discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that the last two decades have given rise to 
burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature on CSD practices of organisations in 
various industries (Islam & Deegan, 2008; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; O’Donovan, 
2002; Milne & Patten, 2002). There is, however, relatively limited research on the CSD 
practices of organisations in the gambling industry, and where such research has been 
undertaken, it does not appear to have been undertaken within the Australian context 
(for overseas research see Jones et al., 2009).  
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Chapter 2 provides background information on the Australian gambling industry – an 
industry which has evolved to be one of significant national economic importance with 
economic benefits for Australia; the industry also comes with substantial negative social 
costs associated with problem gamblers (such as social issues including family 
problems, crime, suicide, depression, relationship breakdowns, bankruptcy and job loss 
[Productivity Commission, 1999]). 
This chapter examines the extent and type of CSDs found in the annual reports of two 
major publicly-listed, and highly visible Australian gambling companies: Crown 
Limited (Crown) and Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Tabcorp). The analysis covers the 15-
year period from 1995 to 2009. As such, this chapter specifically uses three interrelated 
Australian government initiatives, which are arguably reflective, or a manifestation, of 
community pressure (as discussed in Chapter 2), as proxies for public concerns about 
the social costs of gambling. The three government initiatives are: (1) the 
recommendations of the Productivity Commission, 1999, Australia’s Gambling 
Industries, Report No.10 (PC1999), (2) the establishment of the Ministerial Council on 
Gambling (MCG), and (3) the MCG-initiated National Framework on Problem 
Gambling (NFPG) 2004-2008.  
The Australian Government conducted its first public inquiry into the gambling industry 
in 1998. The inquiry attracted substantial public attention resulting in the PC1999 report, 
which reflected an assimilation of community expectations and concerns regarding 
gambling. The MCG was established in 2000, and the NFPG implemented for the 2004-
2008 period; both were a consequence of the recommendations from PC1999. 
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Drawing upon legitimacy, stakeholder, and institutional theory (refer to Chapter 4 for a 
detailed discussion), this chapter proposes that changes in the CSD practices of 
gambling organisations coincided with specific community concerns and pressure that 
was reflected in PC1999’s recommendations, the formation and operation of the MCG, 
and the introduction of the NFPG 2004-2008.  
The balance of the chapter is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief 
overview of the three Australian government initiatives (i.e. PC1999, MCG and 
NFPG)
26
 followed by a brief review of the theoretical framework underpinning part one 
of the study. The research method is then outlined, including a brief discussion of the 
two gambling organisations under analysis (Crown and Tabcorp), followed by a 
presentation, discussion and conclusion of the findings of part one of this study.  
5.2 Australian Government initiatives in the gambling 
industry 
Gambling is an old industry, and also one of the most profitable and fastest growing 
industries globally. Gambling provides a substantial source of profits and taxes for 
gambling companies (and therefore, dividends for shareholders) and state/territory 
governments, respectively. These substantial profits have encouraged the strong 
expansion of the gambling industry. In Australia, gambling consumption expenditure 
increased from AUD$11 billion in 1997-98 (Productivity Commission, 1999) to 
AUD$19 billion in 2008-09, which was about the same as alcohol sales in Australia 
(Productivity Commission, 2010). The gambling industry contributes tax revenues of at 
                                               
26
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Australian Government conducted the second public inquiry into the 
gambling industry in 2008 and its report, PC2010, was released in June 2010. PC2010 did not form the 
first part of this thesis, as annual report information was not available at the time this part of the research 
was conducted. 
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least AUD$4.7 billion annually, which represents approximately 10 per cent of 
state/territory taxation revenue (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008). Therefore, the 
contribution to the total tax revenues of governments is significant. 
The liberalisation of gambling in the 1990s contributed substantial economic benefits to 
Australia in terms of contributions to taxes, associated tourism, employment and the like; 
however, the growth of the gambling industry has also raised community concerns 
about the adverse social impacts on many Australians and their families, particularly the 
issue of problem gambling. Responding to growing community concerns, in 1998 the 
Australian Government conducted its first independent national inquiry into the 
gambling industry, with the aim of enhancing public and industry understanding of 
industry-related issues, and particularly its economic and social impacts.  
5.2.1  The Productivity Commission’s inquiry 1998 
As detailed in Chapter 2, community concern about the adverse social impacts of 
gambling was the impetus for the Australian Government’s first independent national 
inquiry into the gambling industry in 1998. The government conducted its first public 
inquiry into gambling industries in 1998 and its report, PC1999, was released in 1999. 
PC1999 and its recommendations resulted from high levels of community engagement 
with a wide range of participants who raised various concerns with, and expectations of, 
the gambling industry in terms of its social costs, in particular, those associated with 
problem gamblers. Thus, it can be said that PC1999 and its recommendations in 
particular were reflective of community concerns with and expectations of the gambling 
industry. Part one of the study used the PC1999, particularly its recommendations, as a 
proxy for community concerns. As this chapter will explain, the publication of PC1999 
110 
 
brought many negative issues associated with the gambling industry into public focus, 
and there was an expectation that this scrutiny would evoke some form of disclosure 
response from affected organisations, i.e. gambling organisations. The basis for this 
expectation will be explained shortly. 
5.2.2 The Ministerial Council on Gambling (MCG) and its National 
Framework on Problem Gambling (NFPG) 
Following the release of PC1999, the Australian government adopted the key 
recommendation of PC1999, and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
formally established a MCG in April 2000 with the objective of minimising the 
prevalence of problem gambling. In 2003, the MCG developed a NFPG (2004-2008) 
aimed at minimising harm associated with problem gambling as recommended in 
PC1999. The recommendations of PC1999 and the related focus of the NFPG are 
shown in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.  
The establishment of the MCG, and the aim of the NFPG, was to alleviate the negative 
social impacts of problem gambling by recommending various harm minimisation 
approaches and ways to promote a responsible gambling environment, as identified in 
PC1999, to the Australian State and Territory governments. The formation of the MCG, 
and more specifically the NFPG, reflected community expectations for organisations 
that provide any, or all, of the principal forms of gambling services. Whether these 
government initiatives, which were driven by community pressure, resulted in a change 
in CSD practices of the Australian gambling industry is the focus of this chapter; this 
part of the study aims to develop an understanding about what information is provided 
in CSDs of gambling companies, and the motivations behind such disclosure. CSD via 
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the media, such as annual reports, are voluntary and hence management has discretion 
about what types of disclosures to make, if any
 27
. As will be explained in this chapter, 
the view is that the establishment of the MCG and subsequently the NFPG further 
sustained and increased pressure on the gambling industry, particularly gambling 
companies, over and above that already created by PC1999. This increasing pressure 
would provide further impetus for organisations to make public disclosures to counter 
the increasing pressures that were being faced (perhaps by deflecting attention to more 
positive social impacts being generated by the organisations).  
5.3 Theoretical background and research propositions  
Part one of the study uses a joint consideration of the three complimentary theories: 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory which are detailed in 
Chapter 4. The view taken in part one of the study, is that a joint consideration of these 
three related theories provides richer insights for examining the changing trends of CSD 
practices of gambling companies than would be possible if only one theory was 
considered in isolation. While Chapter 4 provides a detailed discussion of these three 
theories, this chapter highlights the applicability of these three theories in predicting and 
explaining the potential disclosures of gambling companies in response to Australian 
government initiatives (PC1999 and the MCG’s NFPG). In doing so, this section 
develops three principal research propositions for part one of the study. 
Legitimacy theory is one of the most widely used theories to explain management 
motivations behind CSD (for comprehensive accounts see, for example, Deegan, 2002 
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 As Deegan (2013) explains, CSD is generally not required by International Financial Reporting 
Standards, ASX Listing Requirements, or the Corporations Act. Rather, these sources of regulation tend 
to fixate on providing information pertaining to the financial performance and position of a reporting 
entity, thereby making the disclosure of social and environmental information voluntary. 
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2014; Gray et al., 1996; Mathews, 1993). Suchman (1995, p.574) states that 
‘[l]egitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions’. Chapter 4 discusses how legitimacy theorists often rely 
upon the notion of a ‘social contract’ and the assumption that organisations will adopt 
various legitimation
28
 tools – including disclosures – to inform the general public that 
the organisation is attempting to comply with societal expectations, and therefore with 
their social contract. The ‘social contract’ or ‘license to operate’ is considered a 
representation of an implicit agreement between an organisation and its society 
(Shocker & Sethi, 1974); i.e. legitimacy is a conferred status that is controlled by others 
and grants rights to organisations’ to operate. Nevertheless, societal expectations are not 
static but evolve over time. Therefore, to maintain legitimacy, organisations must be 
responsive to the changes in public expectations (Lindblom, 1993).   
In the late 1990s, the issue of problem gambling and its adverse social impacts on many 
Australians and their families shifted community concerns to the social costs of 
gambling rather than its economic benefits (Productivity Commission, 1999). 
According to the findings of PC1999, around 70 per cent of Australians considered that 
gambling did more harm than good. It was the increasing community concern about 
problem gambling that motivated the government to commence its various initiatives to 
address problem gambling-related social issues (Productivity Commission, 1999). The 
findings of PC1999 indicated that community concerns about gambling’s economic and 
social impacts had heightened. Issues associated with problem gambling were 
potentially creating legitimacy threats for the industry, with the consequential result that 
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 Lindblom (1993) distinguishes between legitimacy and legitimation where the former is a status or 
condition and the latter is the process of obtaining the status or condition. 
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the government might react to community concern (through, for example, restrictive 
regulations, the introduction of additional taxes, and so forth). 
As Deegan et al. (2002, p.319) argue, ‘when significant events such as a major 
environmental disaster occur, or when there is sustained mass media interest, then it is 
reasonable to assume that most managers would perceive that the organisation’s 
ongoing legitimacy is threatened’. The significance of the findings documented in 
PC1999 was evident in the response from the gambling industry, which expressed 
strong concerns over the potential negative public reaction to the draft report of PC1999, 
given its heavily focused statements about problem gambling and the related social 
costs of gambling. The view was that PC1999 was further magnifying the community’s 
concerns about various negative social aspects associated with the gambling industry. 
For example, in a submission to the Productivity Commission, Tabcorp expressed the 
view that the draft report of PC1999 lacked balance and was ‘damaging to the industry’ 
(Productivity Commission Submission: D232, p. 3). The view of organisations such as 
Tabcorp that the draft report was significant enough to cause ‘damage’, would 
conceivably motivate managers to adopt strategies, including disclosure strategies, to 
counter the possible damage; i.e.,  ‘threats’ to an organisation’s perceived legitimacy 
lead to responsive actions by management, who will endeavour to minimise the impacts 
of such threat
29
. Prior research on CSD suggests that organisations use CSD as a tool to 
respond to perceived threats to their organisational legitimacy
30
 (Deegan et al., 2000; 
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Refer to Chapter 4 where Lindblom (1993) explains there are four courses of action that an organisation 
can take to obtain, maintain or regain legitimacy following legitimacy threatening events, and central to 
all of these strategies is the public disclosure of (legitimising) information. 
30
 There are two major views of legitimacy theory in understanding how the legitimating organisation 
justifies their position – institutional legitimacy and organisational (or strategic) legitimacy. Institutional 
legitimacy refers to the examination of the use of institutional structures and/or activities that have gained 
social acceptance; while organisational legitimacy is used to identify different strategies that 
organisations seeking legitimation may adopt (Gray et al., 1996; Suchman, 1995).   
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Deegan & Rankin, 1997; Patten, 1992). An annual report is one form of reporting or 
disclosure that is considered a vehicle for shifting community perceptions back in 
favour of the organisation (O’Donovan, 2002). Gray et al. (1995a, p. 54) maintain that 
the annual report is not only a statutory document, but also an ‘important document in 
terms of the organisation’s construction of its own social imagery’.  
Given the focus of PC1999 on aspects of problem gambling and the promotion of 
responsible gambling
31
, it is anticipated that there will be a subsequent increase in 
annual report disclosures regarding the positive social aspects of gambling organisation 
(for example, support of community initiatives, local sporting events and clubs, tax 
contributions), and the initiatives being implemented to address the negative aspects of 
gambling. Based on the above, the first proposition of this chapter is: 
P1: There will be an increase in the extent of CSD by gambling organisations in 
their annual reports (particularly in the responsible gambling category) following 
PC1999.  
Stakeholder theory is often utilised by researchers (in conjunction with legitimacy 
theory) to explain motivations behind CSD. Deegan (2014) explains that ‘stakeholder 
theory’ is a broad ‘umbrella term’ for a number of related theoretical perspectives that 
place the ‘stakeholder’ as a key focus of analysis. The managerial branch of this theory 
offers a rich understanding on how organisations can strategically manage their 
particularly powerful stakeholders (Neu et al., 1998; Ullmann, 1985) and balance the 
often conflicting demands of different stakeholder groups (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
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 Chapter 1 defined ‘responsible gambling’ as ‘gambling that takes place in a regulated environment 
where the likelihood of harm is minimal and where people can make informed decisions about their 
gambling activity’ (Queensland Treasury, 2002a, p. 3; 2002b, p. 4). 
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From the detailed discussion of government initiatives in the gambling industry and the 
managerial branch of stakeholder theory provided in Chapters 2 and 4 respectively, the 
‘community’ may be perceived as a ‘powerful’ stakeholder in the gambling industry, 
given its power to influence government initiatives and decisions (such as PC1999), 
which may then have further impact on the operations and future of gambling 
organisations. Without community pressure, there might be no initiatives taken by 
gambling companies and governments in view of the attractive gambling profits and tax 
revenues benefiting them. In the event that gambling organisations are able to meet, or 
satisfy, the powerful stakeholders’ (‘community’) expectations, then this could mean 
that there might be no intervening initiatives from governments (such as PC1999, the 
MCG and NFPG), and no further introduction of regulations for gambling.
32
 
Accordingly, gambling companies may feel driven to respond to the social expectations 
and concerns of the community as they are reflected in the MCG’s harm minimisation 
initiatives or, more specifically, the NFPG. The response by gambling companies could 
be a strategy to alleviate and/or influence community concerns and prevent or mitigate 
the effects of potentially onerous regulations and policies that may impact on the 
operational practices and profitability of gambling organisations. From a stakeholder 
theory perspective (managerial branch), two propositions are advanced in this chapter. 
The first is that:  
P2a: Following the release of the MCG’s NFPG 2004-2008 there will be a 
further increase (over and above that caused by the PC1999) in the extent of 
disclosures relating to responsible gambling (particularly in terms of public 
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 As an example of the introduction of legislation in response to particular concerns, the New South 
Wales’s Gaming Machine Act 2001 (for hotels and clubs) was introduced to foster responsible gambling 
and minimise problem gambling. More recently, the National Gambling Reform Act 2012 was introduced 
in 2012. 
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awareness activities regarding harm minimisation) in the annual reports of 
gambling organisations.  
The basis of propositions 1 and 2a is that community and stakeholder support is 
generally required for corporations to survive in the longer run, and should an 
organisation’s legitimacy be questioned, then stakeholders might switch to other 
organisations that project values that are more in alignment with community values. At 
times, however, other pressures will come to light which might act to moderate the 
focus on attaining community support through social disclosures. In the period of the 
analysis for this study, one potentially moderating factor was the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC).  
In 2007 – when the GFC was at its height – corporations found that support from 
investors and other providers of financial resources became problematic. Arguably, at 
this point in time, the importance to organisations of stakeholders with command over 
financial resources became heightened. Consistent with the proposal that Crown and 
Tabcorp will increase their CSDs based on community stakeholder pressure via 
government initiatives, this part of the study also proposes that in times of particular 
financial stress, organisations will reduce their promotions of an image of social 
responsibility. As the 15-year time frame of part one (1995 to 2009) covers the time in 
which the GFC occurred (beginning in 2007), the opportunity to examine this proposal 
arises. Karaibrahimoglu (2010), in a study of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
disclosures in a sample of Fortune 500 companies, reports that in times of financial 
crisis there is a significant drop in disclosures and in the number and extent of social 
responsibility projects undertaken. Consistent with the above, the proposition is: 
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P2b: Following the global financial crisis in 2007, there will be a decrease in the 
extent of CSDs by gambling organisations in their annual reports in 2007 (and 
2008). 
Consistent with previous discussion in this study (Chapter 4), institutional theory 
suggests that gambling organisations may be coerced by powerful stakeholders – for 
example, the community, via the government – into appearing to adopt and maintain 
particular practices that are thought to provide institutional legitimacy. It is anticipated 
that the gambling companies across the industry sought to generate a perception that 
they embraced the issue of problem gambling and responded to responsible gambling 
initiatives (such as the development of a responsible gambling code) as recommended 
by PC1999 and the MCG in the NFPG (such as venue policies for problem gamblers, 
including staff training in the responsible conduct of gambling; refer to Table 2.1 in 
Chapter 2). While instituting responsible gambling-related activities and programs, 
gambling organisations will choose to disclose such information within their annual 
reports in order to make it known to the ‘community’ that they have changed their 
behaviour and are adopting practices consistent with community expectations. This also 
conveys the message that the organisation ‘is acting on collectively valued purposes in a 
proper and adequate manner’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1991, p. 50). As observed by Deegan et 
al. (2002, p. 340), ‘changing activities without communicating such changes is 
considered to be insufficient’33. The insights from the institutional theory lead to the 
following proposition: 
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 Again, it is emphasised that there will likely be a moderation in the amount of disclosures focusing on 
social issues at the time of the GFC. At this point in time it is likely that management will place relatively 
more focus on financial issues (Karaibrahimoglu, 2010). 
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P3: Through various pressures to conform to institutional norms of disclosure, 
there will be similarities in the CSD patterns of Australian gambling companies 
as they react to the various societal pressures being exerted upon them.  
In summary, as can been seen from the brief discussion above as well as the detailed 
discussion in Chapters 2 and 4, a combination of the three theories – legitimacy, 
stakeholder, and institutional theory provide a complementary perspective in predicting 
and potentially explaining the motivation behind providing voluntary CSDs that would 
not be as obvious if only one theory were used. Again, it is the contention of this 
chapter that a joint consideration of the three theories provides a richer basis for 
understanding and explaining voluntary CSD. With these insights, it is predicted that 
organisations will institute and report on various activities and strategies to meet the 
(changing) expectations and demands of their powerful stakeholders in order to 
maintain legitimacy. While studies have found support for these theories in a variety of 
industries, this chapter determines whether these theories are also applicable to the 
gambling industry, where an organisation’s products and services can have a potentially 
harmful effect on its users (Jones et al., 2009).  
5.4  Research method and organisational overview 
Within the social and environmental accounting (SEA) literature, a common method of 
researching information on CSD is through the analysis of annual reports (Guthrie & 
Abeysekera, 2006). A review of annual reports in part one of this study was chosen for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, since these are a legally-required, publicly available and 
readily accessible reporting document, year-on-year comparisons are made relatively 
easy (Woodward, 1998; Tilt, 2001). Secondly, annual reports are a widespread and 
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popular means of communication to stakeholders and have a high level of credibility 
(Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Adams, 2004; Raman, 2006). Thirdly, the two selected 
companies in part one of the study did not produce any separate social and/or 
environmental (sustainability) reports for the period of analysis (Crown did produce a 
brief sustainability report in 2008 and 2009; however, the content of the report was also 
reproduced in the annual report). Fourthly, as the investigation covers a 15-year period 
from 1995 to 2009, the ability to locate and extract all corporate communications data 
(for example, from web-sites) relating to social and environmental issues from the 
companies’ websites was problematic and could potentially result in incomplete data 
and inconsistent content analysis (Gray et al., 1995b).  
The annual reports of Crown and Tabcorp were examined to understand what 
information is reported in CSDs, and why; this was to ascertain if their disclosures 
appear to reflect or respond to the external pressure exerted upon them through the 
recommendations of PC1999 and the MCG’s NFPG, and whether there appears to be 
consistency between the disclosure responses produced by the two organisations. All 
annual reports released by Crown and Tabcorp from 1995 to 2009 were obtained via the 
companies’ website and Connect 434 . Information about the CSDs being made by 
Australian gambling organisations does not otherwise appear to be available within 
SEA literature. 
5.4.1 The two major Australian gambling organisations 
In contrast to many industries, the gambling industry is typically managed through 
exclusive licences issued by the respective state/territory gambling regulatory body (for 
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 Connect 4 is an electronic database of annual reports for the largest 500 organisations (by market 
capitalisation) listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. 
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example, the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation is the body 
that administers Victoria’s gambling licences), which effectively protects the licensed 
organisations from competition. Nevertheless, the existence of such exclusivity provides 
regulatory bodies with a mechanism to control and influence gambling organisation’s 
activities and/or disclosures. For example, Crown is obliged under the terms and 
conditions of its Casino Licence to comply with various requirements, such as the 
maximum and minimum numbers of gaming tables and electronic gaming machines 
(EGMs) allowed in the Crown Melbourne Casino. Similarly, if the state/territory 
gambling regulatory body imposed consumer protection-related information disclosure 
policy as a licence requirement, gambling organisations would need to disclose such 
information in order to comply with licence requirements.  
Crown and Tabcorp were selected for part one of the study (this part) for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, both organisations offer wide-ranging forms of gambling products and 
services, including gaming, wagering and lottery products; secondly, the two 
organisations control substantial market share (e.g., approximately 85% [$4 billion]) of 
the total Australian casino industry revenue (IBISWorld, 2012); thirdly, both 
organisations were listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Top 100 in 2010, 
and being large companies their activities and social and environmental performance are 
more likely to be visible to stakeholder groups (Nobes & Parker, 1991). While Tatts 
Group Limited (Tatts) – the next largest members of the Australian gambling industry – 
was also listed on the ASX Top 100 in 2010, it was excluded from part one of the study 
because it was only first listed on the ASX in 2005 and annual reports were, therefore, 
not available for the 15-year period specified for part one.   
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5.4.1.1 Crown Limited 
Crown Limited is one of Australia’s largest entertainment groups, with its core business 
and investments in the integrated resort and entertainment sectors in Australia and 
Macau and wholly-owns and operates a high-end casino in London (Crown Limited, 
2011, about us section). Crown Limited was originally owned by Crown Casino when it 
was listed on the ASX in 1994. In 1999, Crown Casino merged with Publishing and 
Broadcasting Limited (PBL) and became a part of PBL. In May 2007, PBL announced 
the proposed de-merger of its businesses into two separately listed companies on the 
ASX: Crown Limited and Consolidated Media Holdings (Crown Limited, Annual 
Report 2007). Crown assumed ownership of all of the gaming assets previously owned 
by the PBL, reporting a normalised net profit after tax (before continued operations and 
non-recurring items) of $280.7 million for the year ending 30 June 2009 (Crown 
Limited, Annual Report 2009). In 2009, the latest period of the analysis, Crown publicly 
noted that it had implemented a new Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct as part of 
its ongoing commitment to responsible gambling (Crown Limited, Annual Report 2009).  
5.4.1.2 Tabcorp Holdings Limited 
Tabcorp is Australia’s ‘premier gambling and entertainment group’ (Tabcorp Holdings 
Limited, 2011, about us section). Tabcorp’s leading customer brands include Star City 
and Jupiters Casinos, Tabaret, Keno, Luxbet and TAB Sportsbet. Tabcorp was listed on 
the ASX in 1994, and employs approximately 11,000 staff nationally in its three major 
business units: casinos, wagering and gaming (Tabcorp Holdings Limited, Annual 
Report 2009). Tabcorp reported a net profit after tax (normalised and before non-
recurring items) of $496.2 million for the year ending 30 June 2009 (Tabcorp Holdings 
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Limited, Annual Report 2009). In June 2011, Tabcorp de-merged its casinos’ operations 
which resulted in Tabcorp’s casinos business being separately listed as Echo 
Entertainment Group Limited (ASX: EGP). The existing wagering, gaming, keno and 
media businesses were retained by Tabcorp (ASX: TAH).  
5.4.2  Content analysis 
Content analysis was adopted as a research method from which replicable and valid 
inferences from data to context could be made (Krippendorff, 1980). Part one of the 
study utilised the content analysis instrument used by Hackston and Milne (1996) and 
Deegan et al. (2002), with some adaptations. The content classifications by Hackston 
and Milne (1996) are based on the earlier schemes developed by Ernst and Ernst (1978) 
and Guthrie (1982), which embraced six categories of disclosure: environment, energy, 
human resources, product & safety, community involvement, and others. However, an 
additional broad category – responsible gambling – was added. The reason for the 
inclusion of the seventh category was that responsible gambling was a primary issue 
identified in PC1999’s recommendations, as well as in the NFPG. Within each of these 
seven broad categories, sub-classifications of disclosure are identified (see Appendix A). 
Additional sub-classifications identified in the review of annual reports were added to 
several categories: environmental pollution, waste management, water and recycling 
were added to the environment category; women in employment, employee training, 
employee morale and other human resource issues were added to the human resources 
category.  
Within the responsible gambling category – the category which relates primarily to the 
work of PC1999 and NFPG – it is decided to create three sub-categories of disclosure, 
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these being public awareness, responsible environment and support services. The 
specific disclosure items included under each of these sub-categories are shown in 
Appendix A. These three sub-categories of disclosure can be related to the contents of 
Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 (and as have noted earlier, Table 2.1 summarises the 
recommendations of PC1999 and the subsequent focus of the NFPG) on the following 
basis: 
• Public awareness includes disclosures related to promoting the nature of 
gambling products, the potential for harm and the availability of support services 
and disclosures relating to education, training and research (i.e., this category  
includes items noted in the first and fourth categories of Table 2.1 in Chapter 2).  
• Responsible environment includes disclosure items relating to the development 
of a responsible gambling environment (category two in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2) 
and includes the relationships of industry operators with gambling associations 
and regulatory authorities in developing codes of practice and strategies to 
regulate the gambling environment (e.g. through pre-commitment measures and 
smartcard technologies to limit the amount gambled).  
 Support services includes disclosures relating to intervention, counselling and 
support services (category three in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2) developed 
collaboratively with industry stakeholders (community services, government and 
non-government organisations) to minimise harm, for example, across regional, 
rural and remote locations.  
The extent of disclosures made in relation to a particular disclosure category was 
measured by the number of words. The number of words has commonly been used in 
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previous research on CSD (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan & 
Gordon, 1996; Deegan & Rankin, 1999; Islam & Deegan, 2008). Measuring the number 
of words (in each category) has been found to correlate highly with other measures used 
in the literature, such as sentences, or percentage of pages dedicated to particular 
disclosure themes (Hackston & Milne, 1996). This chapter measures the ‘extent’ of 
disclosure and the assumption is that the greater the extent of the disclosure (that is the 
greater the number of words dedicated to particular issues), the more the organisation is 
trying to bring the respective issue or initiative to the attention of the readers
35
. Also, 
given the lack of research investigating CSD practices of gambling companies 
particularly in the Australian context, CSD information and practices by gambling 
companies might be relatively unknown to researchers and the general public. Therefore, 
part one aims to provide an understanding of the CSD practices of Australian gambling 
companies, which does not otherwise appear to be available within SEA literature. 
A typical gambling organisations’ annual report usually includes a chairman’s report, 
managing director’s report, financial statements, notes to the financial statements, a 
corporate governance report, an auditor’s report, a social and environmental report, 
shareholder information, and corporate information. The gambling organisations’ CSDs 
are predominantly highlighted in a separate section under headings such as community, 
contribution to the community, caring for communities, environment and employees, 
community and environment, employees, enriching communities, our people, corporate 
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 The researcher was responsible for all the coding. Nevertheless, as a basic check on the reliability of the 
coding, two years of coding was also undertaken by other researchers in the first part of this thesis. The 
result was that there was only very minor discrepancy in the results, and this discrepancy was discussed 
and resolved in such a way that the researcher was satisfied that the coding instrument was being 
appropriately applied. 
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social responsibility, customer focus, environmental commitment, supporting our people, 
or responsible gambling.  
In capturing the words of disclosures, it was ultimately decided not to differentiate 
between positive and negative disclosures, that is, between those disclosures which 
prima facie project the organisation in a positive image versus those that could be 
construed as providing negative information about the organisation
36
. The rationale for 
this decision was that organisations might provide information about negative issues or 
events (which might be in the public arena in any case) to increase the perceived 
credibility of the organisation and to acknowledge that the organisation accepts 
accountability in relation to this particular aspect of corporate performance. 
Nevertheless, it was anticipated that any negative disclosures would be coupled with 
disclosures of a positive aspect, which could be remedial actions being taken, targets for 
improvement, and so forth. Hence, providing negative disclosures about a particular 
social issue might, as with positive disclosures, be part of the legitimising activities of 
an organisation, as the disclosures would highlight that the organisation is aware of the 
issue, accepts that it is accountable or responsible for the issue, and believes that it is 
important enough to discuss within the report. 
The 15-year period of analysis undertaken for this part of the study was divided into 
three phases of equivalent duration that approximated (potentially different) periods of 
developing external pressure on the gambling industry related to the timing of 
government initiatives. The three phases are: 
                                               
36
 In prior research, ‘positive social disclosures’ have been defined as disclosures that depict the company 
as operating in harmony with the community and/or environment while ‘negative social disclosures’ can 
be defined as disclosures that depict the company as operating to the potential detriment of the 
community and/or natural environment (Deegan & Rankin, 1996). 
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 Phase 1: 1995 to 1999 – before PC1999; 
 Phase 2: 2000 to 2004 – after PC1999 and the establishment of the MCG; 
 Phase 3: 2005 to 2009 – after the introduction of the MCG’s NFPG 2004-2008. 
5.5  Results  
The results of this chapter are presented in the following section. In examining the 
nature, content, and extent of CSDs by Crown and Tabcorp, annual report disclosures 
were collated for each organisation by year in total, and by year for each of the seven 
categories: environment, energy, human resources, product & safety, community 
involvement, others and responsible gambling.  
Figure 5.1 depicts the total CSDs of the two companies from 1995 to 2009. For both 
companies, there is a general trend of increasing CSDs over time (at least until 2007, 
see below for further discussion), with a comparatively low amount of disclosure in the 
1995-1999 period (Phase 1), followed by a pronounced upward shift in the 2000-2004 
period (Phase 2), and culminating in a peak in disclosures in the 2005-2009 period 
(Phase 3). On the whole, Crown and Tabcorp have similar trends for disclosures over 
the 15-year period of analysis, which in itself is an interesting finding given the 
voluntary nature of such disclosures (and which in itself might be an indication of the 
‘institutionalised’ nature of CSD, albeit that such a judgement is based on a small 
sample).  
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Figure 5.1: Gambling Organisations’ Annual Report – Social and Environmental 
Disclosures from 1995-2009 (in words) 
 
In Phase 1 (1995-1999), the limited disclosure may reflect a time of liberalisation in the 
gambling industry, where community attention was on the economic benefits of 
gambling rather than its negative social impacts (i.e., the low level of CSDs can be 
attributed to the relatively limited external [community] pressure experienced by the 
gambling industry regarding social-related issues and the social costs of gambling). 
The increase in the total CSDs during Phase 2, particularly in 2000 and 2003, coincided 
with increased community concerns about the social issues associated with problem 
gambling, the subsequent establishment of the MCG in 2000, and development of the 
NFPG 2004-2008. This finding supports the view that an increase in CSDs is a reactive 
response by organisations to provide more information about its social and 
environmental activities in order to maintain legitimacy.  
In Phase 3, fluctuations in total CSDs can be observed with an increase in disclosures in 
the initial period followed by a decrease in 2007 (and 2008), and an increase in the last 
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year of analysis (2009). Both companies’ CSDs reached a peak in this phase, which is 
consistent with the prediction that with the implementation of the NFPG 2004-2008 
there would be a commensurate increase in total CSD. A contrary result, however, can 
be observed in 2007 for both organisations (with Crown also further decreasing in 2008) 
where CSDs decreased dramatically. This is consistent with the proposition (2b) that the 
GFC would lead to a subsequent decrease in CSDs as corporate managers shifted 
attention from community and broader ‘stakeholder’ concerns to shareholders’ concerns 
(that is, a ‘shareholder primacy’ focus was more actively embraced during the GFC). A 
review of the two organisations’ annual reports for 2007 and 2008 supports this 
conjecture, with increased annual report disclosures on financial matters and responsible 
directors’ remuneration relative to CSD.  
The increased CSD in 2009, particularly apparent for Crown, coincided with a second 
government-initiated public inquiry into the gambling industry – New Productivity 
Commission Inquiry into Gambling, which commenced in December 2008. The aim of 
this inquiry was to update PC1999 and provide additional research to assess the impacts 
of harm minimisation measures since 1999. Thus, this new inquiry could be viewed as 
another legitimacy-threatening event, the response to which was an increase in CSD in 
2009. It also occurred at a time when concerns relating to the GFC were reducing to 
some extent. 
Overall, the results showed an increasing trend in CSD, which appeared to be associated 
with increasing external pressure. In addition, the study also found that the CSDs were 
predominantly positive and it was rare to find instances of negative disclosure
37
. Such a 
                                               
37
 Positive and negative disclosures were defined earlier in this chapter. For example, a positive CSD 
would be ’Burswood chefs annually prepare more than 9,000 litres of soup, which is donated to 
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finding – minimal negative CSD – is similar to the results reported in Jones et al.’s 
(2009) study of the UK gambling industry wherein the authors found that the 
overwhelming majority of social disclosure was positive in nature. The results are also 
consistent with research appearing in the SEA literature in which it is suggested that 
positive disclosures are the most effective means of trying to maintain or restore 
legitimacy around potentially legitimacy-threatening events (although, as it is noted 
earlier in this chapter, there is a counter argument that the disclosure of negative 
information might also, in certain circumstances, be beneficial for maintaining or 
regaining threatened legitimacy)
38
. 
From the results, the CSD of the gambling organisations can be construed as appearing 
to be more for legitimising purposes, rather than for demonstrating accountability. As 
Gray et al. (1996, p. 38) suggest, accountability is ‘the duty to provide an account (by 
no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is 
held accountable’. If gambling organisations are to embrace ‘accountability’ to the 
community, then arguably they would have provided CSDs in a manner that represented 
a balanced and genuine attempt to cover some negative, as well as positive aspects, of 
their social performance (Adams, 2004); this should be regardless of external pressure. 
However, as the study result has shown, CSD practices over the 3 phases appeared to 
                                                                                                                                         
Foodbank Western Australia to support Perth’s homeless’ (Crown Limited, Annual Report 2009). A 
negative CSD would be ‘High occupancy rates and high humidity levels at the Jupiters Townsville Hotel 
and Casino, resulted in a 3% increase in total greenhouse gas emissions in 2007’ (Tabcorp Holdings 
Limited, Annual Report 2007). In a sense this negative disclosure provides a form of ‘excuse’ for a rise in 
emission levels. Further, this disclosure was also coupled with information about how other initiatives 
will bring down the absolute amount of future greenhouse emissions. 
38
 Whilst it is not something that is pursued in this chapter, the almost total lack of negative disclosures in 
relation to problem gambling is interesting. Though it is conjecture, it might be that organisations 
consider that because problem gamblers have various potential means of, and venues for, gambling, one 
particular organisation cannot, and perhaps should not, take responsibility for the negative attributes of 
problem gambling, though of course it can take initiatives to try to reduce it (education and so forth). 
Perhaps it is a cost that is more correctly attributed to the industry, rather than at the corporate level and 
therefore it is more relevant to reporting that is undertaken at a broader industry level. 
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alter and it is believed this was a result of the external pressure emanating from the 
community, via the government. The focus on providing CSDs also seemed to wane 
around the time of the GFC when corporate survival was more likely to be linked to 
economic or financial factors. If corporations embraced ‘true accountability’ based on 
such considerations as stakeholders’ rights-to-know, then accountability for social 
issues would not have declined when potential survival threats from the GFC arose. 
Whilst Figure 5.1 provides aggregated results for all CSDs, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a 
summary of the yearly totals in words over the three phases from 1995 to 2009 for the 
seven broad categories of disclosure for Crown and Tabcorp respectively. Consistent 
with the perspective that organisations within the same industry tend to respond in a 
similar manner to various pressures, both Crown and Tabcorp exhibit comparable and 
similar disclosure trends. Both companies take a similar focus on disclosure categories 
with the four highest specific categories of CSD being human resources, community 
involvement, others and responsible gambling. The extent of environmental and energy-
related disclosures shows a rapid growth during Phase 3. Product & safety-related 
disclosures were relatively minimal for both companies over the 15 years of the study.  
Table 5.1: Social and Environmental Disclosures of Crown Limited (in words) 
Phase Year Environment Energy 
Human 
Resources 
Product 
& 
Safety 
Community 
Involvement 
Others 
Responsible 
Gambling 
Total 
Phase 
1 
1995 0 0 417 0 97 239 0 753 
1996 0 0 698 50 253 227 68 1296 
1997 0 0 875 43 238 126 200 1482 
1998 0 0 539 0 93 158 111 901 
1999 0 0 385 0 7 19 0 411 
Total 0 0 2,914 93 688 769 379 4,843 
Phase 2000 0 0 946 27 798 116 240 2127 
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2 2001 28 0 1128 78 845 230 111 2420 
2002 0 0 760 37 864 248 247 2156 
2003 0 0 1280 58 1020 517 136 3011 
2004 221 99 1303 116 1590 509 220 4058 
Total 249 99 5,417 316 5,117 1,620 954 13,772 
Phase 
3 
2005 414 100 1833 110 2061 478 337 5333 
2006 755 120 1310 169 2013 364 354 5085 
2007 427 75 785 0 587 63 312 2249 
2008 270 101 347 0 555 25 279 1577 
2009 460 258 612 0 702 67 305 2404 
Total 2,326 654 4,887 279 5,918 997 1,587 16,648 
Grand Total 2,575 753 13,218 688 11,723 3,386 2,920 35,263 
 
Table 5.2: Social and Environmental Disclosures of Tabcorp Holdings Limited (in words) 
Phase Year Environment Energy 
Human 
Resources 
Product 
& Safety 
Community 
Involvement 
 Others 
Responsible 
Gambling 
Total 
Phase 
1 
1995 0 0 66 61 0 60 0 187 
1996 0 0 108 0 149 112 0 369 
1997 0 0 48 74 192 323 0 637 
1998 0 0 71 196 308 237 0 812 
1999 0 0 156 0 357 359 12 884 
Total 0 0 449 331 1,006 1,091 12 2,889 
Phase 
2 
2000 0 0 76 39 624 294 85 1118 
2001 54 89 82 0 594 453 415 1687 
2002 53 82 430 0 815 237 264 1881 
2003 149 100 1587 0 535 583 321 3275 
2004 102 61 177 51 601 893 608 2493 
Total 358 332 2,352 90 3,169 2,460 1,693 10,454 
Phase 
3 
2005 527 263 898 13 887 631 956 4175 
2006 453 192 1473 58 867 1153 1206 5402 
2007 375 114 691 0 199 153 629 2161 
2008 289 233 651 0 201 217 602 2193 
2009 258 369 806 66 317 217 588 2621 
Total 1,902 1,171 4,519 137 2,471 2,371 3,981 16,552 
Grand Total 2,260 1,503 7,320 558 6,646 5,922 5,686 29,895 
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The most highly represented category – human resources – mainly covered issues of 
employee morale, employee profiles, employee training, employment of minorities and 
women, industrial relations, health and safety, employee assistance/benefits, employee 
remuneration, and ‘other human resources disclosures’ (Appendix A identifies the 
disclosures that are included under the caption ‘other human resources disclosures’). 
Disclosures relating to employee morale, other human resources, employee profiles and 
employee training were among the highest for Crown; for Tabcorp, employee morale 
and employee profile were significantly higher compared to other sub-categories.  
Both companies disclosed relatively limited information on minorities and women, 
employee remuneration, and employee assistance/benefits across the period of study. 
Health and safety-related disclosures only appeared within annual reports in the mid-
2000s. It is interesting that the organisations showed high levels of disclosure in relation 
to employees when a great deal of the political and societal pressure related to problem 
gambling. Potentially, the companies were attempting to deflect attention to the 
assistance or support they were providing to one stakeholder group (employees) over 
and above the help being provided to another stakeholder group (problem gamblers)
39
. 
The second highest category of disclosure – community involvement – covers issues of 
donations and support for community activities, community health projects, sports 
projects, and education projects. Company disclosures tended to emphasise positive 
aspects associated with donations to community, charitable or not-for-profit 
organisations. Again, there was a general trend of increasing disclosures in this category 
(until 2007) and this could also be evidence of the organisations’ attempt to deflect 
                                               
39
 As noted previously in this chapter, one of the legitimising strategies that organisations can take when 
their legitimacy appears threatened is to use disclosures to deflect (distract) attention from potentially 
negative aspects of  performance to different, but positive, performance attributes (Lindblom, 1993). 
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attention away from the critical issue of problem gambling. Interestingly, this was one 
category of disclosure that dropped dramatically in 2007 and 2008 (rebounding 
somewhat in 2009). Whilst conjecture, the reason for this might be that immediately 
following the GFC, particularly powerful stakeholders at the time (for example, 
shareholders) would not want to hear about the company transferring financial resources 
away from the company and towards projects that were not directly income producing. 
The third highest category – other social and environmental disclosures – included 
‘general’ issues such as corporate objectives/policies, corporate governance practices, 
and those related to ‘customer focus’ such as improving customer satisfaction, customer 
loyalty and survey results on customer issues. An increasing emphasis on customers (i.e. 
gamblers) was observed in the annual reports of both companies and is of particular 
interest given that customers represent a potentially powerful industry stakeholder. 
The responsible gambling category accounts for the fourth highest proportion of CSDs. 
As this category is one that differentiates the CSDs of gambling organisations from 
organisations in other industries, and because it is the category of disclosure which 
closely relates to the pressure being exerted on the industry, a detailed discussion of this 
category and its sub-categories (public awareness, responsible environment, and 
support services) will be provided shortly (refer also to Table 5.3 and Table 5.4). 
During Phase 1, only 5 categories of CSD were provided by both companies, these 
being human resources, community involvement, others, responsible gambling, and 
product & safety. No disclosures were made within the environmental and energy 
category, and there was very limited disclosure within the responsible gambling 
category. Tabcorp made no disclosures on responsible gambling before 1999 (and 
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therefore before PC1999), and disclosures in 1999 were limited to twelve words. Crown 
provided limited disclosure of responsible gambling issues from 1996 to 1998 (379 
words) but no disclosure in 1995 or 1999. The absence of disclosures in 1999 may be 
linked to a change of ownership from Crown Casino to PBL in 1999, with a shift in the 
focus of CSD practices. 
During Phase 2, the focus of increasing CSDs by both companies remained in the 
categories of human resources, community involvement, and other social and 
environmental disclosures. Disclosures in these categories typically revolved around 
philanthropy and corporate citizenship, charity donations, sponsorship to local 
community and sporting organisations. These results are generally consistent with those 
of Jones et al. (2009), who found that the UK gambling companies increased disclosures 
of information related to their charitable donations and contribution to the communities 
in periods when they were under sustained political scrutiny in relation to such issues as 
problem gambling. Such strategies aim to foster a positive image of the gambling 
companies at a time when other factors may be undermining their image (O’Donovan, 
2002; Deegan et al., 2002).  
Of particular interest in this second phase was the considerable attention of management 
to the responsible gambling category; total disclosures by Tabcorp increased from 12 
words in Phase 1 to 1693 words in Phase 2. This appeared to be a rather dramatic 
increase, and whilst it is not certain that it was a reaction to the government initiatives, it 
is certainly consistent with the notion of organisations adopting a tactic of producing 
legitimising disclosures in response to the government scrutiny that was in place. For 
the first time in the history of annual reports for Tabcorp, a sub-section heading was 
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devoted to responsible gambling. This sub-section included details of responsible 
gambling and harm minimisation initiatives adopted by the company such as display 
materials about the availability of problem gambling counselling services, a self-
exclusion program
40
, and the launch of Tabcorp’s Responsible Gambling Code. 
Consistent with the first proposition of this chapter, increasing disclosures in the 
responsible gambling category coincide with the recommendations of PC1999, the 
formation of the MCG in 2000, and the development of the NFPG in 2000-2003. In a 
sense these disclosures were arguably a reaction to the threat of government 
intervention, the view possibly being that if the companies could show that they were 
taking the issue seriously then this might reduce the community’s perception that some 
form of government intervention was necessary. 
Both companies also commenced disclosing information related to the environmental 
and energy categories. Disclosures in the environmental category were introduced by 
both companies in 2001; however, only Tabcorp consistently disclosed in this category 
in the following years. Tabcorp also introduced disclosures in the energy category in 
2001, while Crown only introduced energy disclosures in 2004. Even though they are 
not issues considered in PC1999 or by the MCG, one interpretation of this disclosure is 
that the positive information offered (for example, the receiving of environmental 
awards) is a way to offset the potentially negative perceptions of gambling companies
41
.  
                                               
40
 An exclusion/self-exclusion program refers to a situation where problem gamblers seek to control their 
gambling by excluding themselves from gambling venues. Jurisdictions in Australia also allow 
licensee/gambling organisations to exclude problem gamblers if their gambling is perceived to be 
damaging to themselves or their dependents (Productivity Commission, 2010).  
41
 Alternatively, across this period there was also a general increase in community concern about the 
environmental performance of organisations, inclusive of organisational contribution to climate change, 
and some of these disclosures could have been in response to such pressures. 
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The last phase of the analysis – Phase 3 (2005 to 2009) – shows a shift in focus of CSDs. 
Both organisations continued with relatively high levels of disclosures regarding their 
community involvement and human resources activities. Crown, however, appeared to 
have chosen to make stakeholders more aware of their environmental activities. The 
environment category, which was only introduced by Crown in Phase 2 with very 
limited disclosure, became the third highest disclosure category in Phase 3. While the 
increased disclosure is arguably a strategy to project a positive company image and 
deflect attention from issues of problem gambling, an alternative explanation for the 
increase may also be the introduction of various government initiatives and legislations, 
together with various reporting guidelines throughout the mid to late 2000s, that tended 
to have a flow-on effect across all larger organisations
42
. Comparatively, Tabcorp chose 
to disclose more about responsible gambling, so much so that it became its second 
highest category of disclosure.  
Another interesting finding related to the product & safety category. The study results 
also showed very limited disclosure in this category for both companies, though product 
& safety-related information was recommended by the PC1999 (for example, basic 
consumer information such as product price information to players, understanding the 
nature of the game, and information on the risk of problem gambling). Although Crown 
disclosed product & safety information from 2000 to 2006, the disclosure was related to 
its media products (such as magazines) rather than to its gambling products. When PBL 
de-merged into Crown and CMH in 2007 (Crown was a part of PBL from 1999 to 2006), 
                                               
42
 For example, the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act (2007) and the Energy Efficiency 
Opportunities Act (2006) were introduced during this period. Whilst such legislation applies to large scale 
emitters, there would arguably be flow-on effects to other large companies that fall below the required 
emissions thresholds. Also, during the period, the uptake of companies to initiatives such as the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (initially formed in 2000) and the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (an accounting tool for 
measuring greenhouse gas emissions) increased, all of which provided general impetus across 
corporations to increase their level of environmental reporting.  
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Crown discontinued disclosure on product & safety from 2007 to 2009 (also for 1998 
and 1999). This trend is similar to Tabcorp, where the disclosure of product & safety 
information was minimal and limited to only certain particular years throughout the 
period of this study. Further, information provided under this category was related to 
product development (such as introducing new machines) instead of product safety-
related information (such as safety standards demanded by community). The very 
limited disclosure of this category is somewhat odd given that gambling products and 
services are potentially harmful to users and a threat to organisational legitimacy.  
In summary, the extent of disclosure on responsible gambling for Crown and Tabcorp 
during Phase 2 and 3 are significantly higher than in Phase 1. These results support the 
first proposition that there would be an increase in the extent of CSD in the annual 
reports by gambling organisations (particularly in the responsible gambling category) 
following PC1999. What is also of interest is the nature of the disclosures within the 
responsible gambling category.    
A detailed analysis of disclosure in the responsible gambling category for Crown and 
Tabcorp is presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, respectively, and includes the sub-categories 
of public awareness, responsible environment, and support services.  
Table 5.3: Responsible Gambling Disclosures of Crown Limited (in words) 
Phase Year 
Public 
Awareness 
Responsible 
Environment  
Support 
Services 
Total 
Phase 1 
1995 0 0 0 0 
1996 28 40 0 68 
1997 157 43 0 200 
1998 67 44 0 111 
1999 0 0 0 0 
Total 252 127 0 379 
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Phase 2 
2000 27 213 0 240 
2001 61 50 0 111 
2002 247 0 0 247 
2003 82 54 0 136 
2004 220 0 0 220 
Total 637 317 0 954 
Phase 3 
2005 310 27 0 337 
2006 219 121 14 354 
2007 248 50 14 312 
2008 215 56 8 279 
2009 242 0 63 305 
Total 1,234 254 99 1,587 
Grand Total 2,123 698 99 2,920 
 
Table 5.4: Responsible Gambling Disclosures of Tabcorp Holdings Limited (in words) 
Phase Year 
Public 
Awareness 
Responsible 
Environment 
Support 
Services  
Total 
Phase 1 
1995 0 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 0 
1998 0 0 0 0 
1999 12 0 0 12 
Total 12 0 0 12 
Phase 2 
2000 85 0 0 85 
2001 291 124 0 415 
2002 192 35 37 264 
2003 321 0 0 321 
2004 560 48 0 608 
Total 1,449 207 37 1,693 
Phase 3 
2005 792 133 31 956 
2006 870 232 104 1206 
2007 539 0 90 629 
2008 521 0 81 602 
2009 460 0 128 588 
Total 3,182 365 434 3,891 
Grand Total 4,643 572 471 5,686 
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The public awareness sub-category disclosures were the highest of all sub-categories 
and accounted for more than 70 per cent of the total amount of responsible gambling 
disclosures for both companies across the period of the study. Public awareness 
disclosure includes the promotion of information about the establishment of responsible 
gambling’s codes of conduct, harm minimisation initiatives/programs, counselling 
services and educational awareness activities and campaigns (including staff training) to 
raise awareness of responsible gambling. Disclosures in this sub-category increased 
substantially from 2004 to 2009. This level of disclosure can be interpreted as a 
proactive response by Crown and Tabcorp to the introduction of the NFPG 2004–2008. 
As an example of related disclosures, one can consider the following excerpts from 
Crown and Tabcorp annual reports: 
‘A high priority is placed on employee training in the areas of responsible gaming 
and casino awareness. Online training tools are used to raise awareness of core 
issues and responsibilities.’  (Crown Limited, Annual Report 2006) 
‘Tabcorp recognises the importance of responsible gambling for the long term 
sustainability of our industry. For the second year in a row, the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index recognised Tabcorp as a global leader in the promotion of 
responsible gambling. Our commitment to leadership in this area continues and we 
will work with regulators to maintain the highest standards of care and probity.’  
(Tabcorp Holdings Limited, Annual Report 2009) 
The public awareness disclosures could be construed as an attempt to encourage the 
public to believe that the gambling business operations were taking responsible 
gambling seriously and in a way that was sympathetic to community expectations. 
Whilst the study can never be certain about the motivations underlying particular 
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disclosures, the focus on positive disclosures pertaining to efforts to reduce the harm of 
problem gambling does appear consistent with organisations adopting legitimising 
disclosures around the time that the particular issue was of significant community 
concern. The disclosures could also have been a strategy to prevent or impede the 
potential introduction of (further) onerous government policies/regulations into the 
gambling industry that might, in turn, have had negative implications for the 
profitability of gambling companies. For example, in response to stakeholders’ concerns 
reflected in the MCG’s NFPG, Crown provided additional information on employee 
training in the areas of responsible gambling in their annual report in 2004 (this 
information was not available in the 2003 annual report or earlier reports). Only from 
2004 did Tabcorp specifically highlight their commitment to promoting customer 
awareness and education through responsible gambling campaigns, employee training in 
responsible gambling, and professional assistance to customers who require the services.  
The second sub-category of disclosures responsible environment - had relatively limited 
disclosure representing 10 per cent and 24 per cent of the total disclosures in the 
responsible gambling category by Tabcorp and Crown respectively. Responsible 
environment disclosure includes information about an organisation’s collaborations with, 
and/or contributions to, gambling related associations or government authorities to 
develop strategies, codes of practice and conduct to minimise problem gambling. It also 
includes information about initiatives undertaken by the organisation ‘in house’ to foster 
an environment to reduce the potential harm caused by problem gambling (for example, 
providing gamblers with personal reports about their gambling expenditure, instituting 
self-exclusion programs, reducing hours of operation, increased use of natural lighting 
and visible clocks, introduction of pre-commitment strategies, and limited acceptance of 
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gamblers’ cheques). Information about these activities and collaborations, contributions, 
or affiliations present a positive image that gambling companies are supporting efforts 
to address problem gambling. Through their disclosures, both gambling companies 
appear to acknowledge the importance of relationships with stakeholders such as 
government and/or not-for-profit organisations. As an example of a disclosure in this 
sub-category, one can consider the following excerpt from Tabcorp’s annual report: 
Tabcorp has taken a leading role in developing the Australian Gaming Council’s 
Framework for Responsible Gaming, which provides a model of best practice for 
the gaming industry (Tabcorp Holdings Limited, Annual Report 2001). 
Support services – another sub-category of responsible gambling, has very limited 
disclosure, especially during Phase 1 and 2, but attracted some attention during Phase 3 
(in the most recent annual reports) for both companies. This category includes issues 
related to how organisations were engaged in collaborative partnerships to develop 
effective and accessible counselling and support services across a range of diverse and 
geographically dispersed communities with a view to minimising harm.  As an example 
of related disclosures we can consider the following excerpt from Crown’s annual report: 
A program of engagement with a wide range of community service organisations 
and responsible gaming groups to develop effective support system was also 
embarked upon throughout the year (Crown Limited, Annual Report 2009). 
 
The analysis above supports proposition 2a that following the release of the MCG’s 
NFPG 2004-2008, there would be a further increase (over and above that caused by the 
PC1999) in the extent of disclosure relating to responsible gambling (particularly in 
terms of disclosures promoting public awareness of harm minimisation initiatives) in 
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the annual reports of gambling organisations. The disclosures in the responsible 
gambling category tended to increase across the period of analysis, particularly since 
1999. Minor increases were evident around the time that government initiatives 
occurred – again suggesting disclosure for legitimation purposes. The results also 
suggest that there was a potential institutional effect (i.e., gambling organisations tend 
to be disclosing similar information about operating activities and policies, such as 
providing information about the implementation of staff training in harm minimisation, 
and about the introduction of responsible gambling codes). This supports proposition 3, 
that through various pressures to conform to institutional norms of disclosure, there will 
be similarities in the CSD patterns of Australian gambling companies as they react to 
the various societal pressures being exerted upon them. 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the extent and type of CSD within the annual 
reports of two major Australian gambling organisations over a 15-year period from 
1995 to 2009 and to provide some insights into what might be motivating the CSD 
disclosures. This examination was undertaken within the context of three major 
contemporaneous Australian government initiatives relating to the gambling industry. 
This is the first study to undertake an analysis of the CSD practices of organisations 
operating within the Australian gambling industry. It is believed that this study is 
particularly timely given the many political issues that continue to be raised in the 
Australian Federal Parliament (typically by politicians that are independent of the major 
political parties) about the need for harm minimisation strategies to minimise problem 
gambling-related social issues. Indeed, in November 2012 the Federal Government 
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passed the National Gambling Reform Bill 2012, which at least in some peoples’ minds, 
is a precursor to further, more stringent, legislation in future years. Also, from a purely 
descriptive perspective, results from part one of the study show how two major 
Australian gambling companies are disclosing social and environmental information – 
something that, was not previously reported, and which might now encourage further 
attention from other researchers. 
The findings show that both Crown and Tabcorp increased their number of words in 
CSDs over the 15-year period, particularly in the areas of human resources, community 
involvement, others, and more recently, responsible gambling and the environment. The 
increasing levels of disclosure coincide with evolving major government initiatives in 
the industry, initiatives which are arguably a manifestation of community pressure; i.e. 
Tabcorp and Crown appear to be reacting to increasing community concerns about 
problem gambling. Whilst the community and government pressure related primarily to 
problem gambling, the results showed that CSD increased across a variety of social 
responsibility-related issues other than just problem gambling. This result suggests that 
this is potentially part of a corporate strategy to deflect attention away from problem 
gambling – which was the major focus of the inquiries and the related submissions – 
and towards other social issues with which the companies were favourably portrayed.  
As the disclosures seemed to increase across the same period in which government 
scrutiny of gambling was increasing, and because of the predominantly positive nature 
of the disclosures, it is believed the disclosures had little to do with demonstrating 
accountability, but more to do with securing corporate legitimacy. However, the 
overwhelmingly positive nature of the disclosures could also decrease the credibility of 
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other voluntarily produced information appearing in the annual reports – although this is 
not an issue that is pursued further within this chapter. The predominantly positive 
CSDs would seem to be somewhat at odds with the perceived (by certain politicians, 
NGOs and the community) seriousness of the issue of problem gambling
43
. The failure 
of the gambling companies to provide more disclosures pertaining to problem gambling 
and harm minimisation information might provide more impetus for calls that gambling 
companies are not taking the problem seriously enough, thereby necessitating further 
government intervention. That is, there appeared to be no clear attempt to ‘account’ for 
the actual or potential social ‘costs’ associated with the organisations’ activities. 
Part one of the study finds support for all propositions developed in this chapter and the 
explanative power of the three overlapping theories underlying these propositions: 
legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional theory. This leads the researcher to conclude 
that in an endeavour to maintain social legitimacy, both Crown and Tabcorp will 
continue to increase relatively similar and positively-orientated CSDs in response to 
powerful stakeholders (in this case the broader community via government) and in order 
to mitigate any mooted changes in regulations that may impact unfavourably on their 
operations and profit.  
Disclosures appear to be motivated by a perceived need to manage their societal level of 
legitimacy than from direct efforts to be accountable to a broad range of stakeholders 
(Chen & Roberts, 2010). A possible, and potentially only short-term, exception to this 
prediction is when either or both organisation(s) is (are) facing extraordinarily high 
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 As we have indicated elsewhere in this chapter, in the very limited number of instances in which 
otherwise negative CSDs were made they either effectively created a segue for the organisation to discuss 
initiatives being undertaken to address the issue, or they were followed by disclosures that tried to justify, 
or provide an excuse, for the otherwise negative information. Apart from such instances of ‘negative’ 
disclosure the balance of the CSD was positive in nature. 
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financial stress (such as the GFC), at which point it would be expected that the 
corporate annual report disclosures would reorient to matters of financial concern to 
appease shareholders and other financial capital providers (which in a time of financial 
crisis might be particularly important in terms of ensuring their ongoing financial 
support and the firm’s survival). In times of financial stress (such as in the GFC) shifts 
in the perceived power of a particular stakeholder group are observed. However, after 
securing shareholder and investor support, it is predicted that disclosures would shift 
back to matters of broader societal concern, particularly if concerns about issues such as 
problem gambling abound. Thus, based on the 15-year analysis, unless significantly 
greater societal pressure is placed on gambling organisations and/or evidence is 
provided that the social costs of problem gambling have decreased, similar disclosure 
trends to those reported in this chapter will be found.  
Having reviewed the government inquiry report into problem gambling and the 
respective corporate annual reports, what was clear is that there will obviously always 
be tensions between an organisation owned by shareholders who traditionally seek 
sound dividend returns, and the expectations of other stakeholders who seek their 
interests and expectations to be satisfied. Such tensions will be amplified for an industry 
such as gambling, which by its nature can create many adverse social impacts. Further, 
whilst the government needs to appear to be reacting to community concerns (else 
perhaps risk losing some electoral support), the reality is that government(s) receives a 
great deal of revenue from the gambling industry and without such revenue many other 
community-based programs might be abandoned, and/or the taxes imposed on other 
parts of the community might be increased (which could also create adverse shifts in 
community, and electoral, support). Certainly, the debate on implementing various harm 
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minimisation strategies will be continued in 2014 and beyond in view of its complexity 
involving social, economic and political interests. Clearly there will be different and 
sometimes conflicting perspectives of the responsibilities and accountabilities of 
gambling companies, and there will be various and alternative vested interests.   
More recently, in November 2012 the Federal Government passed the National 
Gambling Reform Bill 2012. Whilst this legislation provides some measures to address 
problem gambling, there were sentiments from a number of federal politicians that the 
bill introduced to parliament did not go far enough. As The Age reported (by Lisa 
Martin 31 October, 2012): 
Greens senator Richard Di Natale said the reform was a "small step ... but a long 
way from where we need to be”. Independent Senator Andrew Wilkie said the 
reforms were “better than nothing”. 
"I have no doubt that history will record the limited reforms of this parliament as 
being the start of the clean-up of an industry that has grown fat on the misery of 
Australia's most vulnerable people," Mr Wilkie said. 
Fellow independent anti-gambling campaigner Nick Xenophon said the only nice 
thing that could be said about the legislation was that it set a precedent for 
federal intervention in gambling reform. 
"Unfortunately the reform that has been achieved is p**s-weak and I blame the 
government for that," he told AAP. "The fact the pokies industry is relaxed and 
comfortable about this indicates what a missed opportunity this is." 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that CSD will be influenced by the 
threats to the apparent legitimacy of the organisation, the implication being that if no 
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threats exist, then little CSD disclosure might be made. Consistent with this, results in 
part one of this study show that prior to PC1999 there was relatively little CSD by the 
study sample companies. This is despite the fact that problem gambling is not a new 
problem, but rather is a problem that would, to some extent, have always been 
associated with the gambling industry. What is ‘new’ is the level of public and political 
concern and the consequential need to undertake legitimising activities. In relation to 
disclosures that seem to be driven by concerns about corporate legitimacy, Deegan, 
Rankin and Tobin (2002, p.335) note: 
Legitimising disclosures are linked to corporate survival. In jurisdictions such as 
Australia, where there are limited regulatory requirements to provide social and 
environmental information, management appear to provide information when 
they are coerced into doing so. Conversely, where there is limited concern, there 
will be limited disclosures. The evidence in this paper, and elsewhere, suggests 
that higher levels of disclosure will only occur when community concerns are 
aroused, or alternatively, until such time that specific regulation is introduced to 
eliminate managements’ disclosure discretion. However, if corporate legitimising 
activities are successful then perhaps public pressure for government to introduce 
disclosure legislation will be low and managers will be able to retain control of 
their social and environmental reporting practices. 
The findings of this chapter provide evidence consistent with the view that disclosures 
‘wax and wane’ selectively as different social and political pressures are exerted on the 
companies and the industry. Given such pressures are always likely to be at play in the 
gambling industry, and if we were to embrace a normative position that gambling 
providers have an obligation to be accountable for the social consequences of their 
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operations and to provide a certain base-line of disclosures (to be determined), then an 
argument for legislation arises.  
The findings reported in part one of this study form the basis for further detailed 
investigation of RGHM disclosure practices of gambling companies to gain a greater 
understanding of the extent to which gambling companies publicly discharge (or do not 
discharge) their accountability to stakeholders for social issues associated with problem 
gambling. A detailed investigation of RGHM disclosures of Australian public 
companies is the focus of the second part of this broader study and is presented in 
Chapter 6.  
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Chapter Six  
An examination of RGHM disclosure practices of 
gambling companies operating within Australia 
  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the second part of a broader study of the corporate social and 
environmental disclosure (CSD) practices of gambling companies operating within 
Australia. Part one (Chapter 5) of the study looked at the changing trends of the overall 
annual report CSD practices within the context of three major contemporary Australian 
government initiatives relating to the gambling industry; these are arguably reflective, 
or a manifestation, of community pressure (as discussed in Chapter 5). Whilst the 
respective two gambling companies (Crown Limited and Tabcorp Holdings Limited) 
investigated in part one of the study appeared to be responding to community concerns 
pertaining to problem gambling issues, the findings suggest that an increase in CSD is a 
reactive response by the organisations to provide more information about its social and 
environmental activities in order to maintain legitimacy rather than to demonstrate 
accountability. Part one reported that although there is evidence of increasing disclosure 
in the responsible gambling category by Australian gambling companies over time, the 
extent of disclosure is still low and does not notably increase when compared to 
disclosures relating to issues such as community involvement and human resources. 
Previous studies have also argued that gambling companies’ disclosure levels pertaining 
to responsible gambling are low. For example, Jones et al. (2009) argued that gambling 
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companies in the United Kingdom (UK) provide little or no information on responsible 
gambling within their CSDs. Given that problem gambling is directly linked to the 
activities of gambling businesses, and also creates various types of harm within 
communities, it seems reasonable that in Australia, as elsewhere, gambling companies 
have a responsibility to ensure a safe gambling environment to protect their patrons, and 
their families, from potential gambling related-harm (Delfabbro et al., 2007). In fact, 
there is a belief held by many stakeholders that gambling companies should be 
accountable for the social consequences of their operations to not only their 
shareholders but also their corporate stakeholders (including broader communities and 
future generations) (Hancock et al., 2008).  
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, over time, stakeholders such as communities have 
expressed increasing concern regarding the social impacts of problem gambling. These 
heightened levels of concern imply that many stakeholders expect accountability and/or 
transparency pertaining to the responsible gambling and harm minimisation (RGHM)
44
 
measures gambling companies have put in place to address problem gambling social 
issues. Nevertheless there is a notable lack of studies examining RGHM reporting, and 
importantly in the context of accountability, to understand the extent to which 
corporations discharge their accountability to stakeholders for problem gambling social 
issues. This lacuna persists, despite wide acceptance that gambling companies should be 
responsible and accountable for the social impacts of problem gambling (Hancock et al., 
2008), and recognition of the importance of corporations’ duty of care to protect patrons 
from the potential harm of gambling (Delfabbro et al., 2007). This study addresses this 
gap by investigating the RGHM disclosure practices of four major gambling companies 
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 For the definition of responsible gambling and harm minimisation please refer to Chapter 1. 
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operating within Australia. Therefore, drawing upon the ethical branch of stakeholder 
theory
45, this chapter will now ‘drill-down’ to the detail of disclosure practices in terms 
of RGHM to assess the extent to which gambling companies publicly discharge (or do 
not discharge) their accountability to stakeholders regarding problem gambling. This 
chapter includes a detailed examination of what gambling companies ‘should’ report in 
relation to RGHM issues in order to discharge their accountability to stakeholders. 
However, it should be emphasised that this study investigates the public disclosures 
being made by gambling organisations and as such is not investigating whether 
particular RGHM measures actually exist. Rather, this study investigates whether the 
sample gambling organisations publicly provide information about the presence, or 
absence, of particular RGHM measures. That is, it is understood that particular RGHM 
measures may exist, but given the voluntary nature of social reporting, gambling 
organisations might elect not to disclose their existence. However, failure to publicly 
provide such information impedes the ability of stakeholders to assess the actions being 
undertaken by organisations (and also, their inactions) and is reflective of a low level of 
accountability being discharged by the corporations under study.   
Previous studies in the social and environmental accounting (SEA) literature used a 
variety of disclosure indices for the purposes of classifying and measuring CSDs in 
annual reports (for example, see Ernst & Ernst, 1978; Wiseman, 1982; Guthrie & Parker, 
1989). However, the various disclosure indices used were relatively general in nature 
regarding CSDs and therefore did not tend to ‘drill-down’ and provide useful guidance 
or information in relation to RGHM disclosures and related accountability practices of 
gambling companies. Part two of this thesis (the research reported in this chapter) 
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 Refer to Chapter 4, section n 4.3.2 for a detailed discussion of the ethical branch of stakeholder theory. 
152 
 
addresses this issue by developing a RGHM disclosure index to evaluate four gambling 
companies’ annual report RGHM disclosure practices in order to understand the extent 
of accountability being discharged by gambling companies in relation to RGHM 
information. The details of the development of the index will be provided in section 
four – Research methods.       
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section two presents an overview 
of the significance of the study, followed by section three – the theoretical framework 
underpinning part two of the study. Section four presents the research methods, section 
five the findings of this part of the study, and the last section, section six, provides 
concluding comments. 
6.2 Significance of the study 
In Chapters 2 and 5, the issue of social costs of problem gambling was discussed in light 
of the fact that it represents one of the serious social issues at the forefront of political 
attention and community concern with regards to the gambling industry (Productivity 
Commission, 1999; 2010). There are various social costs related to problem gambling 
currently confronting communities, such as crime, depression and relationship 
breakdowns (as discussed in Chapter 2), which can affect not only problem gamblers 
themselves but also their families, friends, and, to a lesser extent, work colleagues and 
others in the general community (Productivity Commission, 2010). It is estimated that 
problem gambling affects up to five million Australians, including friends, family and 
employers of people with a gambling problem (Productivity Commission, 2010). The 
social costs of gambling to the Australian community are significant, and stakeholders 
expect gambling companies to be responsible and accountable for the social 
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consequences of their operations (Delfabbro et al., 2007; Hancock et al., 2008) and to 
embrace broader corporate accountability to minimise the prevalence of problem 
gambling. Reflecting on this expectation, the following quotes were provided within the 
submissions made by stakeholder groups to the New Productivity Commission Inquiry 
into Gambling in 2008:    
A strong accountability framework must be a requirement of pokie venues and 
industry to address the social and behavioural issues inherent in the products they 
are providing. This is particularly important now and in the future because there is 
a large and growing number of people who live alone or who are older and on 
pensions or other small, fixed incomes. Research has found that this demographic, 
especially for females, is more vulnerable to problematic pokie gaming (Macedon 
Ranges Shire Council, Submission no. 129, p. 5). 
Occasions of contact with the local gambling industry (e.g. clubs and hotel 
managers, venue staff) have suggested that there is an attitude amongst some in the 
industry that gambling treatment services are a threat to their business and revenue. 
This lead us to wonder if the responsibility, awareness and commitment for 
responsible gambling practices are truly being communicated, supported, and 
displayed by all staff within gambling venues. Gambling venues should be held 
accountable for ensuring that they provide accurate information to patrons to 
ensure that they are best able to make an informed choice about their gambling. 
This includes ensuring that information about local gambling treatment services is 
displayed and available so that patrons can also make an informed decision about 
seeking support if they wish to (Hunter Council on Problem Gambling, Submission 
no. 111, p. 4). 
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In fact, problem gambling is not a new problem, but rather it is a problem that would, to 
some extent, have always been associated with the gambling industry and gambling 
companies that provide gambling products and services that are potentially harmful to 
users (Jones et al., 2009). Consequently, if corporations are to demonstrate that they are 
accountable to stakeholders, they should provide RGHM information about the 
processes they have put in place to tackle problem gambling issues, so as to minimise 
the negative social impacts/consequences from their gambling-related business activities. 
As indicated by Jones et al. (2009, p. 196): 
Here corporate social responsibility might be seen to start with companies 
looking to minimise any potentially negative impacts before going on to try to 
ensure that they have as positive an impact on society as possible. 
Many stakeholder groups are increasingly expressing their concerns about problem 
gambling-related social issues. These stakeholder groups include communities, religious 
organisations and social organisations (such as the Australian Council of Social Service 
[ACOSS])
46
 (Productivity Commission, 2010). Reflecting the growing calls from 
various stakeholder groups demanding corporations to improve their accountability and 
transparency in relation to RGHM information, the ACOSS made a submission 
responding to a government draft report of the New Productivity Commission Inquiry 
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 According to the webpage of the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), ACOSS is the peak 
body of the community services and welfare sector and the national voice for the needs of people affected 
by poverty and inequality. The Council was established in 1956 with the vision for a fair, inclusive and 
sustainable Australia where all individuals and communities could participate in and benefit from social 
and economic life. The members of the Council are comprised of community service providers, 
professional associations and advocacy organisations. ACOSS provide independent and informed policy 
development, advice, advocacy and representation about issues facing the community services sector, and 
play a key coordinating and leadership role in non-profit social services across the country. (Australian 
Council of Social Service, About us, available from http://www.acoss.org.au/about_us/who_we_are/ 
about us section). 
155 
 
into Gambling in 2008
47
 (Productivity Commission Submission: DR369, p. 6)
48
, which 
states: 
We support Recommendation 8.1 that requires that data pertaining to the frequency 
and type of breaches of the Code of Practice is published at regular intervals and 
that this information is collated centrally.  
Based on recorded breaches, reasonable opportunities should be taken to cancel or 
reclaim licences where venues fail to comply with, apply or show commitment to a 
National Mandatory Code of Practice. Venues that fail to comply with or show 
commitment to a National Mandatory Code of Practice should lose their licences 
permanently in recognition of the considerable risk to public health that they 
present. Owners and managers of such venues should also be penalised as 
individuals through banning their involvement in other licensed venues and 
operations. 
Further reflecting the growing calls for corporate accountability and transparency in 
relation to harm minimisation information, the Productivity Commission has provided 
its recommendations to the Australian Government within its report, Productivity 
Commission 2010, Gambling, Report No. 50, Canberra (PC2010): 
 Recommendation 12.1 – Governments should enable their gambling regulators, or 
accredited compliance auditors, to regularly appraise gambling venues’ compliance 
with harm minimisation measures, both mandatory and voluntary, and publicly 
report their findings (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 57). 
                                               
47
 Refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the government’s public inquiries into gambling 
industries 1998 and 2008. 
48
This submission is accessible at the Productivity Commission webpage: 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/gambling-2009/submissions. 
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From the brief overview, it appears that there are expectations from stakeholders for 
gambling organisations to be responsible and accountable for the social consequences of 
their gambling-related business activities. Based on the ethical perspective (normative 
position) of stakeholder theory, stakeholders have legitimate rights that organisations 
should take into account, and these organisations should be held accountable for the 
social consequences of their business operations by providing an account informing 
stakeholders about the extent to which they meet the responsibilities imposed upon them 
(Gray et al., 1991). If we are to embrace a normative position that gambling companies 
have an obligation to be accountable for the social consequences of their business 
operations, then these companies should disclose information in relation to the RGHM 
measures they have in place to meet the responsibilities imposed upon them, as well as 
publicly discharge their accountability to stakeholders. Furthermore, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, over the years there has been a change in stakeholders’ concerns regarding 
problem gambling-related harm, with an increasing number of stakeholders expressing 
their concerns and expectations about organisations’ RGHM information. Whether 
gambling organisations appear to demonstrate change and to discharge (or not to 
discharge) their accountability to stakeholders regarding social issues associated with 
problem gambling is something that this part of the study explores.  
6.3. Theoretical perspective  
Drawing on an understanding that gambling companies have a responsibility to protect 
the rights of various stakeholders, and that stakeholders’ interests should be 
incorporated into an organisation’s purpose, policies and practices (Evan & Freeman, 
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1988; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; King, 2002), the ethical perspective (normative 
stakeholder theory) approach is adopted in this part two of the broader study. 
A stakeholder is defined as “any individual or group who can affect or is affected by the 
actions, decisions, policies, practices, or goals of the organisation” (Carroll, 1993, p. 74). 
According to the ethical perspective of stakeholder theory, stakeholders have intrinsic 
value in and of themselves and the organisation therefore has an obligation to uphold 
their rights and serve their interests simply because they exist (Goodijk, 2003; Kaler, 
2003; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). As detailed in Chapter 4, based on the ethical 
branch of stakeholder theory, corporate managers have a fiduciary duty to manage the 
business for the benefits of all stakeholders (Boatright, 2004) and all stakeholders have 
the right to be treated fairly by an organisation regardless of stakeholder power (Deegan, 
2009). The normative stakeholder theory presents the moral basis of stakeholder theory 
by stating that organisations should do (or not to do) the right (wrong) thing (Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995). It is also argued that corporations should “account for [their] actions 
or inaction in some form of report provided for its stakeholders” (Holland & Gibbon, 
2001, p. 279-280), and this involves extending the accountability of corporations to all 
stakeholders.  
Accountability is “the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial 
account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held accountable” (Gray et al., 
1996, p.38). Gray et al. (1991) applied the notion of accountability to CSDs and argued 
that social reporting is used to inform stakeholders about the extent to which the 
organisation meets the responsibilities imposed upon it. Indeed, O’Dwyer et al. (2005) 
argue that stakeholders are aware of their ‘right to know’ about the impact an 
158 
 
organisation has on them and and hold expectations concerning the accountability of 
organisations ‘for their stewardship’ of stakeholders’ resources (O’Dwyer et al., 2005, 
p. 22). Therefore, the provision of social responsibility information via media such as 
corporate annual reports is seen as a means by which corporations can “[proclaim] their 
social responsibility credentials” and publicly discharge accountability for social 
responsibility to a wide range of stakeholders (Cooper & Owen, 2007, p. 649; Deegan 
& Gordon, 1996). 
From the above brief overview, together with the detailed discussion of the ethical 
branch of stakeholder theory provided in Chapter 4, based on the normative concept, in 
the case of the gambling industry, particularly gambling companies, CSD decisions 
should be based on their beliefs about what managers are considered to be accountable 
for, and what people need to know about problem gambling and the resulting social 
impacts from their business activities. Consequently, to demonstrate accountability to 
stakeholders, gambling companies should account for their overall social performance, 
particularly regarding their actions (or inaction), for example their RGHM measures in 
place, in order to alleviate problem gambling and minimise gambling harm. Therefore, 
this part of the thesis attempts to assess the extent to which corporations publicly 
discharge their accountability to stakeholders in relation to RGHM information. 
Normative stakeholder theory provides the moral ground for reporting to stakeholders. 
It frames the analysis of what should be reported and the extent of accountability being 
discharged by corporations. Given this moral imperative, and the findings of a 
significant lack of accountability (Smith & Rubenstein, 2011; Hancock et al., 2008), this 
chapter builds a broader framework of social accounting theory in seeking to understand 
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how the organisation-society relationship might work against the promotion of 
transparency and accountability toward stakeholders.  
6.4. Research methods  
This chapter assesses the ‘extent’ of accountability being discharged (or not discharged) 
by gambling companies operating within Australia in relation to RGHM disclosure 
practices. To achieve this objective, a RGHM disclosure index has been developed to 
analyse four major gambling companies’ annual report RGHM disclosure practices over 
a period of 7 years, from 2005 to 2011. The selection of companies was based on the 
criterion that the company would be listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
top 200
49
 companies by market capitalisation (S&P ASX200) as on 1 June 2012. This 
period was chosen to provide insights into what and how the disclosure of RGHM 
information has changed over time during a period where there were growing demands 
from stakeholders that the gambling industry, particularly gambling companies, 
improve its accountability regarding social issues associated with problem gambling. 
For practical reasons, similar to part one of the broader study, part two also only 
considers those gambling companies that provide gambling products and services 
directly to their consumers. The four gambling companies chosen for part two of the 
study are Crown Limited (Crown), Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Tabcorp), Tatts Group 
Limited (Tatts) and SkyCity Entertainment Group Limited (SkyCity). Annual reports 
for these four publicly listed companies are available through the respective companies’ 
websites; each one discloses some responsible gambling-related information on their 
website. However, this information could only be viewed at one point in time and it was 
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 The selection was based on the Top 200 to allow more sample gambling companies to be included in 
part two of the study.  
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not possible to examine changes. Furthermore, websites are a transient rather than 
permanent record, since content can be changed or deleted at any time by the site’s 
author. Therefore, it was decided to ignore web-based disclosures; this is acknowledged 
as a potential limitation of this part two of the thesis. Annual reports, in contrast, are a 
record from a point in time. As such annual reports formed the primary focus of this 
study. Early research into CSD also suggested that annual reports are a major source of 
social and environmental information provided by companies. Using this legally-
required, publicly available and readily accessible reporting document, made year-on-
year and company-to-company comparisons relatively easy (Tilt, 2001). Although 
various researchers have used sustainability/stand-alone social and environmental 
reports (Unerman, 2000), the four selected companies did not produce any separate 
social and/or environmental (sustainability) reports for the period of analysis (Crown 
did produce a brief sustainability report from 2008 onwards, however, the content of the 
report was replicated in their annual report).  
Content analysis (Krippendorff, 1980) has been employed to analyse the disclosures of 
RGHM practices. Content analysis aims to reduce the raw data into manageable 
amounts for analysis and it is a “research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences for texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” 
(Krippendorff, 1980, p. 18). Content analysis involves coding qualitative and 
quantitative information into predefined categories in order to derive patterns in the 
presentation and reporting information (Guthrie et al., 2004; Guthrie & Abeyeskera, 
2006). Certain technical requirements have to be met for content analysis to be effective 
(Guthrie et al., 2004; Guthrie & Abeyeskera, 2006); specifically, the unit of analysis and 
the basis of classification must be clearly defined. 
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There are two approaches used to determine how to capture data: the number of 
disclosures pertaining to a particular issue, or the extent of disclosures (Gray et al., 
1995a). Both of the approaches have been used in SEA literature (Cowen et al., 1987; 
Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Tilt, 2001; Adams & Frost, 2007) and both 
are used in this part of the study. The ‘number of disclosures’ was used as a measure to 
capture the presence or absence of disclosures regarding certain RGHM information in a 
particular year. If the gambling company disclosed information about specific issues 
relating to RGHM, then it was given 1 point, otherwise 0. The assumption for this part 
of the research is that if gambling companies are to demonstrate accountability to 
stakeholders regarding the social consequences of their businesses activities, they 
should disclose RGHM information about the processes they have implemented to 
minimise the negative social impacts of problem gambling issues. To measure the 
extent of disclosure it is assumed that if gambling companies choose to demonstrate 
accountability to validate their social responsibility, they are likely to provide more 
(rather than less) comprehensive information regarding RGHM issues to advance and 
enhance stakeholder’s understanding of corporate RGHM measures.  
For the purpose of this study, a ‘brief disclosure’ refers to a short and simple disclosure 
statement regarding a RGHM issue, without elaboration. In contrast, a ‘comprehensive 
disclosure’ refers to a detailed and in-depth disclosure statement regarding a RGHM 
issue, in order to clearly define the RGHM measures taken by the corporation. Hence, 
the maintained assumption for this part of the research is that if a disclosure is 
comprehensive, the more the organisation is publicising its RGHM social responsibility 
to stakeholders. Consequently, if a gambling company provides comprehensive 
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information on a specific RGHM issue, another 1 point is awarded, which allows for a 
total of 2 points for each specific RGHM issue.  
While it is acknowledged that the ‘brief’ or ‘comprehensive’ disclosure measure utilised 
for the purpose of this study might be deemed to be very subjective and the researcher’s 
judgement cannot be completely avoided in the coding process, subjectivity and bias 
was minimised in this study through detailed descriptions of categories and 
clarifications/examples of comprehensive information for the four sub-categories of 
RGHM disclosures (see Appendix B). For example, under the public awareness 
category (RGHM issue number 1: Statement of corporate participation in public 
awareness of problem gambling activities), if companies only disclosed basic 
information such as mentioning corporate participation in the public awareness of 
problem gambling activities without further elaborating on the types or objectives of the 
activities, such a disclosure was considered brief and given a score of 1 point. As an 
example, the following disclosure is coded as a brief disclosure (RGHM issue number 
1): 
The objectives of the SKYCITY Host Responsibility Policy are outlined earlier in 
this Annual Report. The objectives of the policy include ensuring that each 
SKYCITY site: minimises the potential harm of gaming by…promoting 
community awareness and education initiatives on moderating gaming activities as 
appropriate and the services available for individuals seeking to control their 
behavior (SkyCity Entertainment Group Limited, Annual Report 2006, p. 49).  
However, if companies elaborated on the activities or media campaigns used to promote 
public awareness of problem gambling or relevant issues (for example, the dates or 
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periods of the public awareness activities conducted) in order to enhance stakeholder’s 
understanding of corporate efforts and concerns regarding problem gambling social 
issues, another point was awarded. For example, under the same category discussed 
above, public awareness (RGHM issue number 1), the following disclosure is coded as 
a comprehensive disclosure and awarded 2 points:  
In May 2008, Tabcorp supported the Victorian Responsible Gambling Awareness 
Week. This event represents a partnership between government (State and Local), 
the broader gambling industry and community organisations to highlight to 
gamblers that when they gamble, they should do so responsibly and stay in control. 
Tabcorp’s casinos also conducted their annual employee Responsible Gambling 
Awareness Weeks during May 2008 (Tabcorp Holdings Limited, Annual Report 
2008, p. 8).  
The basis for considering the ‘extent of disclosures’ is based on the points scored. The 
assumption made in this study is that the higher points scored (based on the index, the 
maximum points available for a particular year is 60), the more the organisation is 
believed to be discharging its accountability to stakeholders in relation to RGHM-
related activities; therefore points are reflective of companies’ accountability levels. A 
score of below 20 is classified as a ‘low extent of disclosure’; a score above 40 is 
classified as a ‘high extent of disclosure’. While it is acknowledged that this approach 
of assigning scores to low and high levels of disclosure might appear rather arbitrary, it 
is believed by the researcher that it represents a sound start in providing a basic 
understanding of the extent of accountability being discharged by gambling companies 
regarding social issues associated with problem gambling. However, this type of content 
analysis/score allows for the researcher’s judgment to be impounded in evaluating the 
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value of the disclosure made by a company (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Aerts et al., 
2006). Aerts et al. (2006) argue that whilst subjective, this process of scoring ensures 
avoiding “irrelevant or redundant generalities” in strategies CSD (p. 312).  
In capturing the number of disclosures, it was ultimately decided not to differentiate 
between positive and negative disclosures; that is, between those disclosures which 
prima facie project the organisation in a positive image versus those that could be 
construed as providing negative information about the organisation. The rationale for 
this decision is consistent with the justification as discussed in part one (Chapter 5) of 
the thesis (see Chapter 5, section 5.4.2). Moreover, the findings reported in part one of 
the thesis add weight to support this rationale, where the study results in part one 
(Chapter 5) show that the CSDs of gambling companies were predominantly positive 
and it was rare to find instances of negative disclosure.  
For the RGHM disclosures, a RGHM disclosure index was developed in order to 
categorise the RGHM issues. This development was required because no such 
disclosure index is known to exist within the SEA literature. In undertaking the 
development of the index, the study made reference to a number of documents released 
by Australian state/territory government authorities responsible for gambling and/or 
RGHM initiatives. As discussed in Chapter 2, in response to problem gambling 
concerns raised within PC1999, each state/territory government introduced various 
harm minimisation strategies (e.g. codes of practice, performance guidelines) in their 
respective state/territory with the aim of minimising the prevalence of problem 
gambling. Such initiatives were based on the findings and recommendations within 
PC1999 which reflected an assimilation of community expectations and concerns 
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regarding gambling (refer to the discussion in Chapter 5). Based on this reasoning, this 
study presumed that the government initiatives of each state/territory are arguably 
reflective of community concerns with, and expectations of, the gambling industry, 
particularly gambling companies, in terms of their activities’ impact on the social costs 
of problem gambling. The RGHM measures embodied in the various state/territory 
initiatives were considered to be an appropriate proxy for wider stakeholder concerns 
about social costs of problem gambling. Whilst they did not necessarily focus on 
disclosures, these documents typically identified the types of RGHM measures that 
stakeholders (such as community) expected gambling companies to implement. In order 
for gambling companies to discharge accountability to their stakeholders regarding 
problem gambling social issues, they need to disclose RGHM information. The 
documents that have been reviewed were: 
 The Tasmania Gaming Commission (TGC) released its updated summaries of 
gambling harm minimisation measures on 14 August 2012 (Tasmania, TGC, 
2012). This included implementation on gambling harm minimisation measures 
and practices developed by the government in response to its first social and 
economic impacts study into gambling in Tasmania released in July 2008.  
 The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Parliamentary Council republished the 
ACT Gambling and Racing Commission’s Gambling and Racing Control (Code 
of Practice) Regulation 2002 in February 2009 (ACT Parliamentary Council, 
2009). The document provides codes regarding responsible gambling and harm 
minimisation practices in regards to problem gambling. 
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 The Victoria Government Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem Gambling 
and Other Measures) Act 2007 (assented to on 18 December 2007) with the 
purposes to amend the Gambling Regulation Act 2003; to amend the Casino 
Control Act 1991; and to make a consequential amendment to the Liquor Control 
Reform Act 1998. The Act includes a Code of Conduct that aims to minimise 
harm from gambling and promote responsible gambling in the society. 
 The Northern Territory Responsible Gambling Code of Practice launched in April 
2003 by the Minister for Racing, Gaming and Licensing. The Code was designed 
to promote the adoption of best practice in the provision of responsible gambling 
aimed at minimising problem gambling. The Code reflects a partnership among 
Northern Territory gambling providers, the government, regulators and 
counselling services, and forms an essential part of managing gambling services 
provided by Northern Territory gambling licensees. It represents a whole-of-
industry commitment to best practice in the provision of responsible gambling. 
 Racing and Wagering (Western Australia): Responsible Wagering Code of 
Practice 2011. This code represents a self-regulatory, whole-of-industry 
commitment to best practice in the provision of responsible wagering. It is a 
strategy, for both on and off course services, which incorporates problem 
gambling prevention initiatives, community education, compliance monitoring 
initiatives, and possible identification of procedures to connect customers who 
step forward to professional support channels. 
 The Office of Liquor and Gambling Regulation released its Queensland 
Responsible Gambling Code of Practice, Version 4, in September 2012 
167 
 
(Queensland, OLGR, 2012). The code provides a proactive whole-of-industry 
approach to the promotion of responsible gambling practices to minimise harm to 
individuals and to the broader community. 
 The Office of the Liquor and Gambling Commissioner released its enforcement of 
the Responsible Gambling Code of Practice on 1 December 2008 (South Australia, 
OLGC, 2008). This code provides a framework for gambling providers to ensure 
their general gambling practices are consistent with the community’s expectations 
and that licensed business activities will be conducted in a responsible manner to 
minimise the harm caused by gambling. 
 The New South Wales (NSW) Government Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing 
(OLGR) released the Gaming Machines Act 2001 that aims to minimise harm 
associated with the misuse and abuse of gambling activities. The Act also fosters 
responsible conduct in relation to gambling, to facilitate the balanced development 
of the gaming industry, and to ensure the integrity of the gaming industry, for 
public interest. 
The basis for including a particular RGHM issue in the disclosure index was that at least 
two of the eight documents that were reviewed (as identified above) referred to the issue. 
In part one of the thesis (Chapter 5), the responsible gambling category comprises three 
sub-categories, namely public awareness, responsible environment, and support service. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the categorisations were based on the recommendations of 
the government’s first gambling report, the Productivity Commission, 1999, Australia’s 
Gambling Industries, Report No. 10 (PC1999) and the Ministerial Council on 
Gambling’s National Framework on Problem Gambling (NFPG). This part two of the 
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thesis also utilised the same sub-categories, however, an additional broad category – 
structural machine design – was added. The reason for the inclusion of the forth 
category was that structural machine design was an issue discussed in all the eight 
documents mentioned above. It is speculated that this could be linked to the reason that 
gaming machines accounted for 75-80 per cent of problem gamblers and were found to 
pose significant problems for consumers in general (Productivity Commission, 2010). 
Structural machine design includes disclosures related to machine design relevant 
information (refer to Appendix B).   
A final index of 30 specific RGHM issues was collated, under four general categories: 
public awareness, responsible environment, support services, and structural machine 
design. While it is understood and appreciated that RGHM initiatives being introduced 
and implemented by governments are not limited to these 30 specific issues, in 
developing the disclosure index, the researcher only considered the RGHM measures 
that gambling companies are directly responsible for. For example, the development of 
school education materials on responsible gambling is beyond the responsibility and 
capacity of gambling companies, and therefore such issues were excluded from the 
RGHM index. The view taken in this chapter is that if particular stakeholders wanted to 
investigate whether a gambling company was addressing various RGHM issues within 
its industry, then they would find RGHM information available in annual reports useful 
in their investigation process. The researcher seeks to gain an understanding of the 
current disclosure practices, and trends therein, in relation to RGHM issues, and thus to 
understand the extent of accountability being discharged by gambling companies to 
stakeholders regarding problem gambling social issues. It is believed by the researcher 
that the index represents a sound start in developing an instrument that is not only used 
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in this study, but that can also be used as a starting point for other researchers interested 
in researching the corporate accountability of gambling companies, particularly RGHM.   
Having determined how to classify and measure disclosures, the study then moved to 
coding. A total of 28 annual reports from the four listed gambling companies (identified 
earlier) formed the results of this study. The researcher was responsible for all the 
coding. Nevertheless, as a basic check on the reliability of the coding, a second coder 
was then trained in the research method and also coded the three years’ worth of annual 
report RGHM disclosures. The result was that there was only very minor discrepancy in 
the results, which was discussed and resolved such that the researchers were satisfied 
the coding instrument was being appropriately applied. The annual reports were 
carefully scrutinised, line by line, page by page, to identify disclosures that referred to 
the four general categories mentioned earlier. The findings would then provide an 
understanding of the extent of accountability in the area of RGHM being discharged by 
gambling companies. As discussed earlier, over a 7-year period of analysis, the 
maximum score for a particular year for a gambling company is 60 points (2 points x 30 
specific issues of RGHM). Appendix B contains details of the index.    
6.5   Results   
6.5.1  Overall RGHM disclosures 
Figure 6.1 depicts the RGHM disclosure trends of the four gambling companies from 
2005 to 2011. For all four companies there were fairly low levels (i.e., less than 20 
points) of RGHM disclosures over the period of analysis. There were also some 
fluctuations regarding the trends of the RGHM disclosures. Crown consistently had the 
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most disclosures for the 7-year period, with an increasing trend of disclosure from 2009 
onwards (though the increases were very minor). The RGHM disclosure trend for Tatts 
was considered to be more consistent, with very little variation in disclosure score 
compared with other companies. In general, Tabcorp demonstrated a decreasing trend of 
RGHM disclosures while SkyCity’s level of disclosure fluctuated. If corporations 
discharged their accountability on the basis of such considerations as stakeholders’ 
rights-to-know, then arguably after 15 years of debate we could expect disclosures to be 
reasonably high to begin with and greater detail being disclosed around any particularly 
problematic or issues of stakeholders concerns about problem gambling social issues.  
From Table 6.1 it can be seen that the highest points scored in a particular year were 23 
(Crown in 2011) out of the maximum 60. Furthermore, from the 28 annual reports 
analysed, only 2 scored above 20 points (both provided by Crown in 2010 and 2011). 
The table also shows that the lowest score in a particular year was only 5 points 
(SkyCity in 2008). SkyCity produced more RGHM disclosures in the beginning of the 
analysis period but the disclosures decreased in the subsequent years with a score of 6 
points in the last year of analysis (2011). Such findings suggest that corporations 
certainly embrace a low level of accountability to their stakeholders in relation to 
RGHM information. Throughout the period of analysis, the RGHM disclosures of the 
four companies showed low and fluctuating trends of disclosure over time. If we are to 
embrace a normative position and to accept that the disclosure index is a measure of the 
accountability of reporting regarding RGHM measures, then it could be argued that the 
accountability of gambling companies appears not to have improved over time, and 
there is obvious room for improvement. The results also suggest that RGHM disclosure 
decisions appeared not to be based on what stakeholders need to know about 
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corporations’ social performance, but rather on managements’ discretion regarding what 
types of disclosures to make (or omit), if any. If corporations are to discharge 
accountability to stakeholders regarding problem gambling issues, the RGHM 
disclosures would not be low or fluctuate while community concerns for problem 
gambling issues increased over the period of analysis. 
Figure 6.1: RGHM disclosures by each company over time 
 
Table 6.1: RGHM disclosures by each company (in points) 
Years Crown Tabcorp Tatts SkyCIty Total 
2005 18 17 13 15 63 
2006 20 16 14 18 68 
2007 18 12 14 8 52 
2008 17 12 16 5 50 
2009 18 13 15 10 56 
2010 23 10 18 12 63 
2011 24 17 15 6 62 
Total 138 97 105 74 414 
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The study results showed that not all of the specified issues relating to RGHM were 
discussed by the sample gambling companies. Over the 7-year period, 10
50
 out of 30 
specified issues relating to RGHM were not mentioned by any of the companies. These  
10 issues may have had negative implications on gambling companies’ profitability and 
therefore they did not implement or report them. Another 2
51
 issues were only 
mentioned once by any company over the period. Based on the RGHM disclosures 
index, the findings show that there is very limited information being discussed and 
disclosed by gambling companies in relation to RGHM. Indeed, only 8
52
 out of the 30 
specified issues relating to RGHM were disclosed by all four companies; for example, 
RGHM issue number 1 (statement of corporate participation in public awareness of 
problem gambling activities) and issue number 8 (statement of corporation fostering 
responsible gambling or minimising problem gambling).  
Throughout the 7-year analysis period, Crown consistently scored the highest points 
(138 points) among the four companies. This is followed by 105 points for Tatts and 97 
points for Tabcorp. SkyCity scored the least with only 74 points. In the latest period of 
analysis (2011), Tabcorp showed an increase in disclosures – from 10 points in 2010 to 
                                               
50
 These issues being: statement of corporate ban on credit gambling; statement of corporate restricted 
access to ATMs and EFTPOS; statement of corporate practice on winnings to be paid by cheque; 
statement of corporate limits on frequency of games and/or lines/ways; statement of corporate display of 
odds and/or returns to player information; statement of corporate display of clocks within gambling areas; 
statement of corporate compliance with limitations on 24-hour gambling (except casinos) (while this 
might not be applicable to some gambling companies within this study); statement of corporations 
providing adequate or natural lighting; statement of corporate restrictions on prizes, promotions and 
inducement products in gaming areas; and statement of gambling staff who are licensed. 
51
 These two issues are: statement of corporate restrictions or limitations on note acceptors and statement 
of corporate restriction on entry, minors and penalties; both issues were addressed once by SkyCity alone. 
52
 These issues are: statement of corporate gaming machine operation and performance; statement of 
corporate provisions for exclusion/self exclusion program; statement of corporate displays of problem 
gambling-related information; statement of corporation fostering responsible gambling or minimising 
problem gambling; statement of corporate participation in public awareness of problem gambling 
activities; statement of problem gambling incidences recognition; statement of corporate involvement in 
gambling committees or collaboration with government agencies, community and stakeholders; and 
statement of corporate funds contribution to the Community Support Funds for community and/or 
problem gambling services and assistance, treatment of problem gambling, and/or community   
compliance with regulation and/or policy.  
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17 points in 2011. The speculation for the increases might be due to corporations’ 
reaction to the release of the New Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling 
report, Productivity Commission 2010, Gambling, Report No. 50, Canberra (PC2010) 
in 2010. Therefore, disclosures might not be directly linked to accountability, but 
instead possibly a response to perceived threats to organisational legitimacy. Relative to 
Tabcorp, Crown only increased its disclosures slightly in the latest years of analysis. In 
contrast, the RGHM disclosures for Tatts and SkyCity decreased in the latest period of 
analysis (2011) despite the fact that concerns for problem gambling issues have risen in 
recent years. This finding appeared to be somewhat at odds with the perceived 
seriousness of problem gambling issues (Productivity Commission, 2010). If gambling 
companies want to demonstrate their accountability to their communities, then arguably 
they would provide a high level or at least demonstrate an increasing trend of RGHM 
disclosures in response to the community’s demand for such information over time.  
6.5.2  Disclosures by categories 
While Figure 6.1 provides aggregated results for the overall RGHM disclosures of each 
company, Figure 6.2 provides a summary of the four broad categories of RGHM 
disclosure by the respective companies over the 7-year period. In looking at the 
disclosure categories, the most extensive disclosures were public awareness (176 
points) followed by support services (107 points), then structural machine design (71 
points) and lastly responsible environment (60 points).  
The finding shows that the public awareness category scored the highest points for 
disclosure which is interesting (from Figure 6.2) and consistent with the findings of part 
one (Chapter 5) of the study. It may imply that the four respective companies, in 
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response to community concerns regarding problem gambling issues, see this disclosure 
category as relatively more important to various stakeholders than other categories. 
Although the structural machine design category – issues related to gaming products, 
particularly the electronic gaming machines (EGMs) – is of greatest concern to 
stakeholders in relation to problem gambling-related harm, it did not attract the greatest 
levels of disclosure. This is not surprising given EGMs are potentially harmful to users 
and corporations might tend to avoid disclosures that could potentially harm their 
corporate image.  
     Figure 6.2: The four broad categories of RGHM disclosure by each company 
  
 
Table 6.2: Total disclosures according to the general categories of RGHM (by year) 
Years Public 
awareness 
Responsible 
environment 
Support 
services 
Structural 
machine design 
Total 
2005 25 7 17 14 63 
2006 30 10 19 9 68 
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2007 25 5 14 8 52 
2008 21 7 14 8 50 
2009 22 9 15 10 56 
2010 26 12 13 12 63 
2011 27 10 15 10 62 
Total Points 176 60 107 71 414 
% to Total 42.5% 14.5% 25.9% 17.1% 100% 
 
6.5.2.1 Public awareness 
The annual report disclosures relating to the broad category of public awareness 
addressed 8 specific issues relating to RGHM. The disclosures in this broad category 
scored the highest points among the four broad categories – 176 out of 414, about 43 
per cent.  
This broad category attracted the most attention from the four companies, with 7 
specific RGHM issues (out of 8) within this category discussed by all companies (issue 
number 6 was not discussed by Tatts). Within these 8 specific RGHM issues, issue 
number 8 – ‘Statement of company to foster responsible gambling or minimise problem 
gambling’ – scored the highest level of disclosure (total 53 points); this issue also 
scored the highest among the 30 specific RGHM issues. All companies (except 
SkyCity) scored full points (7 years x 2 points = 14) on this issue. Since gambling 
companies’ gambling products and services are potentially harmful to its users, 
disclosure on this issue (number 8) could be seen as their desire to show that they 
operate their business in a responsible manner. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
majority of the sampling gambling companies scored full points on this issue for the 7 
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years of analysis. Declarations such as ‘committed to responsible gambling’, 
‘committed to harm minimisation’ were commonly found within corporate annual 
reports, managing director’s reports and/or Chairman’s statements. It is believed by the 
researcher that such disclosures aim to demonstrate that corporations are acting 
responsibly and are accountable to communities’ expectations, and thus no government 
intervention is necessary. For example, the following excerpt from Tabcorp was 
awarded 2 points with corporate declarations that the responsible gambling practices are 
embedded in their gambling businesses in order to minimise problem gambling social 
issues (Annual Report, 2011, p. 12): 
Responsible gambling practices are embedded in Tabcorp’s operations. We take 
proactive steps to minimise the potential harm that gambling can cause for some 
individuals. Tabcorp has responsible gambling codes of practice in place for its 
wagering, gaming and Keno businesses, which are tailored to specific customer 
needs and comply with relevant regulatory requirements. 
Issue number 1 – ‘statement of corporate participation in public awareness of problem 
gambling activities’ – was discussed by all companies and scored 31 points (out of the 
total of 176). Most of the companies (except SkyCity) provided comprehensive 
information about their participation in the public awareness of problem gambling 
activities. Most of the disclosures appeared to discuss corporations’ participation in 
public awareness activities with the majority of the companies making reference to the 
Responsible Gambling Awareness Week (RGAW). Nevertheless, RGAW is one of the 
major annual events conducted by governments in their respective state/territory to 
tackle problem gambling issues. As such, corporations might feel driven to participate 
in such events to be seen as concerned about problem gambling social issues. For 
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example, the following excerpt from Tabcorp (Annual Report, 2007, p. 10) disclosing 
the type of awareness activities they were involved in, was granted 2 points: 
In May 2007, the Tabcorp Group again supported the annual Victorian Responsible 
Gambling Awareness Week. The aim of the week was to raise community 
awareness of responsible gambling, and provide Victorian gamblers with 
information so that when they gamble, they do so responsibly. Similar awareness 
activities were conducted within the Company’s casinos, to reinforce to employees 
the importance of responsible gambling. 
Another issue that was discussed by all companies was issue number 7 (total 24 points); 
this issue relates to companies displaying information regarding problem gambling 
issues. Further information provided about this issue was usually linked to corporate 
discussions regarding the types of problem gambling materials available for patrons, 
such as pamphlets (however, only Tatts consistently disclosed this information). There 
was minimal disclosure about player information displayed (such as information about 
the potential risk of gambling which is relevant to minimising problem gambling issues). 
Statements, often repeated in the consecutive annual reports, claimed for example (Tatts 
2008, p. 10; 2009, p. 10; 2010, p. 10; 2011, p. 18):  
Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct exists in each of Tatts Group’s trading 
jurisdictions. These codes contain a variety of measures that respond to 
community expectations in regard to player protection and harm minimization. 
These measures include responsible gambling information, pre-commitment 
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strategies
53
, game rules, advertising restrictions, customer complaint mechanisms 
and self-exclusion programs to name a few. 
Issue number 3 (‘statement on problem gambling incidences recognition’) was also 
discussed by all companies. Nevertheless, these disclosures were provided in a brief 
with a positive aspect that harm minimisation approaches were undertaken to tackle 
problem gambling issues. The ‘recognition’ assumes that corporations have the ability 
to prevent problem gambling incidences and thus no government intervention is 
necessary. Nevertheless, none of the annual reports disclosed records or data relating to 
problem gamblers being identified. For example, consider the following from Tatts (1 
point was granted for this disclosure) (Annual Report 2009, p. 10):  
We recognise that a very small minority of gamblers have difficulty controlling 
their behaviour. New player protection and harm minimisation measures continue 
to be implemented on a regular basis to protect customers from the consequences 
of problem gambling. 
In general, from the above discussion, the results suggest that the RGHM disclosures in 
relation to the broad category of public awareness, by the sample gambling companies 
operating within Australia are brief rather than comprehensive (refer to Table 6.3 for 
points scored). The brief RGHM disclosures could be viewed as a lack of accountability 
to stakeholders regarding problem gambling issues. For example, consider the following 
brief disclosure from Tatts (Tatts only mentioned the RGHM measures without further 
elaboration on each measure) (Annual Report 2008, p. 10): 
                                               
53
 Tatts provided the repeated sentences within annual reports for the years 2008 to 2011 but only added 
additional words of ‘pre-commitment strategies’ in the paragraph from 2010 onwards.  
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A Responsible Gambling Code of Practice exists in each of Tatts Group’s trading 
jurisdictions. These codes contain a variety of measures that respond to community 
expectations in regard to player protection and harm minimisation. These measures 
include responsible gambling information, game rules, advertising restrictions, 
customer complaint mechanisms and self-exclusion programs to name a few. 
6.5.2.2 Support services 
The support services category scored the second highest points although there are only 
3 specific issues in this category. Issue number 24, which is related to corporate funds 
contribution to support problem gambling-related matters, scored the highest (50 points 
out of 107) within this broad category. A statement of corporate contribution and/or 
contribution amounts to community was commonly found within the annual reports of 
gambling companies. Such disclosure arguably shows that companies are contributing 
and giving back to the community. However, such contributions are not all voluntary; 
community benefit funds, for example, are compulsory for companies operating within 
the gambling industry, but the compulsory nature was not mentioned within the annual 
reports.  
Issue number 23 also scored relatively high points (35 points) compared to other 
disclosure issues. Indeed, all companies (except SkyCity) consistently disclosed 
statements relevant to corporate collaboration with government agencies, the 
community and stakeholders. Such disclosures suggest corporations are collaborating 
and working with their stakeholder groups to minimise the prevalence of problem 
gambling. For this issue, only Crown and Tatts provided comprehensive information, 
such as the type of committee in which they were involved, while Tabcorp and SkyCity 
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only disclosed brief information. An example of a disclosure from Crown (Annual 
Report, 2008, p. 10) is as follows: 
Crown Melbourne supports the Victorian Responsible Gambling Ministerial 
Advisory Council, which was established in 2004 as a direct line of advice to 
government on problem gambling issues and research priorities. It is represented 
on various working groups of the Council. Crown Melbourne is also a member of 
the Australian Gaming Council and the Australasian Casino Association. 
6.5.2.3 Structural machine design 
The structural machine design category scored the third highest points – 71 out of 414, 
which only represents 17 per cent of the total disclosures. It is observed that among the 
6 specific issues addressed in this broad category, the disclosures focussed on 1 
particular issue – issue number 25 (related to corporate gaming operations and 
performance). Three of the companies scored 14 points (2 points for each of the 7 years 
of analysis) on issue number 25, by providing comprehensive information regarding the 
number of gaming machines operating within companies and gaming revenue 
performance contributions to corporations; SkyCity only scored 8 points. However, the 
disclosure of gaming machine revenue performance might be targeted at shareholders 
from the financial performance perspective – that is, corporations’ disclosures in 
relation to gaming revenues arguably suggest good profits for gaming businesses and 
thus dividends to shareholders. On the other hand, such disclosures may have also 
provided insight into the seriousness of problem gambling issues seeing that gaming 
machines are the major cause of problem gamblers; gaming machines are found to pose 
significant problems for consumers in general, and 75-80 per cent of problem gamblers 
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result from people playing on gaming machines (Productivity Commission, 2010). 
Nonetheless, data or information about problem gamblers identified by corporations 
never appeared to be available within annual reports of the sample gambling companies, 
despite stakeholders’ ‘right to information’ regarding the potential risk of developing 
problem gambling and the social impacts gambling companies have on them. 
Other specific issues in this structural machine design category received minimal 
attention from corporations. For example, issue numbers 27 and 28 were never 
discussed by any of the companies, while issue number 29 was only discussed once by 
one company; issues number 26 and 30 were discussed by two companies. The low 
level of disclosures in this category is perhaps not surprising, since the product itself – 
gaming machines – is potentially harmful to users. If we are to take from an 
accountability perspective this type of disclosure should be made but the lack of 
disclosures in this category raises the questions as to whether the absence is motivated 
by concerns over legitimacy. These results are consistent with the findings in part one 
(Chapter 5), where the results show that it was rare to find information about gambling 
products within the annual reports of the two gambling companies investigated.  
6.5.2.4 Responsible environment 
The responsible environment scored the least points among the four broad categories – 
60 out of 414 (refer to Table 6.3), although this category comprises the highest number 
of specific RGHM issues compared to the others – 13 specific issues within this broad 
category. Despite this, 7 specific issues (issues number 10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19 and 20) 
within this category were not discussed by any of the companies during the period of 
analysis. Further to this, issue number 17 was only discussed by SkyCity in 2006. Such 
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low levels of disclosure in this category raise questions about the responsibility and 
accountability of gambling companies to ensure a safe gambling environment to protect 
their patrons from potential gambling harm (Delfabbro et al., 2007).   
Out of the 13 specific issues, only issue number 9 (regarding self-exclusion or exclusion 
programs) was discussed by all companies. However, the disclosure levels on this 
specific RGHM issue were still very low, regardless of the fact that it was raised in 
PC1999 and PC2010. Only Crown consistently disclosed self-exclusion-related issues 
over the 7-year period of analysis, while Tatts only disclosed such information from 
2008 onwards. The typical disclosures in this RGHM issue were brief and related to the 
statement of availability of self-exclusion programs for patrons, but without further 
explanation or discussions. None of the companies provided procedures for or records 
of patrons registered, lapsed, revoked, or breached for exclusion or self-exclusion 
programs. The disclosures might possibly suggest that companies were attempting to 
prevent or avoid further regulation being introduced to the industry by showing that 
corporations already had self-exclusion programs implemented, and thus did not need 
regulations.     
While issue number 21 (relevant to pre-commitment, cashless or card-based systems) 
was discussed by the majority of the companies (except Tabcorp), only Crown 
consistently disclosed such information throughout the 7-year period (scoring 2 points 
each year); Tatts only disclosed from 2008 onwards, with 2 points for each disclosure. 
The following is an example from Crown’s disclosure (Annual Report 2011, p. 25):  
Leading the way in proactive responsible gaming services, Crown Melbourne has 
pioneered a number of initiatives including the Play Safe Limits program, a 
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voluntary pre-commitment system that Crown Melbourne first implemented in 
2003. The program allows gaming machine and fully automated table games 
customers to use their Crown Signature Club Cards to set daily individual spend 
and time limits, or a combination thereof. 
6.6   Discussion and conclusions 
Part two of the study examines the RGHM disclosures of four gambling companies 
operating within Australia over a 7 year period. In doing so, by adopting the ethical 
perspective of stakeholder theory, the researcher sought to understand the extent of 
accountability being discharged by gambling companies in relation to RGHM 
information. This is possible because the researcher has synthesized an index of 
potential RGHM disclosures and the study results show that there is a low extent of 
RGHM disclosure by gambling companies operating within the Australian gambling 
industry.  
Based on the ethical (normative) perspective of stakeholder theory, stakeholders have a 
‘right to know’ about the impact that an organisation has on them (O’Dwyer et al., 
2005), and corporations should account for their actions or inaction by providing such 
information, to effectively discharge their accountability to stakeholders (Holland & 
Gibbon, 2001) regarding problem gambling issues. However, the study’s findings 
suggest a low level of RGHM information provided by gambling companies and that 
many RGHM issues are not disclosed within annual reports. When gambling companies 
disclose information about their RGHM practices, most of the information provided is 
brief rather than comprehensive, even though the latter could assist stakeholders to 
better understand corporations’ efforts to minimise problem gambling issues 
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confronting Australian communities. This brief reporting is seen as a lack of 
accountability being discharged by gambling companies; that is, RGHM disclosures do 
not demonstrate a broader (more ethically-driven) accountability to stakeholders. If 
gambling companies were to be accountable to stakeholders regarding problem 
gambling social issues, they would have disclosed a high level of RGHM information to 
demonstrate that they had (did not have) sound RGHM measures in place to tackle 
problem gambling issues. This chapter also contributes to the SEA literature and 
provides an understanding of the extent of accountability in the area of RGHM being 
discharged by gambling companies.  
This chapter has employed a content analysis research method to investigate the RGHM 
disclosure practices of four gambling companies operating within the Australian 
gambling industry. A total of 28 annual reports from 2005 to 2011 were analysed. To 
classify the disclosure, an index called the Responsible Gambling and Harm 
Minimisation (RGHM) disclosure index was developed. The RGHM disclosure index is 
in itself a contribution to research, as it provides a measure of the number and extent of 
disclosures of social responsibility-related RGHM and associated accountability 
information which was not otherwise available. The index might usefully form the basis 
for other researchers seeking to develop an instrument to evaluate RGHM and its 
accountability disclosures. The index developed in part two could be the basis of a 
reporting guide to develop a ‘best practice’ disclosure index in relation to social 
reporting of companies operating within the Australian gambling industry. 
In providing concluding comments to this part of the thesis it is also useful to consider 
the results of this part in conjunction with the results of the previous part (see Chapter 5). 
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As already discussed, Chapter 5 investigated the changing trends of CSD practices of 
two major gambling companies operating within Australia, and found that the changes 
in CSDs of the organisations directly responded to the pressures exerted by the 
community. The CSDs, particularly RGHM disclosures, were not aimed to demonstrate 
accountability but more for legitimacy. This chapter provides evidence to enhance and 
support the argument in part one – that CSDs, or more particularly RGHM disclosures, 
show a lack of accountability from gambling companies. The study findings from both 
part one and two showed no substantial attempt by organisations to ‘account’ for the 
actual or potential social ‘costs’ associated with gambling business activities. The 
failure of the gambling companies to provide RGHM disclosures increases the impetus 
for calls that gambling companies are not taking problem gambling seriously enough, 
thereby necessitating further government intervention via the introduction of more 
onerous regulations/policies into the gambling industries.  
Although the research focuses on four major gambling companies operating in Australia, 
the RGHM index could be utilised across the gambling industry. The index scoring 
approach could assist report users who seek to assess gambling companies’ RGHM by 
evaluating the information being disclosed by companies against the RGHM disclosure 
index. As this index sheds light on what information should be disclosed by companies, 
the findings will be helpful for managers of gambling companies aiming to better 
address their RGHM practices and related disclosure practices, thereby potentially 
demonstrating accountability to their community. With the low level of disclosure of 
RGHM by corporations, the findings will also have implications for regulators and 
standard setters in considering the need to regulate social reporting of organisations 
operating within the gambling industry.  
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The findings reported form the basis for further investigating corporate accountability of 
gambling companies. Within the annual reports, gambling companies proclaim 
themselves to be socially responsible and committed to minimising problem gambling 
harm via CSD, particularly RGHM disclosures. Nevertheless, the failure of the 
corporations to provide RGHM disclosures also suggests that they are not taking 
problem gambling seriously enough in view of RGHM measures can affect gambling 
companies’ profitability (perhaps suggested by a low level of disclosures about 
responsible environment and structure machine design). Consequently, it is argued that 
the RGHM measures might potentially conflict with corporations’ profit objectives. The 
conflict between imperatives for gambling organisations to maximise measures such as 
profit and shareholder value, and attempts to minimise the adverse social consequences 
caused by their income-generating activities raises the question of whether any potential 
decoupling between corporate public positioning and corporate actual positioning in 
relation to RGHM and problem gambling issues exists. Answers to this would provide 
an understanding of whether CSDs are a ‘true’ reflection of managements’ views about 
RGHM and problem gambling social issues. If there is a disconnection between 
gambling companies’ public positioning on the social costs of problem gambling and 
their actual belief and activities, this would lead the researcher to question the 
credibility of gambling companies’ CSD, specifically RGHM disclosures. The third and 
final part of the broader study will investigate this objective, which will be presented in 
Chapter 7.  
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Table 6.3: Responsible gambling and harm minimisation (RGHM) disclosures by each company over the 7 years (2005 – 2011) 
Broad 
categories 
Specific RGHM issues Crown SkyCity Tabcorp Tatts 
Public 
awareness  
1) A statement of corporate participation in public awareness of problem gambling 
activities. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of activities participated such as gambling awareness week 
and media campaign to promote public awareness of problem gambling.  
10 
(07-11) 
1 
(06) 
14 
(05-11) 
6 
(05,06,07) 
2) A statement of corporate problem gambling information materials. 
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure on types of materials available (such as pamphlets and 
posters) and/or languages of information available.  
7 
(05,06,10,11) 
1 
(06) 
2 
(11) 
0 
3) A statement of corporate on problem gambling incidences recognition. 
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure on data and record of problem gambling incidences. 
2 
(10,11) 
7 
(05-11) 
7 
(05-11) 
5 
(05,06,08,09,10) 
4) A statement of corporate appointed gambling contact officer in venue.  
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure of information related to gambling contact officer such as 
responsibilities, location and contact details.  
7 
(07,08,10,11) 
3 
(05,06) 
5 
(05,06,08) 
0 
5) A statement of corporate staff trained on responsible gambling. 
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure about number of staff trained on responsible gambling 
program.  
11 
(05-11) 
5 
(05,06,07,11) 
6 
(05,06,07,11) 
0 
6) Statement of corporate gambling staff are licensed.  
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure of corporate assurance all gambling staff are licensed or 
number of staff licensed.   
0 0 0 0 
7) Statement of corporate display problem gambling related information. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention or disclosure on player information displayed such as rules 
of games,  warning on potential risk of problem gambling, responsible gambling as players 
are able to make informed decision about participating in gambling.  
6 
(05,06,07,10, 11) 
5 
(05,09,10) 
2 
(05,09) 
11 
(06-11) 
8) Statement of corporate to foster responsible gambling or minimise problem gambling. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company commitment to minimise problem gambling, 
availability of responsible gambling codes of practices and/or subscribes to internal or 
external responsible gambling program. 
14 
(05-11) 
11 
(05-10) 
14 
(05-11) 
14 
(05-11) 
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Responsible  
environment   
  
9) A statement of corporate provisions for exclusion/ self exclusion program. 
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure on number of people registered for exclusion/self 
exclusion program.   
7 
(05-11) 
1 
(06) 
2 
(06,11) 
4 
(08,09,10,11) 
10) A statement of corporate display of clocks within gambling areas. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of corporate compliance with guideline or policy of clock to 
be displayed and/or disclosure of the locations of clocks.  
0 0 0 0 
11) A statement of corporate compliance with limitations on 24 hours gambling (except 
casinos). 
+ 1 point if there is a mention or disclosure of operation hours and/or hours break. 
0 0 0 0 
12) A statement of corporate providing adequate or natural lighting. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention or disclosure of proper or natural lighting areas or 
guidelines/principles of proper lighting are being followed.  
0 0 0 0 
13) A statement of corporate compliance with advertising restrictions. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company follows to advertising guidelines/principle 
and or disclosures of advertising guidelines/principle that are being followed.  
2 
(05,06) 
1 
(06) 
0 4 
(08,09,10,11) 
14) A statement of corporate restriction on player loyalty systems/programs. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention on the use of player loyalty system/programs are and not a 
rewards program or promoting gambling but to provide player activity statement to make 
informed decision or assess risk of problem gambling.     
6 
(09,10,11) 
2 
(07) 
0 0 
15) A statement of corporate ban on smoking in gambling areas. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company policy and effort to ban on smoking in 
gambling areas and/or disclosure of penalties for smoking in restriction areas. 
1 
(06) 
4 
(05,06,10) 
0 0 
16) A statement of corporate restrictions of prize, promotion and inducement products in 
gaming areas.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of prizes restrictions, no offer free credits to players, no free 
or discounted alcohol, no service of alcohol to those appears to be intoxicated. 
0 0 0 0 
17) A statement of corporate restriction on entry, minors and penalties. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company’s assurance and efforts of restrictions on 
entry and penalties and/or disclosure of penalties involved. 
0 1 
(06) 
0 0 
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18) A statement of corporate ban on credit gambling. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of company commitment and effort to ban on credit 
gambling includes cash advance from credit card through Automatic Teller Machines 
(ATMs) facilities and cashing of cheques.   
0 0 0 0 
19) A statement of corporate restricted access to ATMs and Electronic Funds Transfer at 
Point of Sale (EFTPOS).  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of ATMs locations and/or ATMs withdrawal limits. 
0 0 0 0 
20) A statement of corporate practice on winnings to be paid by cheques.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company policy on winnings payment by cheques 
and/or disclosure of minimum winnings amount to be paid by cheques or maximum cash 
payout.  
0 0 0 0 
21) A statement of corporate position on pre-commitment, cashless or card-based system.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of corporate supporting or implementing pre-commitment 
system for loss limit on cashless or card-based program/policy relevant.     
14                         
(05-11) 
3 
(05,10) 
0 8 
(08,09,10,11) 
Support   
service 
22) Statement of corporate providing or supporting problem gambling assistance and/or 
counseling services. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of counseling services available such as on-site problem 
gambling assistance or referral, face-to-face counseling, financial counseling, online 
counseling, gambling website, or gambling hotline and/or disclosure on number of referral. 
13                             
(05-11) 
1
(06) 
8 
(05,06,09,11) 
0 
23) Statement of corporate involvement in gambling committee or collaboration with 
governments’ agency, community and stakeholders.   
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company supporting to gambling committee and/or 
disclosure of such memberships.   
13                             
(05-11) 
3
(05,06,09) 
7 
(05-11) 
12 
(05-11) 
24) Statement of corporate funds contribution to the Community Support Funds for 
community and/or problem gambling services and assistance, treatment of problem 
gambling, and/or community   compliance with regulation and/or policy.   
+1 point if there is a disclosure on amount of the company funds contribution to support 
community services, problem gambling assistance, treatment of problem gambling, 
problem gambling counseling.   
11                         
(05-11) 
14 
(05-11) 
14 
(05-11) 
11 
(05-11) 
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Structural 
machine 
design  
25) A statement of corporate gaming machine operation and performance.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention on the number of gaming machine operating within company 
and/or revenue performance contributions to company. 
14                        
(05-11) 
8 
(05,09,10,11) 
14 
(05-11) 
14 
(05-11) 
26) A statement of corporate display rate of loss or bet and win limits information. 
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company policy on rate of loss, and/or disclosure on 
amount of loss limits, bet and win limits.   
0 1 
(06) 
0 2 
(10) 
27) A statement of corporate limits on frequency of games and/or lines/ways. 
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure on limitations of frequency of games (such as spin rate) 
and/or lines/ways (such as line per button push).   
0 0 0 0 
28) A statement of corporate display of odds and/or returns to player information. 
+1 point if there is a disclosure of display of odds and/or minimum returns to player 
information.   
0 0 0 0 
29) A statement of corporate restrictions or limitations on note acceptors.  
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure on amount of notes banned or limits. 
0 2 
(05) 
0 0 
30) A statement of corporate machines linked jackpots relevant information. 
+ 1 point if there a mention of machine linked jackpots approval or disclosure of machine 
linked jackpots related policy or number of machine linked. 
0 0 2 
(05) 
14 
(05-11) 
( ) = Year 
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Chapter Seven 
An examination of gambling companies                 
submissions to the                                                                                  
New Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling  
 
7.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the results of part one of the broader study demonstrated that 
although there was an increasing trend in corporate social and environmental 
disclosures (CSDs) over the period of analysis (from 1995 to 2009), corresponding to 
the external pressures exerted on gambling companies, the responsible gambling 
category did not notably increase when compared to disclosure relating to issues such as 
community involvement and human resources. It was also considered that the 
predominantly positive disclosures had little to do with demonstrating accountability, 
but more to do with securing corporate legitimacy. The results led to a more focused 
investigation carried out in part two (Chapter 6), which investigated the responsible 
gambling and harm minimisation (RGHM) disclosures of gambling companies, to gain 
an understanding of the extent to which gambling companies publicly discharge (or do 
not discharge) their accountability to stakeholders regarding the social issues associated 
with problem gambling. The research findings in part two showed a low level of RGHM 
disclosures, which was inferred as reflective of a low level of accountability being 
discharged by the gambling companies with respect to the social issues and costs of 
problem gambling. This is despite a belief held by many stakeholders that gambling 
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companies should be responsible and accountable for the social consequences of their 
operations to not only their shareholders but also their corporate stakeholders (Hancock 
et al. 2008).  
It can be concluded from the combined results of the previous two parts of this broader 
study (Chapters 5 and 6) that the current RGHM information publicly disclosed by 
corporations falls well short of fulfilling their accountability to stakeholders regarding 
the social issues and costs of problem gambling. The findings suggest that there is no 
substantial attempt by gambling companies to ‘account’ for the actual or potential social 
‘costs’ associated with their corporations’ activities. While corporations proclaim 
themselves to be socially responsible and committed to minimising problem gambling 
harm via CSD, particularly RGHM disclosures, the limited disclosures suggest that 
RGHM measures might potentially conflict with corporations profit objectives.  
The conflict between imperatives for gambling organisations to maximise measures 
such as profit and shareholder value (and to thereby satisfy key concerns of various 
capital market participants), and attempts to minimise the adverse social consequences 
caused by their income generating activities raises the question of whether being 
financially successful as well as being socially responsible is actually possible? Perhaps 
from a long-term perspective it might be, but arguably in the short run there will be 
trade-offs involved. For example, curtailing access by problem gamblers to gambling 
venues will have profit implications for the organisation and perhaps even directly for 
the managers and executives involved (for example, it is common that senior managers 
and executives are paid bonuses tied to the financial performance of the organisation. 
They will also typically hold shares or share options in the respective organisation).  
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Consequently, the gambling companies’ voluntarily produced RGHM information 
within annual reports could arguably be viewed with some scepticism given the 
interdependency between actions taken to address problem gambling and the ‘market 
imperative’ to maximise profits and shareholder value. Can we really expect managers 
to address the social problems in a ‘real way’ if there are so many pressures and 
incentives for them to also strive to maximise financial performance? 
This leads to the following broad questions: what are corporate managers’ real views 
about RGHM and associated problem gambling social issues? Are gambling companies’ 
CSDs a ‘true’ reflection of managements’ views about RGHM and problem gambling 
social issues? Are problem gambling social issues really a matter of concern to the 
managers of gambling companies? Or are gambling revenues the focal interest to the 
managers of gambling companies? Assuming we are able to access data to determine 
the actual views of corporate managers then another related question becomes whether 
there is a decoupling
54
 between corporations public positioning (reflected in their 
disclosures) on the social costs of problem gambling and the corporations’ actual beliefs 
and activities? That is, do the organisations project an image (of caring about society 
and commitment to minimise issues associated with problem gambling) which is 
actually not in accordance with the genuine beliefs of those people that manage the 
organisation.  
If there is a decoupling between how companies project themselves through public 
corporate disclosures and the genuine beliefs (and related organisational practises) of 
                                               
54
 As discussed in Chapter 4, according to Deegan (2014, p.391), decoupling occurs when the way an 
organisation projects itself through such media as annual report disclosures is quite different to the how 
the organisation functions internally, or where there is a difference between the ‘values’ of an 
organisation as projected to the public, and the actual values of the managers in question.  
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the managers involved, then this provides support for a view that perhaps there is a need 
for legislation to be introduced if the community are concerned with creating real 
changes in the accountability and operations of gambling organisations. Arguably 
managers will only voluntarily commit to change if they themselves believe there is a 
need for it. 
Therefore, the aim of the third and final part of this thesis is to explore corporations’ 
views of RGHM and problem gambling-related social issues in order to ascertain 
whether there is any potential decoupling exists between their public positioning on 
issues of RGHM and their internal positioning (view) on the same issues. To achieve 
this research objective, in part three of this thesis (the focus of this chapter) public 
documents (public submissions made by gambling companies to the New Productivity 
Commission Inquiry into Gambling in 2008) will be reviewed to examine the views 
expressed by gambling corporations regarding RGHM and the social issues related to 
problem gambling. In so doing, this part of the study may be viewed as an extension of 
part 2 in that it seeks to identify further evidence, from a different but related source, 
that might (or might not) indicate a de-coupling of gambling companies projected and 
actual practises related to RGHM. 
The balance of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief 
summary of the theoretical perspective – institutional theory – adopted to potentially 
understand differences between the publicly projected views of corporations versus their 
internal corporate views. Two general propositions are developed which focus the 
analysis of the study. This is followed by a description of the research method used to 
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review disclosures by gambling corporations in their public inquiry submissions. The 
results of the review are then presented followed by concluding discussion. 
7.2  Theoretical perspective and proposition development  
This final part of the broader study is underpinned by the decoupling dimension of 
institutional theory which has been detailed in Chapter 4. While Chapter 4 has provided 
detailed discussion of the theory, this section only highlights the applicability of this 
theory in understanding the voluntary corporate social reporting practices of gambling 
companies operating within the Australian gambling industry. In doing so, this section 
develops research propositions for this part three of the study. 
There are two dimensions of institutional theory: isomorphism and decoupling. In part 
one (Chapter 5) of this broader study, the ‘isomorphism’ dimension of the institutional 
theory is used to explain how gambling organisations may be coerced by powerful 
stakeholders (such as the community, via the government) into appearing to adopt and 
maintain particular practices that are thought to provide institutional legitimacy. This 
third part of the study utilises the decoupling dimension of institutional theory which 
has been used by a number of researchers to examine why organisations produce social 
and environmental information (Laine, 2009; Dillard et al., 2004).  
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), decoupling refers to the situation in which the 
formal organisational practice is separate and distinct from actual organisational 
practice. Deegan (2014) explains that if corporations perceived a need for their 
organisation to be seen to be adopting certain institutional practices, corporate managers 
might institute formal processes to implement those practices; however the actual 
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institutional practices can be very different from those formally sanctioned and publicly 
pronounced processes and practices. In other words, the practice is not integrated into 
the organisation’s managerial and operational processes, but more for ‘social fit’ of the 
organisation within its environment in order to gain and maintain legitimacy. 
Organisational formal structure has much more to do with the projecting of an 
organisational-self than with the actual operations of the organisation (Carruthers, 1995). 
That is, the aim of the formal organisational structure is for legitimacy effects. Hence, 
the implementation of an institutional practice is symbolic, or decoupled, if it is not 
integrated into the management and organisation processes. 
According to Deegan (2014), social reporting becomes an element of organisational 
institutionalisation, despite the fact that there might be a decoupling between how the 
organisation projects itself in its public disclosures and the internal operational 
structures and practices within the organisation (Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2007). That is, 
what is being ‘disclosed’ by corporations may not represent actual corporate attitudes, 
actions, processes or performances about certain or particular social and environmental 
issues. Thus, the actual practices can be decoupled from the institutionalised (apparent) 
practices and CSD can be used to construct an organisational image that might be very 
different from the actual organisational social and environmental views. Hence, the 
organisational image constructed through CSD might be one of positive social and 
environmental responsibility when the actual managerial imperative is maximisation of 
profitability or shareholder value.  
The results of the first part of this study (Chapter 5) indicated that gambling 
organisations through their annual report disclosures appeared to be responding to 
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community concerns about the social issues and costs of problem gambling. The 
findings suggest, however, that an increase in CSDs is a reactive response (to 
government initiatives) by the organisations to provide more information about its 
social and environmental activities in order to maintain legitimacy rather than to 
demonstrate accountability. In Chapter 6, following a detailed analysis of annual report 
disclosures on RGHM, it was concluded that the low level of reporting was not 
reflective of an industry motivated by a genuine belief to demonstrate accountability to 
a wide range of stakeholders in relation to their RGHM activities and processes.   
The minimal annual report disclosures appeared to be aimed at generating a positive 
social image, that is, as organisations that are socially responsible and committed to 
responsible gambling and minimising social harm related to problem gambling. The 
following excerpts from Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Tabcorp) and Tatts Group Limited 
(Tatts) annual reports (reviewed in Parts 1 and 2 of this study) reflect this apparent 
projection: 
Tabcorp’s commitment to our people corporate social responsibilities continues to 
be underpinned by the company’s leadership in the responsible gambling. 
Specifically, we believe leadership is about providing the highest standards of 
customer care and assisting customers to make informed decisions about their 
participation in gambling (Tabcorp Holdings Limited, Annual Report 2006, p. 14). 
Tatts is committed to providing its services in a responsible manner and new player 
protection and harm minimisation measures continue to be implemented on a 
regular basis to help protect customers from the harmful consequences of problem 
gambling (Tatts Group Limited, Annual Report 2011, p. 10). 
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The apparent disconnect and incongruity between the minimal level of RGHM 
disclosures and the projection of a positive image to the public by gambling 
corporations suggests a possible decoupling between the organisations’ internal views 
on RGHM and their publicly disclosed view.  
This decoupling may be explained by the potential conflict between gambling 
corporations’ actions regarding RGHM and their profit objectives. RGHM measures can 
affect gambling organisations profitability and value in two broad ways: first, through 
decreasing gambling revenues by decreasing the level of problem gambling
55
 (for 
example, through RGHM measures to reduce the prevalence of problem gamblers, 
gambling revenues may subsequently decrease); and second, through the increasing cost 
of implementing an RGHM strategy (for example, RGHM measures such as pre-
commitment technologies require corporations to install and/or replace their current 
machines with new machines that had updated technology systems). As such, the 
implementation of RGHM measures is in conflict with corporations’ profit objectives. 
Various stakeholders, such as social NGOs, have questioned corporations’ efforts to 
tackle problem gambling-related social issues. A broad range of stakeholders
56
, argue 
that there is a lack of effort and commitment by gambling companies to ‘account’ for 
the actual or potential social ‘costs’ associated with their business operations, often 
because it conflicts with corporations’ own views about the imperatives of maximising 
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 According to the Productivity Commission, it is estimated that problem gamblers’ share of total 
Australian gaming machine losses are around 40 per cent. Some estimates raise the possibility that the 
share could be as high as 60 per cent or, in the most conservative case, as low as a 22 per cent. This 
means that, at a minimum, the ‘small’ group of problem gamblers currently account for $2.6 billion of 
gaming machine losses (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 16-17). Hence, reducing problem gamblers 
will decrease the returns to gambling companies. 
56
 For example, stakeholders such as Maribyrnong City Council and UnitingCare Children, Young People 
and Families (UCCTPF), both submitted public submissions to the government public inquiry into 
gambling industry 2008, that argue there is a lack of effort and commitment by gambling companies to 
‘account’ for the social consequences of their operations’ activities (Maribyrnong City Council: 
Submission no. 118; UCCTPF: Submission no. 90). 
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financial performance. Rather, the existing voluntary codes of conduct about RGHM 
measures could possibly be viewed as a strategy by gambling companies to prevent 
further intervention from government into the gambling industry (for example, 
introduction of onerous government regulations/policies regarding gambling) that might, 
in turn, have negative implications for gambling companies’ profitability.  
Given the above and the findings presented in chapter five and six, it is proposed that 
there is a potential decoupling between gambling companies’ internal position (views 
and operational activities) on RGHM and their projected public position evidenced in 
their disclosures. Should this de-coupling between the organisations’ internal position 
and their externally projected position exist, it is anticipated that, rather than 
emphasising RGHM measures to tackle problem gambling, the content of the public 
submissions made by gambling companies to the New Productivity Commission Inquiry 
into Gambling
57
 (2008), will draw attention to the importance of business profitability 
and provide arguments against further introduction and/or implementation of RGHM 
measures that will impact negatively on corporate profitability. That is, in light of the 
public inquiry, the content of submissions by gambling organisations will provide an 
insight into their internal position. Stated more formally, it is proposed that: 
P1: The submissions by gambling companies to the public inquiry will raise 
and note the importance of the maintenance of gambling profits;  
P2: The submissions by gambling companies to the public inquiry will 
provide a case against further introduction and/or implementation of 
RGHM regulatory measures.  
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 Refer to Chapter 2 for the discussion on the New Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling in 
2008. 
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While previous studies have used interviews to investigate corporations’ opinions, 
which were then linked to their CSD practices (for example, see Islam & Deegan, 2008), 
or explored corporations’ views through public inquiry submissions (Deegan & Shelly, 
2013), this study explores corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM by reviewing 
their public submissions to their RGHM disclosures. The approach to reviewing 
submissions and the rationale for using such documents as a source of evidence is 
considered in the following section. 
7.3  Research Method 
An analysis of the content of submissions by gambling companies to the 2008 – New 
Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling was chosen as the research method in 
this third part of the study as it is considered that documents submitted to the inquiry 
would, in part, be driven by the submitting party’s actual perceptions (or genuine beliefs) 
about RGHM and gambling-related issues. The background of, and rationale for using, 
public submissions is now outlined below and is followed by a description of the 
method by which the review of the submissions was undertaken.  
7.3.1  Public documents review 
The Australian Government conducted its second inquiry into the gambling industry in 
2008 – New Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling, followed by a report: 
Productivity Commission 2010, Gambling, Report No. 50, Canberra (PC2010)
58
. The 
inquiry aimed to provide policy recommendations on gambling for consideration by all 
Australian jurisdictions and to help shape government action to tackle problem 
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 For more information and a discussion on the governments’ public inquiry, please refer to Chapter 2. 
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gambling. The inquiry was to inform policy responses to minimise the prevalence of 
problem gambling in Australia (FaHCSIA, 2011)
59
. Therefore, the recommendations of 
PC2010 could potentially affect gambling companies’ operations and their profitability. 
Correspondingly, there was an expectation that the inquiry would evoke a response 
from affected organisations, particularly gambling companies, who would submit their 
views regarding RGHM and problem gambling-related social issues, in an attempt to 
prevent or impede any possible government introduction of regulations/intervention into 
the gambling industry.  
As the Government has the power to legislate on issues of RGHM, companies would be 
aware of the potential costs that might be imposed on them from such legislation. As 
such, the submissions to inquiries would probably not be the right place for the 
companies to provide views other than those which represent the primary concerns the 
organisation has about the incidence and costs of problem gambling, and the need to 
implement measures to control it. Hence, the maintained assumption for this part of the 
research is that the corporate submissions are likely to provide a more representative 
picture of managers’ views about problem gambling and associated controls than the 
disclosures that are voluntarily made within annual reports (and which by their nature 
are presumed to be made in order to pacify the concerns of various stakeholders). It is 
noted, however, that the problem of organisational (management) bias may still remain 
in formal written reports such as the submissions examined here. While not undertaken 
in this study, interviews with company management may allow further probing on 
issues or themes to investigate and/or confirm management reasoning for particular 
                                               
59
 Chris Bowen, The Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs (3 
December 2007 - 8 June 2009), 'New Productivity Commission inquiry into Gambling’, Joint Media 
release the Hon Jenny Macklin MP, Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs, 20 October 2008.  
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views or actions. Document analysis was adopted as a systematic procedure to review 
gambling company submissions to the Australian government inquiry. It offers a way to 
understand meaning and discover insights into particular research problems (Merriam, 
1988), and provides a means of triangulating data around a particular phenomenon 
which can enhance research credibility and reduce potential bias of studies which 
involve a single source of evidence and/or single method of data collection and analysis 
(Patton, 1990; Eisner, 1991; Yin, 1994). Analysis of documentation has proven to be an 
effective method of identifying key themes and motivations of organizational disclosure. 
Lodhia and Martin (2012), for example, use document analysis to examine 
organizations submissions to the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme when 
investigating disclosures in the Australian minerals industry. Pellegrino and Lodhia 
(2012) use document analysis to examine disclosure strategies of the Australian mining 
industry in response to climate change. 
Submissions made by the four gambling companies identified in part two were  
reviewed for themes around two broad propositions – that is, the importance of business 
profitability and arguments against further introduction and/or implementation of 
RGHM measures. The propositions were used as a way to guide, but not restrict, the 
initial data collection and analysis. Rather than quantifying the content of the 
submissions (for example, in terms of words around a specified category – see Chapters 
5 and 6), the analysis involved reading documents to identify passages of text oriented 
around the two propositions and to identify any particular themes which could provide 
meaningful categories to further interpret and classify the data (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006). The submissions were initially “skimmed” by the researcher which 
gave an indication of potential categories and facilitated the elimination of data that was 
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not pertinent. This was followed by a detailed reading of submissions from which a 
number of key themes emerged and around which interpretations were made and results 
were to be presented (see section 7.4). 
In reviewing submissions to the inquiry, it was discovered that only Tabcorp Holdings 
Limited (Tabcorp) and Tatts Group Limited (Tatts) had made direct submissions 
(Crown Limited and SkyCity Entertainment Group Limited did not). Nevertheless, the 
gambling industry association and council – the Australasian Casino Association (ACA) 
and the Australasian Gaming Council (AGC) made submissions to the inquiry on behalf 
of their members (including the four companies identified in part two). Based on these 
grounds, in view of the representatives of the ACA and AGC
60
, the submissions from 
these two industry associations were also reviewed to represent their members’ overall 
broad views regarding RGHM and the social issues related to problem gambling. 
Therefore, the data used in this study was obtained as a result of reading 13 submissions 
(submissions from Tabcorp, Tatts, the ACA, and the AGC)
61
 made to the government 
inquiry into the gambling industry. Again, the assumption made here is that the 
submissions are likely to provide a reliable reflection of the corporations’ views about 
problem gambling in terms of the associated costs to society and the need to put in place 
mechanisms to control them.  
                                               
60
 According to the submission made by Tabcorp, ‘Tabcorp is a member of the Australasian Gaming 
Council (AGC) and the Australasian Casino Association (ACA). Tabcorp supports the comprehensive 
submissions made by these organisations to the Productivity Commission’s inquiry’ (Submission no. 227, 
p. 2).  
61
  All the public submissions were made publicly available by the Productivity Commission on its 
website. These submissions are accessible at the Productivity Commission webpage: 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/gambling-2009/submissions. The 13 submissions comprise 3 
submissions from Tabcorp (submissions no. 227, 229 and 372), 4 submissions from Tatts (submissions 
no. 87, 104, 240 and 302), 4 submissions from ACA (submissions no. 214, 264, 365 and 416), and 2 
submissions from AGC (submissions no. 230 and 377).    
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In presenting the results of the document analysis, a range of quotes taken from the 
submissions made by the gambling companies and its industry associations will be 
provided. These quotes are considered to be reflective of the views and perceptions of 
gambling companies (or the representative body) in terms of the particular theme 
identified. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that providing extensive quotes is not favoured by all 
researchers, this part of the study considers that the provision of the quotes allows this 
study to provide a richer insight into the gambling organisations’ views and perceptions 
of RGHM and problem gambling-related social issues. Moreover, detailed quotes make 
clear the researcher’s interpretation of the data and allow for consideration of alternative 
explanations (Ferreira & Merchant, 1992; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006).  
7.4 Results and discussion 
In considering the following results and discussion, it is reiterated that submissions 
made by the gambling companies and the industry associations are assumed to be 
reflective of the gambling corporations’ genuine concerns (or lack of concern) about 
problem gambling and the needs, or otherwise, for various reforms or actions.  
Five key themes were identified from the analysis of documents submitted by the 
gambling companies or their representative body; the notion of personal responsibility 
of gamblers for their actions, the ineffectiveness of existing RGHM measures, the impact 
of potential regulations on recreational gamblers freedom and enjoyment, the impact of 
potential regulation on the economy and company viability, and the success of industry 
self-regulation. In discussing these themes reference is made to findings in parts 1 and 2 
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of this thesis (reported in Chapter 5 and 6) to indicate what are perceived to be 
inconsistencies between the annual report disclosures of the gambling companies and 
their positions on RGHM identified in their submissions.  
The first theme, a notion of ‘personal responsibility’ became apparent within 
submissions made by gambling companies. Submissions commonly reflected the view 
that Australians should have the ‘freedom of choice’ to spend their time and money as 
they please, and that problem gamblers should take ‘personal responsibility’ for their 
actions rather than depending on regulations to control their behaviour. The following 
response from Tabcorp (Submission no. 227, p.5) highlights this: 
Australians value freedom of choice in how they spend their time and money. As a 
community, we also value the desire to assist community members in trouble. 
There needs to be an emphasis on personal responsibility in dealing with matters 
such as gambling, rather than simply relying on broad regulatory measures. 
Promoting responsible gambling rather than simply addressing problematic 
gambling is an important means of achieving this balance. 
The submissions included arguments that gamblers should take personal responsibility 
in dealing with their problem gambling behaviour rather than relying on regulations 
imposed on the industry or companies (such as implementation of RGHM measures) to 
restrict their behaviour. As a consequence, gambling companies argued that RGHM 
measures aimed to control problem gamblers’ behaviours by restricting the daily 
withdrawal limit from ATMs in gaming venues (excluding casinos) to $250 should not 
be introduced. This limit, it was argued, will potentially affect the convenience of 
recreational gamblers and other users of ATMs facilities. The promotion of ‘personal 
responsibility’ within corporate submissions could be interpreted as gambling 
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corporations attempting to avoid being accountable for the social impacts of problem 
gambling. Interestingly, within annual report disclosures, there is no indication of the 
notion of personal responsibility of gamblers for their actions, but more so a stated 
corporate commitment and responsibility to protect customers from the harmful 
consequences of problem gambling, and that RGHM strategies had been integrated into 
the organisations’ business practises to tackle problem gambling. For example, the 
following disclosures were included within the annual reports of SkyCity and Tatts: 
A comprehensive Group-wide policy sets out the company’s commitment to host 
responsibility, including early intervention with customers who show signs of 
problem gambling and drinking, and training for all staff. Specific, tailored 
programmes are in place at each property (SkyCity, Annual Report 2005, p.33). 
Tattersall’s has long maintained a commitment to responsible gambling and to 
minimising harm to the small minority of people who experience problems with 
their gambling. For many years, Tattersall’s has been at the forefront of 
responsible gambling practice and has voluntarily introduced protection initiatives 
ahead of legislation and regulation (Tatts, Annual Report 2005, p. 6). 
The second and third (interrelated) themes that emerged from the analysis of 
submissions were that various RGHM measures implemented are not effective in 
minimising the prevalence of problem gambling but are more likely to impact on the 
enjoyment of recreational gamblers. The views in the submissions were that the 
implementation of various RGHM measures (recommended in various government 
initiatives over the past 15 years – see Chapter 2) should not focus mainly to tackle 
problem gamblers alone but should also consider the need for balance between problem 
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gamblers and recreational gamblers i.e. the implementation of RGHM should not reduce 
the benefits for recreational gamblers. Typical submissions included: 
We believe that although they have been aimed exclusively at the problem and ‘at 
risk’ gamblers, some of the more recent measures really do start to erode the 
entertainment and enjoyment of the responsible recreational gamblers. Measures 
such as the maximum bet limit and removal of ATMs are example that fall into this 
category (Tatts, Submission no. 104, p. 1-2). 
Research is yet to show exactly what measures restricting access to cash may be 
effective in providing balance between assistance to problem gamblers and the 
need to preserve the freedom and enjoyment of recreational gamblers (AGC, 
Submission no. 230, p. 57). 
Policy in this area should reflect an appropriate balance between the needs of both 
recreational and problem gamblers. Measures focused on removing or restricting 
access to cash in order to assist problem gamblers may not only fail to achieve their 
objective but carry an additional range of unintended consequences – including 
damage to the hospitality sector and risk to the security of consumers (AGC, 
Submission no. 230, p. 60). 
The points raised here may be interpreted as a way for the gambling organisations to 
prevent or impede any possible government introduction of regulations into the 
gambling industry which will have negative implication on their gambling businesses’ 
profitability, i.e., the rights of the recreational gambler to freedom and enjoyment 
should be recognised and given a degree of priority. Again, some inconsistency is noted 
between the submissions and disclosures in the gambling companies’ annual reports 
regarding their RGHM strategies and commitment to minimising harm associated with 
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problem gambling. For example, consider the following excerpts from the annual 
reports of Crown, Tatts and Tabcorp:   
Initiatives that support responsible gaming continue to be of paramount importance 
to Crown. The establishment by the Crown Board of a Board Committee at the 
beginning of this financial year to oversee responsible gaming is testament to the 
commitment to responsible gaming practices. Chaired by Crown Director, 
Professor John Horvath, the Responsible Gaming Committee meets regularly to 
review and monitor Crown’s responsible gaming programs, recommending policies 
and procedures to enhance the effectiveness of those programs and promote 
awareness of responsible gaming issues. Across Crown Melbourne and Burswood, 
Crown’s continued commitment to responsible gaming practices is evident, with 
increased exposure and promotion of avenues for assistance to patrons who may be 
experiencing difficulty with their gaming behaviours (Crown, Annual Report 2011, 
p.25). 
Tattersall’s is committed to minimising the harm to the small minority of people 
who experience problems with their gambling. The Have fun, but play it safe 
program aims to provide patrons with clear messages about safe gambling to 
ensure that the activity remains a fun form of recreation. Tattersall’s has continued 
to build the level of responsible gambling awareness across both our gaming and 
lotteries businesses. The guiding principles for all Tattersall’s responsible gambling 
practices are: Providing a safe gambling environment; Ensuring well-informed 
players; and providing support when required (Tatts, Annual Report 2006, p.8). 
Our leadership in the implementation of responsible gambling initiatives is an 
important area in which we demonstrate the integrity of our business approach and 
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commitment to the highest standards of customer care (Tabcorp, Annual Report 
2005, p. 10) 
While the previous three themes have what might be considered to be ‘understated’ or 
implicit links to the importance of maintaining profitability for the gambling companies, 
the fourth theme that emerged from document analysis made explicit the importance of 
industry revenues but was couched within the broader context of the importance of 
industry profit for the Australian economy and government. Here we can see a 
juxtaposition of the concerns of the gambling companies for gambling revenues and the 
‘viability’ of their business and the companies concerns and care for problem gambling 
and its related social issues and costs. The following excerpts from the submissions are 
indicative of the position of gambling companies and highlight links to the previously 
discussed themes:    
The recommendation for a $1 bet limit (or indeed any reduced bet limit) must be 
supported by a larger dataset and the impacts modeled in detail. The AGC submits 
that the impacts of this recommendation on recreational gambler (especially high 
spending recreational gamblers) and the gambling industry in general are in no 
manner trivial. Such a policy change would have major implications for consumer 
enjoyment, venue revenues and industry viability. The evidence as provided is not 
acceptable for a recommendation of national policy change (AGC, Submission no. 
377, p. 32).  
There is a risk that the contribution made by casinos to the Australian economy 
may be diminished if implementation of recommendations made by the PC reduces 
the extent of gaming activity offered by casinos. There has been insufficient time to 
carefully analyse the implications of specific recommendations made by the PC for 
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the casino industry. However, some general statements can be made, particularly 
on the importance to casinos of gaming revenues, which are required to support the 
provision of an extensive range of tourism infrastructure and non-gaming services. 
(ACA, Submission no. 365, p.37). 
It should be noted that suggestions contained in the Draft Report for play after 
limits have been reached (such as restricted play of free games offering no 
monetary prizes or 100% return to player (RTP) functionality) are not compatible 
with viable commercial business model and would therefore have impacts on both 
venue and government revenues (AGC, Submission no. 377, p.23). 
The submission excerpts reflect the gambling corporations’ views about the potential 
implementation of regulations by government. This theme concerning gambling 
companies’ profitability is consistent with the first proposition raised in this chapter that 
the submissions by gambling companies to the public inquiry will raise and note the 
importance of the maintenance of gambling profits.  
The final theme that emerges from the document analysis is that gambling companies 
are able to self-regulate and therefore there was no necessity for further government 
intervention in the industry. For example, the submission by ACA noted:  
The practical experience of the last ten years has illustrated how self-regulation can 
complement regulatory requirements. In some instances regulatory requirements 
have taken longer to implement and take effect than industry generated initiatives. 
It has been these self-regulatory responses that have played a key role in bridging a 
‘regulatory lag’ in responsible gambling policy and its further development. (ACA 
Submission no. 214, p. 3). 
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The ACA further proposed that casinos should be exempted from the recommendations 
within PC2010: 
The ACA considers that the PC’s final report should recognise the distinctive and 
destination nature of casinos, its well-developed and robust Responsible Service of 
Gambling frameworks and commitments and recommends that casinos be: allowed 
to implement voluntary pre-commitment systems in conjunction with their state 
governments and regulators; entirely exempt from the PC’s recommendations on 
access to cash and credit limits; exempt from the PC’s recommendations on 
maximum bet and cash limits; recognised for the well-developed complaints 
handling mechanisms currently in place, and be exempt from additional complaints 
handing arrangements (which are aimed more at hotels and clubs); and exempt 
from the unnecessary technological and varied complexities, burdensome and time 
consuming costs associated with mandated universal systems (ACA, Submission 
no. 365, p. 3).  
This theme is consistent with the second proposition developed in this chapter that the 
submissions by gambling companies to the public inquiry will provide a case against 
further introduction and/or implementation of RGHM regulatory measures.  
Perhaps reflective of a number of the themes discussed above are the following excerpts 
from submissions by the ACA and the AGC in expressing their views about PC2010’s 
recommendations for the introduction of RGHM measures (measures that could 
possibly reduce and minimise problem gambling-related social issues).  
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The ACG
62
 Analysis say that draft recommendations may impact on the casino 
industry by: reducing the enjoyment derived by recreational gamblers from playing 
EGMs in casinos through reducing the amount able to be set on individual plays 
thus interfering with an individual’s choice; imposing costs upon casinos 
associated with complying with new regulations; reducing casino revenues and 
thus limiting the scope for casinos to continue to provide international-class 
tourism infrastructure required by their licence conditions (ACA, Submission no. 
365, p. 2). 
The AGC suggests that the requirement for venues to pay any gambling prize 
above $250 by cheque or direct credit to a gamblers account is likely to: create 
substantial operational pressures – raising costs and wait times for consumers; 
cause inconvenience to consumers and loss of revenue to businesses as customers 
who may wish to use a portion of winnings for other recreational options, 
consumables or transport purchases may be unable to do so; and result in 
unintended consequences as problem gamblers ‘play down’ their wins even further 
to avoid cheque payment (AGC, Submission no. 377, p. 5). 
From the discussions above, it appears that gambling companies are not supportive of 
the implementation of further RGHM measures, although such measures are considered 
by the Productivity Commission to be effective in reducing the prevalence of problem 
gambling.  
The results of the document analysis suggest that gambling companies are reluctant to 
embrace further RGHM initiatives by the government. Such reluctance to regulation 
appears to be underpinned by an industry that is seeking to maintain (or grow) its 
                                               
62
 The ACA commissioned the Allen Consulting Group (ACG) to provide an analysis of parts of the draft 
report, specifically Chapters 3, 4 and 11. Therefore, the report provide by the ACG also formed part of 
the submission of ACA. 
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revenues and reduce its costs of operations. This “underlying” financial motive also 
appears inconsistent with the projected position of the gambling companies as reflected 
in their annual report RGHM disclosures.  
7.5  Conclusion 
The aim of the third part of this thesis was to identify (additional) evidence that might 
corroborate (or not) the argument that developed from part 2 of this thesis, that is, there 
is a potential decoupling between gambling companies actual position (views, practises, 
actions) in regards to RGHM and the “publicly pronounced” position (Deegan, 2014) 
reflected in the annual report disclosures. It was posited that this decoupling was linked 
to the underlying (and arguably dominant) motivation of gambling companies to 
enhance their financial positions. Submissions by gambling companies and their 
representative industry bodies to the Australian government inquiry in 2008, New 
Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling, were identified as a potentially 
relevant and reliable source of evidence that may yield insights into the “genuine” 
motivations of gambling companies regarding RGHM. Systematic and detailed analysis 
of the documents submitted by the gambling companies and their representative 
industry bodies revealed five themes which (particularly when considered overall) 
provided support for the propositions that gambling companies will raise and note the 
importance of the maintenance of gambling profits and will provide a case against the 
further introduction and/or implementation of RGHM regulatory measures.  
The review of inquiry submissions made by gambling companies provides additional 
evidence that suggests gambling revenues and viability of the industry are the focal 
interest to the managers of gambling companies. The ACA went as far as suggesting to 
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the Productivity Commission that casinos should be exempted from the RGHM 
measures recommended within its report (PC2010), given their distinctive activities 
(from other forms of gambling) and (tourist) destination .  
The findings of this part of the thesis, adds weight to the argument that there is a 
disconnection between gambling corporations public positioning (reflected in their 
disclosures) on the social costs of problem gambling and the corporations’ actual beliefs 
and activities. Within RGHM annual report disclosures of the gambling companies 
(Chapter 6) a case was made that disclosures were primarily a means of projecting an 
image of socially responsible organisations that were caring for and of the community 
and committed to minimising harm associated with problem gambling. Disclosures did 
not appear to be motivated by a broader sense of community accountability. The 
findings of this part three, which seeks to extend the study undertaken in part two by 
providing evidence from an additional source, further support the contention that 
gambling company disclosures are not so motivated by the ethical treatment of 
stakeholders (for example, in providing an account of the organisation’s social effects 
on people’s lives) (Stoney & Winstanley, 2001); but more by the desire to maintain 
profits. The results suggest that corporations appear fixated on profits and related issues 
and as such this further makes it difficult to accept that they will voluntarily embrace a 
responsibility and accountability in relation to problem gambling issues. 
As far as the researcher is aware, this study (part three) is the first to adopt documentary 
analysis in exploring the disclosures within gambling industry with a view to 
understanding the potential decoupling of gambling organisations activities from their 
projected position reflected in annual report disclosures. The findings add weight to the 
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argument that additional regulatory intervention may be necessary to minimise the 
impact of harm from problem gambling. This argument will be further considered in 
Chapter 8 when the results of the three parts of the study are considered collectively.  
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
8.1  Introduction 
This study has explored the corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSD) 
practices of organisations operating within the Australian gambling industry. The 
motivation behind undertaking the research was that the Australian gambling industry 
has a significant impact on the Australian economy and the social wellbeing of its 
population. Exploring the CSD practices of Australian gambling companies provides us 
with a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, picture to help understand the current 
disclosure practices and the motivation behind these practices, particularly in relation to 
responsible gambling and harm minimisation (RGHM).  
Part one of the study reveals that changing external pressures being exerted on gambling 
companies can ultimately lead to change in the CSD practices of two major Australian 
gambling companies, Crown Limited (Crown) and Tabcorp Holdings Limited (Tabcorp). 
The findings of part one, as outlined in Chapter 5, led to an investigation of two related 
research issues. Drawing upon ethical branch of stakeholder theory, part two (Chapter 6) 
‘drills-down’ to the detail of disclosure practices in terms of RGHM to assess the extent 
to which gambling companies publicly discharge (or do not discharge) their 
accountability to stakeholders regarding social issues associated with problem gambling. 
This part of the study investigated four major gambling companies operating within the 
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Australian gambling industry: Crown, Tabcorp, Tatts Group Limited (Tatts), and 
SkyCity Entertainment Group Limited (SkyCity). The results of part two show a low 
level of RGHM disclosures by the four gambling companies (when compared to items 
in a disclosure index developed in this part of the study); this is assumed to be reflective 
of a low level of accountability being discharged by the gambling companies. The 
results are consistent with the findings of part one – that is, CSD is not used to 
demonstrate broader (more ethically-driven) accountability to its stakeholders, but are 
more for legitimation purposes.  
Based on the findings outlined in part two (Chapter 6), part three (Chapter 7) explores 
gambling corporations’ views and perceptions of RGHM and problem gambling-related 
social issues (from the submissions made by gambling corporations to the New 
Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling in 2008) to ascertain any potential 
decoupling exists between corporations’ public positioning on issues of RGHM and 
their internal positioning on the same issues. The findings of part three reveal an 
apparent decoupling between the publicly projected views of corporations (reflected in 
their disclosures) on the social costs of problem gambling and the corporations’ actual 
beliefs. The results suggest that corporations appear fixated on profits and related issues 
and, as such, this further makes it difficult to accept that they will voluntarily embrace 
responsibility and accountability in relation to problem gambling issues. 
This chapter provides a summary of the research findings for each part of the study and 
outlines the implications of the findings. Research limitations will then be presented, 
followed by further potential directions within this area of research. 
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8.2 Research findings and implications 
Three interrelated research issues are investigated in this study. Each part of this broader 
study has particular implications within the social and environmental accounting (SEA) 
literature, as it focuses on a specific industry and social issue; that is, CSD practices of 
gambling companies and the related social costs, an area in which very limited 
information is currently available (Jones et al., 2009). More specifically, this study 
investigates the information that gambling companies are publicly providing, especially 
the extent of RGHM disclosures – an issue that is yet to be investigated from the social 
accounting perspective. As such, the study also broadens the scope of research within 
corporate social accounting literature. The main findings and implications from the 
research in each part of the study are discussed below: 
1. Part one of this study (Chapter 5) investigated the changing trends in the CSD 
practices of two major Australian gambling companies, Crown and Tabcorp,  
over a 15-year period (1995-2009). The results indicated that particular 
stakeholder groups – the ‘community’ being deemed as one of the most 
powerful – have placed pressure on the gambling industry via government 
initiatives to tackle social issues related to problem gambling since the late 
1990s. This pressure in turn drove changes to the CSD practices of the two 
respective gambling companies. With the pressures being exerted by the 
community via government, gambling companies’ levels of CSD appeared to 
increase in response. However, the study results also showed that the disclosure 
category of most apparent concern to stakeholders, responsible gambling, did 
not increase extensively compared to other categories such as human resources 
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and community involvement. The minor and predominantly positive disclosures 
on responsible gambling were evident around the time that government 
initiatives occurred; thus the minor increases were deemed to be due to external 
pressure being exerted on gambling companies, which suggests that CSD is used 
for legitimation purposes rather than for demonstrating accountability to 
stakeholders. The study results also led to questions regarding the possible need 
to regulate CSD in the gambling industry.  
The results of part one suggest that the CSD practices of gambling companies 
are indeed influenced by external pressure a finding that supports prior research 
conducted in other industries. For instance, in the study of the garment industry 
in Bangladesh, Islam and Deegan (2008) found that the CSDs of BGMEA were 
directly driven by the changing expectations of multinational buying companies, 
which, in turn, were directly related to the expectations of the community in 
which they operated. In the case of Australian gambling industry, the changing 
of CSD behaviours are similarly driven by community pressures via 
governments initiatives.  
This first part of the study is the first known study to investigate how changing 
levels of external (stakeholder) expectations influence the CSD practices of 
Australian gambling companies within annual reports over an extended period of 
analysis. It also offers an original contribution in terms of theoretical 
applications. By applying legitimacy theory, part one shows that communities 
imposed their expectations via government initiatives, which in turn influenced 
the reporting practices of gambling companies. By considering stakeholder 
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theory, this part also shows that gambling companies’ disclosure practices 
reacted to the expectations of the community – the group deemed to be the most 
powerful stakeholder. Furthermore, by also utilising institutional theory, this 
section of the broader study highlights that through various pressures to conform 
to institutional norms of disclosure, there will be similarities in the CSD patterns 
of Australian gambling companies (Crown and Tabcorp) as they react to the 
various societal pressures being exerted upon them. In this manner, a joint 
consideration of legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory is 
applicable within the context of the gambling industry, which provides gambling 
products and services that are potentially harmful to its users (Jones et al., 2009). 
2. Part two of this study (Chapter 6) adopted an ethical perspective (embodying a 
normative position) and investigated RGHM disclosure practices of four major 
gambling companies to understand the extent of accountability being discharged 
by gambling companies to their stakeholders in the area of RGHM regarding 
problem gambling social issues. The results indicated that although stakeholders 
are increasingly concerned about the social issues associated with problem 
gambling and related RGHM information, the extent of gambling companies’ 
RGHM disclosures is low. The results were supportive of a view that current 
RGHM information provided by the gambling companies reflects that 
corporations fall well short of fulfilling their accountability to stakeholders 
regarding problem gambling social issues. This is despite the fact that there is a 
belief held by many stakeholders that gambling companies should be 
accountable for the social consequences of their operations, to not only their 
shareholders but also their corporate stakeholders (including broader 
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communities and future generations) (Hancock et al., 2008). If we are to 
embrace a normative position and to accept that the disclosure index is a 
measure of the ‘accountability’ of reporting regarding RGHM measures, then it 
could be argued that the accountability of gambling companies appears not to 
have improved over time, and there is obvious room for improvement.  
The findings also suggest that because of the dynamic nature of indices (i.e. 
social expectations are not static and they may change over time) researchers are 
encouraged to constantly revisit this RGHM disclosure index. Therefore, future 
research could continue to refine this index as more issues might be relevant and 
useful for users in relation to evaluating gambling companies’ RGHM disclosure 
practices.  
With the low level of RGHM disclosure by corporations, the findings may have 
implications for regulators and standard setters in considering the need to 
regulate the social reporting of organisations operating within the gambling 
industry. The index developed in part two could provide the basis of a guide for 
a ‘best practice’ disclosure index in relation to social reporting of companies 
operating within the Australian gambling industry.  
3. While part two of the research is descriptive in nature, it builds the foundation 
for further investigation that then leads to part three of the research (Chapter 7), 
that is, to explore corporations’ views about RGHM and problem gambling 
social issues in order to ascertain whether any potential decoupling exits 
between the corporate public position on issues of RGHM and their ‘real’ (actual) 
position on the same issues. To do this, submissions made to the latest 
222 
 
Australian government public inquiry into gambling industry 2008 – New 
Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling, by the four companies 
identified in part two of the study were identified and reviewed. In total 13 
submissions (submissions made by Tabcorp, Tatts, the Australasian Casinos 
Association, and the Australasian Gaming Council)
63
 were analysed. 
The findings of part three suggest that there is a disconnection exists between 
gambling companies’ public positioning on the social costs of problem gambling 
and their actual beliefs and activities. Within the RGHM disclosures (study 
results from part two – Chapter 6), while brief, the corporations seemingly 
proclaim themselves to be socially responsible and committed to minimising 
harm associated with problem gambling harm. However, in contrast to the 
annual report RGHM disclosures, the reviews of the gambling companies’ 
submissions made to the Australian government inquiry into gambling appear to 
focus on the importance of gambling business profitability (which are required 
to support of community initiatives, local sporting events and clubs, tax 
contribution, the provision of an extensive range of tourism infrastructure and 
non-gaming services as well as employment opportunity) and argue against 
further introduction and/or implementation of RGHM regulatory measures. The 
difference in orientation between the companies’ public position and the 
companies’ actual beliefs on RGHM issues reveals an apparent decoupling 
between corporations’ public positioning on issues of RGHM and their internal 
positioning on the same issues. The results suggest that corporations appear 
                                               
63
 Refer to Chapter 7, Crown and SkyCity did not provide any submissions to the inquiry. However, ACA 
and AGC are the two industry bodies that provided submissions on behalf of its members, which include 
the four companies. Therefore, the submissions made by ACA and AGC were also reviewed.   
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fixated on profits and related issues and as such this further makes it difficult to 
accept that they will voluntarily embrace a responsibility and accountability in 
relation to problem gambling issues. This raises questions about the credibility 
of, and motivation behind, voluntarily produced CSDs of gambling companies. 
Consequently, the findings of the study provide increased justification for 
legislation to be introduced in order to create real change in the operations of 
gambling organisations and associated accountabilities, particularly as the 
Australian Productivity Commission was of the view that the voluntary code of 
practice “had minimal impact on controlling industry activity” (The ACT 
Gambling and Racing Commission, 2012, p. 25). These findings have important 
implications for Australian federal government or state-based regulation relating 
to gambling; increased RGHM regulation might be necessary for broader public 
accountability in the gambling industry and to potentially minimise the 
prevalence of problem gambling.  
The findings of the final part of the study provide further evidence to support a 
view that annual reports may not provide a ‘true’ reflection of managements’ 
beliefs about their social and environmental information. 
8.3  Research limitations 
While this study has certain implications through the research findings, there are some 
limitations that should be addressed. The following limitations to this study need to be 
noted: 
224 
 
1. Firstly, words were used as the unit of measurement in part one of the study to 
determine quantities of disclosures within and between the sample gambling 
companies. The use of words has been criticised for lacking reliability, 
providing meaningless results and excluding information such as that provided 
in images (Unerman, 2000; Milne & Adler, 1999). An important assumption 
associated with the use of content analysis, however, is that the quantity of 
disclosures represents an importance source of information for users of the issue 
being examined (Unerman, 2000; Gray et al., 1995b; Krippendorff, 1980). 
Further, measures, such as words, have been found to be highly correlated with 
other measures, such as sentences or percentage of pages dedicated to particular 
disclosures (Hackston & Milne, 1996).  
2. Secondly, the disclosure scoring system applied in part two of the study 
obviously has limitations that must be acknowledged. For example, it gives an 
item a score of 1 point if some mention is made of the particular RGHM issue 
and an additional score of 1 point for comprehensive information and/or a 
discussion on that particular RGHM issue without further considering the extent 
of how details or comprehensive of that particular RGHM issues. However, it 
can be argued that whilst subjective, the process of scoring ensures avoiding 
“irrelevant or redundant generalities” in strategies CSD (Aerts et al., 2006, p. 
312).   
3. Thirdly, in parts one and two of the study, during the coding and categorising 
process, interpretations and judgment by the researcher were required to 
categorise the data. Subjectivity was therefore unavoidable, which could lead to 
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possible bias in the results. It seems likely that the researcher’s prior expertise in 
relation to the specialised areas being investigated would be more satisfactory 
and productive than employing a research assistant to attempt a formalised 
‘categorising’. For this study, the categorising process was performed by the 
researcher herself, who was closely supervised by two experts who have long-
term local and global experience in the field of SEA. Using this research 
expertise, efforts were undertaken to ensure consistency while conducting, 
coding and categorising secondary data such as annual reports. 
4. Lastly, part three of the study explores corporations’ views and perceptions of 
RGHM and problem gambling social issues by way of analysing public inquiry 
submissions made by gambling companies to the government inquiry into 
gambling industry in 2008. The results of this part should be considered in light 
of the usual methodological limitations inherent in a document review approach, 
including limited submission numbers and parties, and the fact that it is an 
interpretive study relying on the information provided by the submitting parties. 
It is also acknowledged that it is expected that there are many other issues that 
the inquiry sought from the public that might not directly relate to RGHM 
information. Also, a central assumption was that the submissions provided an 
unbiased perspective of the ‘actual views’ of the managers. Conducting 
interviews with corporate managers to assess and probe their views on RGHM 
could potentially provide more detailed and/or confirmatory reasons and 
motivations for social disclosures. This provides an avenue for further research 
of corporate motivations for CSD.  
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8.4 Suggestions for future research 
This study widens the scope of social accounting research by focusing on a specific 
corporate social issue. In other words, it opens new research areas in the voluntary 
corporate social disclosure literature by attempting to investigate CSD, particularly 
RGHM disclosure, practices of gambling companies. The following are some examples 
of issues which are worthy of further research that stem directly from this study:  
1. The findings of part one of the broader study provided a basis for testing 
whether the impact of external pressures influence on gambling companies could 
bring any change in the CSD practices of the gambling industry. CSD research 
on gambling companies requires further investigation to determine other 
possible factors contributing to increases in corporations’ CSDs. Furthermore, 
while this broader study considers the CSD practices of gambling companies, 
governments, counsellors, academia, social NGOs, researchers and politicians 
are the major groups that have an interest in problem gambling social issues. In 
this regard, further research could also seek the views of other groups, and the 
public as a whole, to extend the applicability of findings and theories of this 
study. More useful and richer insights could be derived by undertaking 
interviews with a greater number of stakeholders such as social NGOs, religious 
organisations, counsellors and regulators with regards to their views and 
expectations of the CSD practices of gambling companies. This could possibly 
provide some useful insight into developing a ‘best practice’ guide for social 
reporting within the gambling industry.    
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2. Although part two of the study analysed the RGHM disclosure practices of four 
gambling companies, further research could utilise the RGHM disclosure index 
developed in part two to investigate a larger number of gambling companies in 
Australia and also other countries such as New Zealand, Macau, and China, in 
order to investigate whether the findings can be applied broadly to the gambling 
industry globally. Lewis and Ritchie (2003) refer to this as exploring 
representational generalisation, which asks whether what is found in the research 
sample can be generalised to the parent population that the sample is drawn from. 
Such investigation would also help to extend the robustness and applicability of 
the ‘disclosure index’, which is arguably the first index developed to-date in 
relation to RGHM disclosure practices. A survey and/or in-depth interview with 
stakeholder groups such as social organisations, religious and/or counselling 
organisations, would be helpful in gaining a greater insight into what RGHM 
information stakeholders expect and demand from gambling companies to 
disclose. This would help to develop and refine a best practice guide for RGHM 
disclosures within the gambling industry. 
3. While part three of the study explores corporations’ views of RGHM and 
problem gambling social issues, a survey and/or in-depth interviews with 
gambling companies would be helpful in gaining greater insight into their 
perceptions of RGHM and accountability issues, and to understand potential 
reasons for such low levels of RGHM disclosures, such as why they choose to 
disclose only certain RGHM information. Such research would provide insights 
into the perceived obstacles to reporting which would need to be addressed 
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before recommendations on regulation for social reporting could be made in the 
gambling industry.  
4. A further area for potential research that follows from this study is to examine 
the nature and type of submissions made to the New Productivity Commission 
Inquiry into Gambling in 2008, subsequent government reforms and the 
disclosure responses by gambling organisations and others. This would allow for 
the inclusion of all gambling providers (such as clubs and hotels) to understand 
their views about mandating specific social reporting of organisations operating 
in the gambling industry. In view of the conflicting stakeholder demands, 
government dependence on gambling revenues, implications of new and 
potential future legislations, the costs and benefits of such regulation, and the 
form and type of such disclosures would be an interesting area for research. 
Such research might also consider the ‘best’ media for gambling companies to 
fulfil their accountability in relation to corporate social responsibilities.  
This broad study demonstrates that despite 17 years of scrutiny and government 
initiatives, gambling companies’ CSD practices appear to be reactive to community 
pressure. Nevertheless, the disclosures do not disclose a great deal about some issues 
that are of stakeholders concerns (refer to the study results of part two – Chapter 6). 
CSDs, more particularly, RGHM disclosures, do not appear to be motivated by 
accountability to the broader community and stakeholder groups, but rather by profit 
and the desire to prevent government intervention into the gambling industry. The 
results reported in this study provide evidence for the need for federal government 
regulation. Alternatively, various state-based regulations relating to gambling might be 
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amended to include public disclosure requirements, particularly in relation to RGHM 
information in order to create real change in the accountability of organisations within 
the gambling industry. As such, it is hoped that this relatively descriptive and 
explanatory study, and the associated discussions, encourage other researchers to further 
consider the gambling industry as the focus for their accounting research. It is certainly 
an industry where some accountability seems necessary, and where accounting 
researchers have an important role to play.  
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Appendix A: Organisational social and environmental disclosure categories in the 
gambling industry 
 
Categories of Social and Environmental Disclosure 
 
A. Environment  
 Environmental Pollution 
 Pollution control in the conduct of the business operations;  
 Capital, operating and research and development expenditures for pollution abatement; 
 Statements indicating that the organisation’s operations are in compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations; 
 Recognition of the need to comply with society standards and regulations; 
 Statements indicating that pollution from operations has been or will be reduced; 
 Prevention or repair of damage to the environment resulting from processing or natural 
resources, e.g. land reclamation or reforestation; 
 Supporting anti-litter campaigns; 
 Receiving an award relating to the company’s environmental programmes or policies; 
 Disclosing the organisation’s involvement in the environmental related organisation 
memberships; 
 Statements supporting the environmental (or environmental friendly) attributes of the 
operations. 
 
Waste Management 
 Utilising waste materials for energy production;  
 Preventing waste; 
 Efficiently using materials resources in the manufacturing or operations process; 
 Disclosing the organisation’s waste management policies; 
 Training of employees on waste management; 
 Statement indicating the organisation company’s waste management procedures. 
 
Water 
 Conservation of water in the conduct of business operations;  
 Using water more efficiently during the conduct of business;  
 Disclosing the organisation’s efforts to reduce water consumption;  
 Research aimed at improving water efficiency of business; 
 Receiving an award relating to the organisation’s water programme or policy; 
 Disclosing the organisation’s water management policies; 
 Disclosing expenditures or purchased of new machinery related to water savings.   
 
 Recycling 
 Disclosing energy savings resulting from product recycling;  
 Conservation of natural resources, e.g. recycling glass, metals, oil, water and paper; 
 Using, or researching, recycled materials; 
 Research aimed at improving recycling or related projects or sponsorship; 
 Receiving an award or recognition relating to the organisation’s recycling programmes 
or policies; 
 Training of employees in relation to recycling;  
 Disclosing the organisation’s recycling projects or programme; 
 Disclosing organisation’s savings related to recycling;   
 Reporting purchased of new machinery related to company’s recycling activities. 
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Aesthetics 
 Designing facilities harmonious with the environment; 
 Contributions in terms of cash or art/sculptures to beautify the environment; 
 Restoring historical building/structures. 
 
Other 
 Undertaking environmental impact studies to monitor the organisation’s impact on the 
environmental; 
 Conducting reviews of performance, employing specialist consultants; independent 
auditors or verification related to environmental issues; 
 Wildlife conservation. 
 
B. Energy 
 Conservation of energy in the conduct of business operations; 
 Disclosing energy expenditures and using energy more efficiently during the 
manufacturing process; 
 Discussion the organisation’s efforts to reduce energy consumption;  
 Disclosing increased energy efficiency of products; 
 Research aimed at improving energy efficiency of products; 
 Receiving an award for an energy conservation programme; 
 Voicing the organisation’s concern about the energy shortage; 
 Disclosing the organisation’s energy policies; 
 Disclosing purchased of new machinery related to energy savings. 
 
C. Human Resources 
 Health and Safety 
 Reducing or eliminating pollutants, irritants, or hazards in the work environment; 
 Promoting employee safety and physical or mental health; 
 Disclosing accident statistics;  
 Disclosing legal non-compliances on health and safety of workers; 
 Complying with health and safety standards and regulations; 
 Receiving a safety award; 
 Establishing a safety department/committee/policy; 
 Conducting research to improve work safety; 
 Providing low cost health care for employees; 
 Compensation. Litigation or enquiries, related to safety; 
 Providing information on industrial action related to health and safety; 
 Training to employees on health and safety. 
 
Employment of Minorities or Women 
 Recruiting or employment of racial minorities and/or women; 
 Disclosing percentage or number of minority and/or women employees in the workforce 
and/or in the various managerial levels; 
 Employment of youth or local community personnel; 
 Information on apprenticeship schemes; 
 Establishing goals for minority representation in the workforce; 
 Programme for the advancement or minorities in the workforce; 
 Employment of other special interest groups, e.g. the handicapped, ex-convicts or 
former drug addicts; 
 Disclosures about internal advancement statistics; 
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 Disclosing or statement of equal opportunity, employee choice, fair treatments, and 
staff protection related issues such as bullying, harassment. 
 
Employee Training & Development  
 Training employees through in-house programmes; 
 Giving financial assistance to employees in educational institutions or continuing 
education courses; 
 Establishment of trainee centres; 
 Disclosing employee career development, career path and promotion related issues. 
 
Employee Assistance/benefits 
 Providing staff accommodation/staff home ownership schemes; 
 Providing assistance or guidance to employees who are in the process of retiring or who 
have been made redundant; 
 Providing scholarships for employees’ children; 
 Providing recreational activities/facilities; 
 Disclosing employee leaves and superannuation funds. 
 
Employee Remuneration 
 Providing amount and/or percentage figures for salaries, wages except Directors, 
executives and senior managements; 
 Disclosing workers compensation arrangements except Directors, executives and senior 
managements; 
 Any policies/objectives/reasons for the organisation’s remuneration package/schemes 
except Directors, executives and senior managements; 
 Disclosing employee share ownership plan except Directors, executives and senior 
managements. 
 
Employee Profiles 
 Providing the number of employees in the organisation and/or at each branch/subsidiary; 
 Providing the occupations/managerial levels involved; 
 Providing the disposition of staff – where the staff are stationed and the number 
involved; 
 Providing statistics on the number of staff, the length of service in the organisation and 
their age groups; 
 Providing information on the qualifications of employees recruited except Directors, 
executives and senior managements. 
 
Employee Morale 
 Providing information on the company/management’s relationships with the employees 
in an effort to improve job satisfaction and employee motivation; 
 Expressing appreciation or recognition of the employees; 
 Seeking employees’ opinions and input to planning; 
 Providing information on the stability of the workers’ jobs and the organisation’s future; 
 Providing information on the availability of a separate employee report; 
 Providing information about any awards for effective communication with employees; 
 Providing information about communication with employees on management styles and 
management programmes which may directly affect the employees; 
 Disclosing information on employees’ survey statistics or related issues; 
 Statement of supporting people or employee engagement 
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Industrial Relations 
 Reporting on the company’s relationship with the trade unions and/or workers; 
 Reporting on agreements reached for pay and other conditions. 
 Reporting on any strikes, industrial actions/activities and the resultant losses in terms of 
time and productivity; 
 Providing information on how industrial action was reduced / negotiated. 
 
Other  
 Information on the re-organisation of the organisation/discussions/branches which affect 
the staff in any way; 
 The closing down of any part of the organisation, the resultant redundancies created, 
and any relocation/retraining efforts made by the organisation to retain staff; 
 Reporting industrial action associated with a reduction in employees; 
 Information and statistics on employee retention and/or employee turnover; 
 Reporting or disclosing company receiving industry recognition/ industry awards. 
 
D. Product and Safety 
 Product Development  
 Information on developments related to the products, including its packaging, e.g. 
making containers reusable;  
 The amount/percentage figures of research and development expenditure and/or its 
benefits; 
 Disclosing information or introduction new machines and/or new services; 
 Information on research projects or related issues that improve organisation’s products 
or services. 
 
Product Safety 
 Disclosing that products meet applicable safety standards; 
 Making products safer for consumers; 
 Conducting safety research on products; 
 Disclosing improved or more sanitary procedures in the Processing and preparation of 
products; 
 Disclosing legal non-compliances on health and safety of customer; 
 Information on the safety of the product and/or disclosing products information. 
 
Product Quality 
 Information on the quality of the products as reflected in prizes/awards received; 
 Verifiable information that the quality of the product has increased. 
 
E. Community Involvement  
 Donation and Community Support 
 Donations of cash, or facilities or products or employee services to support establish 
community activities, events, organisations and the arts; 
 Other special community related activities, e.g. providing civic amenities, supporting 
town planning; 
 Supporting national pride/government sponsored campaigns; 
 Recognising local and indigenous communities; 
 Providing aid or compensation to communities around their operations; 
 Supporting the development or local industries or community programmes and 
activities; 
 Disclosing employees’ involvement in the fund raising activities or events; 
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 Disclosing the organisation’s involvement and/or sponsorship in the fund raising events 
or activities;  
 Statements related to the amount raised from fund raising activities or events; 
 Disclosing organisation’s contributions or community funds and amounts.  
 
Supporting Health Projects 
 Donations of cash or employee services to support health related projects or 
programmes; 
 Sponsoring public health projects or activities or events; 
 Providing funding and aiding for medical research; 
 Disclosing employees’ involvement to support health projects or activities or events. 
 
Supporting Education Projects 
 Sponsoring educational conferences, seminars or art exhibits; 
 Donations of cash to educational institutions;  
 Funding scholarship programmes or activities or educational funding related issues; 
 Statement related to involvement in education related issues. 
 
Supporting Sports Projects 
 Sponsoring sports events or activities; 
 Sponsoring national or international sports/games events; 
 Disclosing employees’ involvement to support sports/games events or programmes. 
 
F. Others 
General issues 
 Corporate objectives/policies: general disclosure of corporate objectives/policies 
relating to the social responsibility of the company to the various segments of society; 
 Disclosing corporate governance practices and/or related to business sustainability; 
 Disclosing/reporting to groups in society other than shareholders and employees, e.g. 
consumers any other information that relates to the social responsibility of the company; 
 Statement of being socially responsible in relation to conducting business and/or 
corporate citizenship; 
 
Customer focus 
 Statements related to improving of customer satisfaction, customer service, customer 
loyalty, customer centric, and customer focus; 
 Research and/or survey on customer related issues. 
 
G. Responsible Gambling 
Public awareness 
 Disclosing the organisation’s approaches or initiatives or development of programmes 
related to harm minimisation related issues or strategies; 
 Disclosing employees’ training related to problem gambling and harm minimisation;  
 Disclosing the organisation’s code of conducts or amendment to the code of conducts 
related to harm minimisation or responsible gambling related information;  
 Reporting sustainability information or awards or certifications awarded related to 
harm minimisation; 
 Disclosing counselling or related services available to problem gamblers; 
 Statement of supporting harm minimisation and/or responsibility gambling; 
 Statement of responsible gambling or commitment in responsible gambling; 
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 Statement indicating leadership in responsible gambling or recognition in responsible 
gambling; 
 Disclosing employment of managers, officers and staff for the responsible gambling 
purposes;  
 Statement indicating establishment of responsible gambling committee 
 Donation of cash or sponsorship to the gambling or problem gambling educational 
related research, programmes, events or activities; 
 Sponsoring gambling related educational awareness activities, campaign and events 
 
Responsible environment 
 Disclosing information about the organisation’s collaborations with gambling related 
associations or organisations or government regulatory authority in developing codes 
of conduct and/or practice; 
 Statements indicating the organisation’s membership of  gambling associations or 
organisations in developing codes of conduct and/or practice;   
 Disclosing employees’ involvement or contribution to the gambling related associations 
or organisation in developing codes of conduct and/or practice.   
 Disclosures relating to initiatives undertaken by the organisation to foster an 
environment to reduce the potential harm caused by problem gambling (for example, 
providing gamblers with personal reports about their gambling expenditure, instituting 
self-exclusion programs, reducing hours of operation, increased use of natural lighting 
and visible clocks, introduction of pre-commitment strategies, and limited acceptance of 
gamblers’ cheques). 
 
Support services 
 Disclosing the organisation and employees’ involvement with stakeholders in relation 
to gambling related events, support services or activities; 
 Statement indicating support and assistance for stakeholder engagement programmes 
or activities for intervention and support services; 
 Reporting information or statistics on stakeholder engagement activities. 
 
 
Adapted from Hackston and Milne (1996), and Deegan et al. (2002) with changes in italic (only 
individual items) 
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Appendix B: Responsible gambling and harm minimisation (RGHM) disclosure index 
A. Public Awareness   
1. A statement regarding the company’s participation in public awareness of problem 
gambling activities.  
 + 1 point if there is a mention of activities participated in such as gambling awareness week 
and media campaigns to promote public awareness of problem gambling. 
2. A statement regarding the company’s problem gambling information materials.  
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure on types of materials available (such as pamphlets and 
posters) and/or different languages of information available. 
3. A statement regarding the company’s recognition of problem gambling incidences. 
 + 1 point if there is a disclosure on data and a record of problem gambling incidences. 
4. A statement concerning the company-appointed gambling contact officer in venue. 
 + 1 point if there is a disclosure of information related to the gambling contact officer such 
as responsibilities, location and contact details. 
5. A statement regarding the company’s staff training regarding responsible gambling.  
 + 1 point if there is a disclosure about the number of staff who have done the responsible 
gambling program. 
6. A statement concerning the company’s employment of licensed gambling staff.  
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure of corporate assurance that all gambling staff are licensed 
or number of staff licensed.  
7. A statement concerning the company’s display of problem gambling-related information.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention or disclosure on player information displayed such as rules 
of games, warning on potential risks of problem gambling, responsible gambling so players 
are able to make informed decisions about participating in gambling. 
8. A statement of the company fostering responsible gambling or minimising problem 
gambling.  
 + 1 point if there is a mention of the company’s commitment to minimise problem 
gambling, availability of responsible gambling codes of practices. 
 
B. Responsible Environment    
9. A statement regarding the company’s provisions for exclusion/self exclusion programs.  
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure of the number of people registered for the exclusion/self 
exclusion program.   
10. A statement of the company’s display of clocks within gambling areas.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of corporate compliance with guidelines or policies of clocks 
to be displayed and/or disclosure of the locations of clocks. 
11. A statement concerning the company’s compliance with limitations on 24-hour gambling 
(except casinos).  
 + 1 point if there is a mention or disclosure of operation hours and/or hours break. 
12. A statement of the company providing adequate or natural lighting.  
 + 1 point if there is a mention or disclosure of proper or natural lighting areas or 
guidelines/principles of proper lighting are being followed. 
13. A statement concerning the company’s compliance with advertising restrictions.  
 + 1 point if there is a mention of the company following advertising guidelines/principles 
and or disclosures of advertising guidelines/principles that are being followed. 
14. A statement of the company’s restrictions on player loyalty systems/programs.  
 + 1 point if there is a mention on the use of player loyalty system/programs; not a rewards 
program to promote gambling but to provide player activity statements to enable informed 
decisions or assess risks of problem gambling.     
15. A statement regarding the company ban on smoking in gambling areas.  
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 + 1 point if there is a mention of the company policy and effort to ban smoking in gambling 
areas and/or disclosure of penalties for smoking in restriction areas. 
16. A statement of the company’s restrictions of prize, promotion and inducement products in 
gaming areas.  
 + 1 point if there is a mention of prize restrictions, no offer of free credits to players, no 
free or discounted alcohol, no service of alcohol to those who appear to be intoxicated. 
17. A statement regarding the company’s restrictions on entry, minors and penalties.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company’s assurance and efforts of restrictions on 
entry and penalties and/or disclosure of penalties involved. 
18. A statement regarding the company ban on credit gambling.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of company commitment and effort to ban credit gambling; 
includes cash advance from credit card through Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) facilities 
and cashing of cheques.   
19. A statement of the company’s restricted access to ATMs and Electronic Funds Transfer at 
Point of Sale (EFTPOS). 
 + 1 point if there is a mention of ATM locations and/or ATM withdrawal limits. 
20. A statement regarding the company’s practice on winnings to be paid by cheques.  
 + 1 point if there is a mention of the company policy on winnings payment by cheque 
and/or disclosure of minimum winnings amount to be paid by cheque or maximum cash 
payout. 
21. A statement of the company’s position on pre-commitment, cashless or card-based system.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of corporate support or implementation of a pre-commitment 
system for loss limit on cashless or card-based programs/policy.     
 
C. Support Service     
22. A statement of the company providing or supporting problem gambling assistance and/or 
counselling services.  
 + 1 point if there is a mention of counselling services available such as on-site problem 
gambling assistance or referral, face-to-face counselling, financial counselling, online 
counselling, gambling websites, or gambling hotlines and/or disclosure on number of 
referrals. 
23. A statement of the company involvement in gambling committees or collaboration with 
government agencies, community and stakeholders.   
 + 1 point if there is a mention of the company supporting gambling committee/s and/or 
disclosure of such memberships. 
24. A statement of the company’s funds contribution to the Community Support Funds for 
community and/or problem gambling services and assistance, treatment of problem 
gambling, and/or community compliance with regulation and/or policy.   
 +1 point if there is a disclosure of the amount of company funds used to support 
community services, problem gambling assistance, treatment of problem gambling, 
problem gambling counselling.   
 
D. Structural Machine Design    
25. A statement of the company’s gaming machine operation and performance.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the number of gaming machines operating within the 
company and/or revenue performance contributions to company. 
26. A statement regarding the company’s display rate of loss or bet and win limits information.  
+ 1 point if there is a mention of the company policy on rate of loss, and/or disclosure on 
amount of loss limits, bet and win limits.   
27. A statement of the company’s limits on frequency of games and/or lines/ways.  
+ 1 point if there is a disclosure on limitations of frequency of games (such as spin rate) 
and/or lines/ways (such as line per button push).   
28. A statement of the company’s display of odds and/or returns to player information.  
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+1 point if there is a disclosure of display of odds and/or minimum returns to player 
information. 
29. A statement regarding the company’s restrictions or limitations on note acceptors.  
 + 1 point if there is a disclosure on amount of notes banned or limits. 
30. A statement regarding the company’s machine linked jackpots relevant information.  
+ 1 point if there a mention of machine linked jackpots approval or disclosure of machine 
linked jackpots related policy or number of machines linked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
